美學、道德與政治 以康德的 《 判斷力批判 》 為線索

1. 美學、道德與政治以康德的《判斷力批判》為線索美學、道德與政治以康德的《判斷力批判》為線索 吳豐維 2013.4.26

2. 演講內容 • 康德為什麼寫三大批判？《判斷力批判》在康德批判哲學的地位是什麼？其結構與內容為何？什麼是審美判斷？什麼是美與壯美？想像力在美學中的獨特地位是什麼？美學與道德、政治的關係是什麼？

3. 康德的批判哲學 • 純粹理性批判(Critique of Pure Reason, 1781, 1787) • 實踐理性批判(Critique of Practical Reason, 1788) • 判斷力批判(Critique of the Power of Judgment, 1790)

4. 感性 Sensibility 知性 Understanding 理性 Reason

5. 《判斷力批判》的背景(1) • “The Germans are the only ones who now employ the word ‘aesthetics’ to designate that which others call the critique of taste. The ground for this is a failed hope, held by the excellent analyst Baumgarten, of bringing the critical estimation of the beautiful under principles of reason, and elevating its rule to a science. But this effort is futile.” (純粹理性批判, A21/B35)

6. 《判斷力批判》的背景(2) • 《純粹理性批判》中的想像力(imagination) • “[I]magination is the faculty for representing an object even without its presence…the imagination is to this extent a faculty for determining the sensibility a priori, and its synthesis of intuitions, in accordance with the categories…which is an effect of the understanding on sensibility…” (B152)

7. 《判斷力批判》的背景(3) • 《判斷力批判》中的想像力 • “[T]he freedom of the imagination consists precisely in the fact that it schematizes without a concept, the judgment of taste must rest on a mere sensation of the reciprocally animating imagination in its freedom and the understanding with its lawfulness…” (5:287)

8. 《判斷力批判》的背景(4) • 《判斷力批判》中反思判斷的出現 • “The power of judgment in general is the faculty for thinking of the particular as contained under the universal. If the universal (the rule, the principle, the law) is given, then the power of judgment, which subsumes the particular under it…is determining. If, however, only the particular is given, for which the universal is to be found, then the power of judgment is merely reflecting.” (5:179)

9. 《判斷力批判》的背景(5) • 《判斷力批判》要嫁接自然與自由的鴻溝 • “Now although there is an incalculable gulf fixed between the domain of the concept of nature, as the sensible, and the domain of the concept of freedom, as the supersensible, so that from the former to the latter (thus by means of the theoretical use of reason) no transition is possible…”(5:175-6)

10. 《判斷力批判》的結構 第一部：審美判斷力批判 第一章：美的分析論(Analytic of the Beautiful) 第二章：壯美的分析論(Analytic of the Sublime) 第二部：目的論判斷力批判

11. 審美判斷:第一環節 • First moment (quality): “Taste is the faculty for judging an object or a kind of representation through a satisfaction or dissatisfaction without any interest(不帶任何利益). The object of such a satisfaction is called beautiful.” (5: 211)

12. 審美判斷:第二環節 • Second Moment (quantity): “That is beautiful which pleases universally without a concept(美的事物是不帶概念而普遍地使人愉悅).” (5: 219)

13. 審美判斷的第三個環節 • Beauty is the form of the purposiveness of a object, insofar as it is perceived in it without representation of an end. (5:235) • 一個對象之所以引起我們美的感受，是因為它的合目的性的形式，而不是它表象了一個客觀的目的。

14. 審美判斷的第四環節 • 第四環節是有關於判斷的模態(modality)，康德分三種判斷的模態：或然、實然與必然。康德認為審美判斷是一種必然判斷。 • “That is beautiful which is cognized without a concept as the object of a necessary satisfaction.”(5:240)

16. 杜象(Marcel Duchamp, 1887-1968)

