Case Study:Rwanda

1. Case Study:Rwanda Lina Saraie Baan Ali Tiyanyu Wang (River) Peter Brüesch

2. Outline • Historical background • Key events • Action taken by the UN • Failures of the international community • The situation today • Conclusion

4. Hutu Tutsi • Farmers • Majority in Rwanda (~85%) • Cattle herders • Minority (~15%) • Traditional political and economic elite Peaceful coexistence: • Intermarriage • Same language • No racial conflicts Hutu and Tutsi – an overview

5. Colonization Colonial rule by Belgium after WWI → Construction of racial identities: • Tutsi: “civilized“ (originally not from Rwanda) • Hutu: inferior race → • Privileging the Tutsi as the ruling group • Support to the Tutsi monarchy

6. The Hutu Rebellion • Rebellion against the Tutsi monarchy in 1959 →Withdrawal of Belgium forces in 1961 → Overthrow of the Tutsi monarchy • Independence in 1962 under Hutu control • Failed Tutsi counterrevolution in 1963 →Hutu reprisal: “the most horrible and systematic human massacre we have had occassion to witness since the extermination of the Jews by the Nazis“ (Russell in Wheeler p. 210)

7. Military coup 1972 military coup by General Juvenal Habyarimana • Northern based Hutus claim power • More Tutsi-friendly Hutus in the south lose on influence • Doctrine of Hutu superiority • Establishing of the MNRD

8. RPF Rwandan Patriotic Front MNRD Mouvement National pour la Revolution et le Developpement Governing party Many Hutu extremists Fear of the Tutsi and fear to share power Control over military • Exile Tutsis who fled to Uganda after 1959 • Supported by Uganda • Militarized Opposing parties

9. The Civil War • RPF‘s Invasion into Rwanda in 1990 • Repelled by Rwandan, Belgium, French and Zaïran forces • Ended in a „stale-mate“ civil war • President Habyarimana • Faced international pressure to democratize (economic aid condition) • Faced domestic pressure due to war with RPF • Transitional Government from June 1991 • Three new key political parties emerged • Targets a sharing agreement with RPF

10. Peace Negotiations • Starting in June 1992 • Habyarimana reluctant and fearful for his own position However: • International pressure from US, France & Belgium • Mediation efforts from the OAU and UN → Arusha Peace Agreement

11. Arusha Peace Agreement • Peace agreement between MNRD and RPF in Arusha (Tanzania) in August 1993 • Cease fire and formal end of civil war • Right to return granted to Rwandan refugees • Equal representation in the government of RPF and MNRD • New composition of the army: roughly 50:50 between RPF and MNRD → supposed to be a „textbook success of preventative diplomacy and conflict management“

12. The Problems with Arusha • The implementation of the peace agreement depended on the extremists within Habyarimana‘s clique compromising with the RPF → CDR was founded and set into practice by these extremists • By agreeing to the Arusha accords Habyarimana signed his own „death warrant“

13. The Introduction of organizations UN = United Nations UNAMIR = United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (by Resolution 872) DPKO = UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations RPF = Rwandan Patriotic Front

14. The Introduction of organizations CDR = Defense de la Republique ( anti Tutsis organization, which started the genocide) RTLMC = Radio Television Libre Mille Collines ( basically a radio station borcasted message for killing Tutsis)

15. Key Events

16. Before the genocide • 1. RPF’s invasion (1990) and Arusha Peace Agreement (1993)

17. 2. CDR’s found and the “Final Solution” • It was found by anti Tutsis extremists during 1992, and it organized the genocide • Four key elements 1.President’s own family and trusted advisers 2.Rural organizers (maker of the target list) 3.The armed militias (youth wings, envy Tutsis) 4. The presidential Guard

18. 3. The set up of RTLMC • Radio Television Libre Mille Collines was set up during 1993 by people from Habyarimana’s circle • Broadcasted message of hate to Tutis

19. 4. Resolution 872 & 909 by UN • Resolution 872. Oct.5 1993, the found of the UNAMIR “ To monitor the implementation of the ceasefire and the movement to a transitional government” • Resolution 909 Apr. 5 1994. withdrawal of UNAMIR “UN would pull out in 6 weeks unless the transitional government was created”

20. 5. President Habyarimana’ plane crash • The plane was shot down on Apr. 6.1994 still remain unclear who response for it • The start point of the genocide

21. The start of the genocide • 6.After the plane crashed, the genocide began. Soon RTLMC started to broadcast messages to kill Tutsis

22. 7. Dead of Belgium soldiers • CDR killed the the Hutu’s Prime Minister and 10 Belgium soldiers • It made Belgians withdraw from Rwanda

