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GridCC Security Infrastructure. Sakis Moralis < amoral@netmode.ntua.gr > IASA & NTUA Network Management & Optimal Design Laboratory – NETMODE December 15, 2005. GridCC Specific Characteristics. Near real time control of (virtual) instruments Responsive control
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GridCC Security Infrastructure Sakis Moralis <amoral@netmode.ntua.gr> IASA & NTUA Network Management & Optimal Design Laboratory – NETMODE December 15, 2005
GridCC Specific Characteristics • Near real time control of (virtual) instruments • Responsive control • Control of instrumentation within a Grid environment • Quality of service requirements for all components of the GridCC Grid • Automated problem solving within a Grid environment • Human interaction with Grids through the Virtual Control Room • Enactment of complex workflows. • Based on Web Services Technologies
GridCC Core Use Cases • Control and monitor of a High-Energy Physics (HEP) experiment • very high number of instruments • a large number of concurrent “users” (sometimes in the form of automatic monitoring tasks) • a high-rate of incoming data • Far Remote Operation of an Accelerator • large numbers of instruments (mainly sensors) • requirements on the reaction times to alarms • human-machine interface • error-handling • PowerGrid
Other GridCC Use Cases • Control of a Distributed Intrusion Detection System (IDS) • Meteorology (Forecasting) • Geo-Hazard predictions • Device Farm • Neuro data analysis
AAI Guidlines • Single sign on. An authenticated user should be able to authenticate once (per user session) and access many resources. • Encrypted Authentication, using X.509 Certificates. In this way the existing CAs, employed by other grid projects will be utilized. A user should have one Certificate in order to access different Grid infrastructures • Message authentication and integrity. These should be mandatory while encrypted communication could be optional depending on each use case • Access control. Only authorized resources should be used, as long as they are available • Auditing of control messages and the user who sent them • Must pose minimum weight on the responsiveness of a control session
GridCC Architectural Choices • X.509 Certificates for initial authentication (using PKINIT) • Kerberos for Authentication to the end-systems • Authorization is based on the subgroup of a user • Mapping of a identity • user/subgroup@VO -> principal/instance@REALM • Access Rules (default deny policy) • Operation, PortType, Service Endpoint Url, Kerberos Instance
Performance improvements Over PKI • Session Key distribution is performed using Kerberos tickets (improve performance by avoiding SSL Handshake) • Service Providers (e.g. IE) do not keep/check remote user’s credentials for Authentication (accept if the ticket is valid) • Authorization is performed through the Access Control Manager (ACM) rule based system. The use of groups allows fewer rules. • Finer control of a session characteristics • Encrypt the whole message with the session key • Sign the message with the session key (timestamp included)