17. 畢卡索的哭泣的女人

18. Subjective Universality (1) • “Now an objectively universally valid judgment is also always subjectively so, i.e., if the judgment is valid for everything that is contained under a given concept then it is also valid for everyone who represents an object through this concept. But from a subjectively universal validity(主觀而普遍的效力), i.e., from aesthetic universal validity, which does not rest on any concept, there can not be any inference at all to logical universal validity; because the first kind of judgment does not pertain to the object at all.” (5: 215)

19. Subjective Universality (2) • “For that very reason, however, the aesthetic universality that is ascribed to a judgment must also be of a special kind, since the predicate of beauty is not connected with the concept of the object considered in its entire logical sphere, and yet it extends it over the whole sphere of those who judge(鑑賞的人).” (5: 215)

20. Universal Voice(普遍的見解) • “Now here it can be seen that in the judgment of taste nothing is postulated except such a universal voice with regard to satisfaction without the mediation of concepts, hence the possibility of an aesthetic judgment that could at the same time be considered valid for everyone….The universal voice is thus only an idea(普遍的見解只是一種理念).” (5: 216)

21. Pleasure and Judging: A Puzzle • “Whether in the judgment of taste the feeling of pleasure precedes the judging of the object or the latter precedes the former?” (5: 216) • 愉悅先，還是美的判斷先？

22. State of Mind(心靈的狀態) • “Thus it is the universal capacity for the communication of the state of mind in the given representation which, as the subjective condition of the judgment of taste, must serve as its ground and have the pleasure in the object as a consequence. Nothing, however, can be universally communicated except cognition and representation so far as it belongs to cognition.” (5: 217)

23. Free Play (1) • 自由的互動/自由的遊戲 • “The powers of cognition that are set into play by this representation are hereby in a free play, since no determinate concept restricts them to a particular rule of cognition.” (5: 217)

24. Free Play (2) • “Now there belongs to a representation by which an object is given, in order for there to be cognition of it in general, imagination(想像力/構想力) for the composition of the manifold of intuition(雜多的直觀) and understanding (知性)for the unity of the concept that unifies the representations. This state of a free play of the faculties of cognition….is the only kind of representation that is valid for everyone.” (5: 217)

25. 美與壯美的差別(1) • The beautiful in nature concerns the form of the object, which consists in limitation; the sublime, by contrast, is to be found in a formless object insofar as limitlessness is represented in it…[deleted]…so that the beautiful seems to be taken as the presentation of an indeterminate concept of the understanding, but the sublime as that of a similar concept of reason. (5:244)

26. 美與壯美的差別(2) • [I]n the former (the beautiful) directly brings with it a feeling of the promotion of life, and hence is compatible with charms and an imagination at play, while the latter (the feeling of the sublime) is a pleasure that arises only indirectly, being generated, namely, by the feeling of a momentary inhibition of the vital power…[deleted]…the satisfaction in the sublime does not so much contain positive pleasure as it does admiration or respect, i.e., it deserves to be called negative pleasure. (5:245)

27. 美與壯美的差別(3) • [T]he feeling of the sublime, may to be sure appear in its form to be contrapurposive for our powerof judgment, unsuitable for our faculty of presentation, and as it were doing violence to our imagination, but is nevertheless judged all the more sublime for that. (5:245)

28. 壯美判斷的四個環節 • For as a judgment of the aesthetic reflecting power of judgment, the satisfaction in the sublime, just like that in the beautiful, must be represented as universally valid in its quantity, as without interest in its quality, as subjective purposiveness in its relation, and the latter, as far as its modality is concerned, as necessary. (5:247)

29. 壯美的區分:數與力 • But one division is necessary in the analysis of the sublime which that of the beautiful did not require, namely that into the mathematically and the dynamically sublime. (5:247)

30. 數(學)的壯美 • We call sublime that which is absolutely great. However, to be great and to be a magnitude are quite different concepts. Likewise, simply to say that something is great is also something entirely different from saying that it is absolutely great. The latter is that which is great beyond all comparison. (5:248)