23. The End of the genocide • 8. RPF’s invasion RPF invaded Rwanda in July and Hutu government made a peace agreement with RPF The symbol of the end of the genocide

24. USA’s Movement • 1. the failure in Somalia deeply affected US’s decision, and it affected the UN’s whole decision • 2. “Continuing support for the force would depend upon progress in implementing the peace agreement and keeping costs under control”

25. French’s movement • In fact French had a close relationship with the Habyarimana’s government • help training the Presidential Guard • Only rescue Western nationls after the genocide broke out

26. Failure of International society to protect Rwandans Civilians. ( The Withdrawal) The UNIMAR forces was ruined because of the withdrawal of : Belgium the murder of 10 Belgium peacemakers on 7th April. they were concerned of the safety of their soldiers. Bangladesh they had 900 soldiers, they also were concerned about the safety of their soldiers.

27. The Secretary General Proposal After he received a report from Dallaire on 10th April asking for reinforcements, the secretary general set out three alternative of UNAMIR: • Massive deployment of troops. • Scale down UNAMIR forces to a force size of around 270. • Complete withdrawal of UNAMIR. the secretary general concluded his report by stating that it is to parties to Arusha agreement who must “bear the responsibility” for the current situation.

28. Alternative constrictions for the killing, which the general should have been aware • Dallaire's report there were no mention for Dallaire`s report, stating that a genocide were taking a place and that UNAMIR camps had become a safe havens for Rwandan civilians and requesting reinforcement to protect human rights. • US-based human Rights Watch stated that as many as 100,000 people might have been killed during the previous two weeks. ButrusButrusGhali ignored those alternatives and stated that his options are the only available action can be taken.

29. The Non-permanent Members’ Reactions: • They relied on the secretariat for their information • they were in no position to challenge the Secretary-General interpretation of the situation.

30. How did the non-permanent members legitimate their decision? France, Britain and especially USA had the military capabilities to respond to Dallaire`s request for reinforcements to protect human rights. BUT they did not take an action to help them. They could legitimate their decision not to intervene and stop the massacres by naming of the violence as a “civil war” not a “ genocide” !

31. Reasons of choosing the 2nd option of Secretary General • Britain advocated the secretary general 2nd option of withdrawing the UNAMIR whilst leaving a small group behind to try and negotiate a ceasefire. • The terrible situations that the peacemakers were facing in Rwanda, Baril stated that there ‘was no a military commander in the world who would leave an army in such a way... They were “exhausted, confused and questioning the responsibility of their superiors” and constantly in fear’.

32. After applying the resolution 912 of reducing UNAMIR to 270 As soon as the bulk of UNAMIR left Kigali, many of civilians being protected by them (UNAMIR) were KILLED!!!

33. More Justifications & More Alternative Solutions • Justifications : *any more peacekeeping fatalities would mean more criticism and fewer resources for the UNAMIR * No state in the security council was prepared to risk its soldiers to save Rwandans civilians * The Secretariat and Security Council had a moral responsibility to protect UNAMIR soldiers • Solution: *This agonizing moral choice could have been a voided by a change of mandate and the deployment of an effective fighting force. * Informing the UN members of Dallair`s request for reinforcements would have undermined the argument that there were no alternative but to withdraw the force or massively reinforce it.

34. The Situation Today • Rwanda has shown tremendous economic growth in the past 17 years. • The tourism industry in Rwanda is growing. • Rwanda has improved their healthcare fundamentals such as AIDS and family healthcare. • Education is improving.

35. Rwanda’s GDP Growth

36. The Situation Today • However, poverty affects 40 percent of the population. • Overpopulation is becoming a problem in Rwanda. • The aftermath of the genocide haunts the country in forms of orphaned children and emotional trauma.

37. The Situation Today • Paul Kagame is the president of Rwanda. • He has been in control of Rwanda since his rebel army (Rwandan Patriotic Front) ended the genocide. • After the genocide, it is said that two million Hutus fled to DR Congo. • The relationship between Hutsu and Tutsi is not peaceful.

38. Wheeler’s Framework and Criteria for Humanitarian Intervention UNAMIR ○ ○ × ×

39. Wheeler’s Framework and Criteria for Humanitarian Intervention UNAMIR ○ △ ○ ×

40. Wheeler’s Framework and Criteria for Humanitarian Intervention Operation Turquoise △ △ × ×/△

41. Wheeler’s Framework and Criteria for Humanitarian Intervention Operation Turquoise ×/△ ○ ○ ×

42. The End Thank you for listening!!