170 likes | 321 Views
Can the strict search-and-isolate strategy for controlling the spread of highly-resistant bacteria be mitigated?. G Birgand a , I Lolom a , E Ruppe b , L Armand-Lefèvre b , S Belorgey a , A Andremont b , JC Lucet a
E N D
Can the strict search-and-isolate strategy for controlling the spread of highly-resistant bacteria be mitigated? G Birgand a, I Lolom a, E Ruppe b, L Armand-Lefèvre b, S Belorgey a, A Andremont b , JC Lucet a aInfection control unit, Bichat-Claude Bernard Hospital, Paris, France bBacteriology laboratory, Bichat-Claude Bernard Hospital, Paris, France ICPIC Geneva 2013
IntroductionEpidemiological Context in France GRE CPE E.Faecium VR EARSS 2011 Kp Carba-R EARSS 2011 2 ICPIC Geneva 2013
Introduction French National Recommandations, 2006-2010 Patients detected colonised with GRE or CPE: Single room + contact precautions for case patients along their entire hospital stay Single room + contact precautions for contact patients, until three negative weekly rectal screening (D0, D7, D15) Screening of contact patients already transferred, alert at readmission Cohorting of cases and contact patients in 2 different dedicated areas with dedicated staff 24/7 Interruption of transfers of carriers and contact patients +interruption of new admissions, pending results of screening 3 ICPIC Geneva 2013
Introduction Potential consequences Medical impact: Unintended deleterious adverse effects for patients ? Disruption for the ward Loss of chance for patient due to inappropriate care Economical impact: Lost income due to interruption of transfers and admissions Cost of lab techniques and contact precautions Cost of additional staff for cohorting 4 ICPIC Geneva 2013
Objectives • To describe the episodes of HRB during a 4-year period in a 1000-bed University Hospital • To describe adapted control measures according to the epidemiological risk analysis
MethodsDescription of the Episodes 30 episodes from January 2009 to December 2012: • 14 Glycopeptide-resistant Enterococcus faecium (GRE) • 10 vanA • 4 vanB • 18 Carbapenemase-producing enterobacteriacae (CPE) • 13 OXA-48 producers • 4 KPC • 2 E. coli NDM-1
MethodsEpidemiological Risk Analysis • Ward associated factors: • Workload • Previous experience of the ward with HRBs • Ward organisation and management • Compliance with hand hygiene: Alcoholic handrub consumption • Geographical distribution of the ward • Number of contact patients • Cross disciplinary factors: • Expertise and impact of the Infection control team • Reactivity of the bacteriology lab • Expertise of the lab to identify HRB (PCR, enrichment) • Involvement and support of the hospital administration http://www.sf2h.net/
MethodsEpidemiological Risk Analysis http://www.sf2h.net/ • Factors associated toexposure: • Time from admission to HRB identification • Factors associated theamount of HRB: • Type of positive sample: infection > colonisation • Positive screening : direct plating or after enrichment • Antibiotic treatment bacterial burden • Factors associated with workload: • Nurse-to-patient ratio • Dependence in nursing care of case patients • Presence of invasive devices
ResultsControl Strategy 1 - No “contact” patients 2 - Colonised patients: Contact precautions Cross sectional weekly screening Patients known as colonised at admission N= 11 (5 GRE, 7 CPE) 3 Episodes with secondary cases 1 episodes with 2 late 2ndary cases (D32) 2 episodes with 1 late 2ndary case (D18, D 53) Colonised patients Dedicated area 1/2 Dedicated staff 1/ 2 Reinforced staff 2/2 Interruption of transfers & admissions 2/2 Colonised patients Reinforced staff Interruption of transfers & admissions
ResultsControl Strategy Identification >48h after admission N = 19 (9 GRE, 11 CPE) « Contact » patients Contact precautions (n= 19) Weekly screening (n= 19) Colonised patients Contact precautions (n= 19) Interruption of transfers and admissions (n= 10) Reinforced staff (n= 10) 5 Episodes with 14 secondary cases 5 GRE (D3) ; 4 GRE (D5) ; 2 GRE (D3) ; 2 GRE (D34) ; 1 CPE (D3) « Contact » patients Dedicated area (n= 3/5) Dedicated staff (n= 2/5) Weekly screening (n= 5/5) Colonised patients Dedicated area (n= 3/5) Dedicated staff (n= 3/5) Additional interruption of transfers and admissions (4/5)
Discussion • French national guidelines are costly and difficult to implement • Local experience suggests the possibility to adapt control measures according to the epidemiological risk • However … several prerequisites: • Involvement of the infection control team • Frequent presence of the ICT in the affected ward • Education of nursing staff day/night • Alert system for colonised and contact patients (admission and transfer) • Involvement of the bacteriology lab • Involvement of the hospital administration
Which lessons from epidemic situations? Delay in the identification of HRB Higher risk of GRE transmission than CPE Prolonged length of stay with staffweariness Obstacles: Difficulties to transfer colonised patients to downstream units (very high LOS) More flexible national recommendations coming soon (September 2013) Discussion - Conclusion