31. 數的絕對大與敬重 • If…we say of an object absolutely that it is great, this is not a mathematically determining judgment but a mere judgment of reflection about its representation, which is subjectively purposive for a certain use of our cognitive powers in the estimation of magnitude, and in that case we always combine a kind of respect with the representation, just as we combine contempt with that which we call absolutely small. (5:249)

32. 壯美的絕對大 • That is sublime in comparison with which everything else is small. (5:250)

33. 壯美超越感官的所有尺度 • Thus we can also add this to the foregoing formulation of the explanation of the sublime: That is sublime which even to be able to think of demonstrates a faculty of the mind that surpasses every measure of the senses. (5:250)

34. 聖彼得大教堂

36. 敬重 • The feeling of the inadequacy of our capacity for the attainment of an idea that is a law for us is respect. (5:257)

37. 壯美的不快與愉悅 • The feeling of the sublime is thus a feeling of displeasure from the inadequacy of the imagination in the aesthetic estimation of magnitude for the estimation by means of reason, and a pleasure that is thereby aroused at the same time from the correspondence of this very judgment of the inadequacy of the greatest sensible faculty in comparison with ideas of reason, insofar as striving for them is nevertheless a law for us. (5:257)

38. 美與壯美:靜與動之別 • The mind feels itself moved in the representation of the sublime in nature, while in the aesthetic judgment on the beautiful in nature it is in calm contemplation. (5:258)

39. 美來自和諧，壯美來自衝突 • For just as imagination and understanding produce subjective purposiveness of the powers of the mind in the judging of the beautiful through their unison, so do imagination and reason produce subjective purposiveness through their conflict…(5:258)

40. 力(學)的壯美 • Power is a capacity that is superior to great obstacles. The same thing is called dominion if it is also superior to the resistance of something that itself possesses power. Nature considered in aesthetic judgment as a power that has no dominion over us is dynamically sublime. (5:260)

41. 力的壯美與畏懼 • However, that which we strive o resist is an evil, and, if we find our capacity to be of no match for it, an object of fear. Thus, for the aesthetic power of judgment nature can count as a power, thus as dynamically sublime, only insofar as it is considered an object of fear. (5:260)

42. 無害怕情緒的畏懼 • We can, however, consider an object as fearful without being afraid of it. (5:260)

43. 害怕之人無法鑑賞自然 • Someone who is afraid can no more judge about the sublime in nature than someone who is in the grip of inclination and appetite can judge about the beautiful. (5:261)

44. 狀美帶來力量 • In this way, in our aesthetic judgment nature is judged as sublime not insofar as it arouses fear, but rather because it calls forth our power (which is not part of nature) to regard those things about which we are concerned (goods, health and life) as trivial…[deleted]…in which the mind can make palpable to itself the sublimity of its own vocation even over nature. (5:262)

45. 文化與壯美 • In fact, without the development of moral ideas, that which we, prepared by culture, call sublime will appear merely repellent to the unrefined person. (5:265)

46. 沒品味與無感覺 • For just as we reproach someone who is indifferent in judging an object in nature that we find beautiful with lack of taste, so we say of someone who remains unmoved by that which we judge to be sublime that he has no feeling. (5:265)

47. Aesthetics and morality(1) • [T]he both, united in the same subject, are purposive in relation to the moral feeling. The beautiful prepares us to love something, even nature, without interest; the sublime, to esteem it, even contrary to our (sensible) interest. (5:267)

48. Aesthetics and morality(2) • The pleasure in the sublime in nature, as a pleasure of contemplation involving subtle reasoning, also lays claim to universal participation, yet already presupposes another feeling, namely that of its supersensible vocation, which, not matter how obscure it might be, has a moral foundation. (5:292)

49. Aesthetics and morality(3) • No I say that the beautiful is the symbol of the morally good, and also that only in this respect…does it please with a claim to the assent of everyone else, in which the mind is at the same time aware of a certain ennoblement and elevation above the mere receptivity for a pleasure from sensible impressions, and also esteems the value of others in accordance with a similar maxim of their power of judgment. (5:292)

50. Sublime and Nazi