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The U.S. in Vietnam

The U.S. in Vietnam. Part II. William C. Westmoreland Maxwell Taylor. U.S. troops in Vietnam. 1964, year end: 24,000 1965, year end: 184,000 1966, year end: 385,000 1967, year end: 490,000 Total troop strength will exceed 500,000 in 1968. Aspects of the build-up.

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The U.S. in Vietnam

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  1. The U.S. in Vietnam Part II

  2. William C. Westmoreland • Maxwell Taylor

  3. U.S. troops in Vietnam • 1964, year end: 24,000 • 1965, year end: 184,000 • 1966, year end: 385,000 • 1967, year end: 490,000 • Total troop strength will exceed 500,000 in 1968.

  4. Aspects of the build-up • LBJ: did not call out the reserves or the National Guard. • Army had to rely upon volunteers and draftees to meet personnel needs. • Field forces in Vietnam: about half volunteer, half drafted. • Manpower issues complicated by one-year tours of duty • Issues of class and race?

  5. Limiting the War: 1965-68 • Army: not allowed to attack NVA bases on Cambodia, Laos, or north of DMZ. • Air Force/Navy: Target and engagement restrictions placed on Rolling Thunder. • LBJ – does not impose any economic constraints.

  6. Regions: • Northern provinces • Central highlights & coast • Northwest of Saigon • Mekong River delta

  7. U.S. strategy: 1965-68 • U.S. combat forces given primary responsibility for locating & eliminating large NVA/VC units. • GVN + various U.S. civil and military agencies pursue pacification effort. • Air Force & Navy maintain bombing of North Vietnam (Rolling Thunder).

  8. Westmoreland’s plan • First defend South Vietnam, defeat Communist offensives, secure bases for additional troops. • Then launch offensives to destroy enemy units. • Ultimately hoped to attack Communist sanctuaries, shift effort of U.S. troops to pacification.

  9. U.S. combat operations • Unpopulated areas: “Search & destroy” operations relied upon helicopter mobility and superior artillery and air support. • Populated areas: U.S. troops employed patrols and helped provide security for roads and villages.

  10. Air Support • Helicopter gunships • Air Force/Marine sorties with high explosives or napalm. • Operation ARC LIGHT

  11. Ia Drang, November 1965 • First large engagement between U.S and NVA troops. • 7th Cavalry prevails, but takes high casualties. • Demonstrates effectiveness of: • U.S. air support • NVA/VC close infantry tactics.

  12. Pacification • Marines: pursue “combined action program.” • Elsewhere MACV relies upon GVN efforts. • U.S. assistance complicated by bureaucratic confusion. • 1967: U.S. aid efforts centralized under the Office of Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS). • Launched OPERATION Phoenix to eliminate, capture, or co-opt VC cadres.

  13. Restrictions on Rolling Thunder

  14. Problems bombing the DRV • Objectives. • Effectiveness? • Subsistence–level economy. • DRV has manpower to operate air defenses and repair bombing damage. • DRV able to maintain flow of supplies and men to support operations in the South. • Cost? • 900 aircraft and >1,000 crewman lost Rolling Thunder to 1968. • $10 of expense to inflict $1 damage?

  15. Assessment of U.S. efforts 1965-67:Positives • South Vietnam defended (still exists). • More stable GVN: • Nguyen Van Thieu and Nguyen Cao Ky come to power in 1965. • NVA on defensive. • VC insurgency checked.

  16. Assessment of U.S. efforts 1965-67:Negatives • NVA able to raise troop levels, resulting in escalating U.S. forces. • Pacification: • Ties of rural population to GVN still tenuous. • VC organization still functioning. • Large displacement of rural population.

  17. Communists develop a plan:“General Offensive – General Uprising” • NVA to first launch attacks in central highlands & near DMZ area to draw off U.S. reserve troops. • VC cadres to infiltrate towns and cities & capture GVN/ARVN installations, which would precipitate a general revolt. • U.S. posts to be assaulted to sow confusion, & for psychological effect. • NVA units to reinforce VC forces & “liberated” citizens in urban areas.

  18. The Siege of Khe Sanh • Isolated U.S. base near DMZ surrounded. • NVA attacks began January 21, 1968. • Lasted 77 days

  19. The Tet Offensive • Began January 30, 1968. • Violence erupts in more than 200 villages, towns & cities. • About 80,000 Communist troops participated.

  20. Tet: Communist military defeat • No urban uprisings occurred. • U.S. and ARVN troops prevailed in urban battles. • NVA reinforcements checked by air strikes and counterattacks. • Of 80,000 men, Communists lost half (including numerous VC cadres).

  21. Tet: Communist political victory • Tet destroyed LBJ’s will to continue the conflict. • Also shocked in the U.S. public, greatly expanded popular disaffection with the war.

  22. The U.S. domestic scene • Growing anti-war movement. • Sympathetic coverage by news media. • How mainstream?

  23. LBJ after Tet • Sends another 20,000 troops to Vietnam, but rejects Westmoreland’s request for 206,000. • Authorized a limited call-up of reserves. • Announced on March 31, 1968: • Would stop Rolling Thunder • Would seek talks to end the war (no preconditions). • Would not seek re-election.

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