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Get Britain Working: Employment Support Reform Eamonn Davern Head Jobcentre Plus International Relations Gdansk January 25 th 2012. The problem. most who come onto benefit leave quickly – over half within 3 months… …but some get stuck and need more support to avoid long term unemployment
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Get Britain Working: Employment Support ReformEamonn DavernHead Jobcentre Plus International RelationsGdansk January 25th 2012
The problem • most who come onto benefit leave quickly – over half within 3 months… • …but some get stuck and need more support to avoid long term unemployment • Proposition… • it costs a lot to keep people on benefit – could we spend some of that to help people back to work?
The Work Programme Biggest of its kind the UK has ever seen For those at risk of long term unemployment 2.4 million expected referrals Replacing much of the complex range of poor value existing provision Flexibility, results focus, partnership working
How will the Work Programme be better? • Longer to work with customers • Black box (but transparent, with safeguards) • Integrated – All JSA and ESA customers can access • More sophisticated payment model
Payment model *Incentive payments
£15,000 £9,600 £14,000 £13,000 £12,000 Sustainment payments £11,000 £10,000 £9,000 £8,000 Job outcome £5,000 £5,000 £7,000 £4,700 payment £6,000 £5,000 £2,800 £2,300 £2,200 £4,000 Attachment £3,000 fee £2,000 £1,200 £1,200 £1,200 £3,500 £1,200 £1,200 £1,000 £1,000 £0 £400 £400 £400 £400 £400 £600 £600 4. JSA 5. ESA 6. ESA Flow 7. ESA Ex-IB 3. JSA Ex-IB 1. JSA 18-24 2. JSA 25+ seriously volunteers disadvantaged Differential pricing: Maximum payments
Avoid paying for ‘do nothing’ outcomes • Some would find jobs without help • Will only pay for a job outcome for the unemployed after 6 months in work • Providers have to beat ‘do nothing’ outcomes to keep contracts
10. Paying for results out of benefit savings Cohort of customers on benefit 100% 90% Saving from normal off-flow without intervention 80% 70% 60% 50% Additional saving from Work Programme 40% 30% 20% 10% Remaining cost of paying benefits 0% 0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 Months
Prime providers • At least 2 per contract package area • Will compete for market share • 7 year contract – long term relationships • Greatest ever freedom and financial incentives to succeed
In conclusion • Real innovation • Powerful incentive to help people into work • With other welfare reforms real chance of success