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Operation Tomodachi Lessons Learned

Operation Tomodachi Lessons Learned. Bob Stephenson Technical Director Fleet Readiness Directorate U.S. Navy Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command Deputy J6/Science Advisor Joint Support Force Operation Tomodachi. Operation Tomodachi.

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Operation Tomodachi Lessons Learned

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  1. Operation TomodachiLessons Learned Bob Stephenson Technical Director Fleet Readiness Directorate U.S. Navy Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command Deputy J6/Science Advisor Joint Support Force Operation Tomodachi UNCLASSIFIED

  2. Operation Tomodachi • U.S. Military support to Japan after Great Eastern Japan Earthquake • Combined effects of earthquake , tsunami, and radiological accident • 125,000 people homeless, 21,000 dead or missing • Tidal wave caused power outage at FunukoshiDaichi Nuclear Plant • -3 reactors with partial meltdown of the core • 3 reactors with spent fuel pools damaged • Reactor fission products (Iodine, Cesium, stronium, cobalt) released into the air and sea resulting in 30 KM “hot zone around the plant • Lethal radiation levels inside the reactor buildings • J pipe, hose spools, etc.

  3. Challenges • Assist to JSDF to • Locate survivors/remains • Assess damage • Assist in cleanup/restoral of ports and airports • Monitor reactors and measure radiation levels • Radiological consequence management

  4. Things that helped us succeed • Pre-existing Infrastructure to support large influx of personnel • Strong US-Japan alliance with robust CENTRIXS network • Communicators from all four services with a knowledge of each services unique capabilities and talent to make rapid changes in a hurry • Local DAA allowing rapid and flexible network changes

  5. Things that helped us succeed • Development of an Information SOP early in the operation that facilitated information sharing • On call mobile communications assets we could modify to meet our requirements • Ability to locally develop an application for a common operational picture to permit informed decision making by senior leadership UNCLASSIFIED

  6. Radiological COP • Needed to show laydown of US and JSDF forces • Needed to show location of air and water radiation plumes • Needed to show HA/DR info (roads, shelters, major damage • Need to show radiation sensors (US and JMSDF)

  7. Solution • Based on CENTRIXS Google earth server on GCCS-J at JSDF HQ Ichigaya • Wrote tools to data mine sensor and other source data. Applications written, tested and employed by an O-1, and E-3 and a contractor (Fleet Systems Engineer) • RADIANT Mercury repaired. New rule set to trasfer .KML files from unclas to to CENTRIXS J.

  8. Result

  9. Things to improve in the Future • Enterprise networks cannot support crisis • No process exists for rapid changes to support Commanders urgent needs • In a crisis, you don’t drive the timeline • Complexity and size of the enterprise does not support rapid injection of new capabilities • Enterprise does not support coalition data sharing • Mission secret networks are a must, but they must have common tools with the Enterprise, and they must be able to communicate to and from the enterprise. • A Common Operational Picture is critical, but it must be more than GCCS • Geospatial Information Services are a powerful data fusion tool • Crisis requires quick response • Must be able to rapidly add seats to existing networks • Must be able to bring in new capabilities to meet operational requirements • Must be able to do this without having to contract (fee for service does not work in a crisis) • Standard IM/KM practices are essential as a starting point. • Current IA policy and practice supports neither network security, or rapid technology insertion • Need data services to the tactical edge. • Need web services that will work to low bandwidth, high latency, disconnected user (i.e. ships) • Need to balance access to a wide range of users, with security

  10. QUESTIONS?

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