Defending Human Rights

1. Defending Human Rights Spring 2013

2. Most eminent theorist of “dignity” in Western tradition: Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) UDHR not committed to this way of thinking about dignity Dignity

3. The passengers and crew members who are exposed to such a mission are in a desperate situation. They can no longer influence the circumstances of their lives independently from others in a self-determined manner. This makes them objects not only of the perpetrators of the crime. Also the state which in such a situation resorts to the measure provided by § 14.3 of the Aviation Security Act treats them as mere objects of its rescue operation for the protection of others. Such a treatment ignores the status of the persons affected as subjects endowed with dignity and inalienable rights. By their killing being used as a means to save others, they are treated as objects and at the same time deprived of their rights; with their lives being disposed of unilaterally by the state, the persons on board the aircraft, who, as victims, are themselves in need of protection, are denied the value which is due to a human being for his or her own sake. In addition, this happens under circumstances in which it cannot be expected that at the moment in which a decision concerning an operation pursuant to § 14.3 of the Aviation Security Act is taken, there is always a complete picture of the factual situation and that the factual situation can always be assessed correctly then.

4. Under the applicability of Article 1.1 of the Basic Law (guarantee of human dignity) it is absolutely inconceivable to intentionally kill persons who are in such a helpless situation on the basis of a statutory authorisation. The assumption that someone boarding an aircraft as a crew member or as a passenger will presumably consent to its being shot down, and thus in his or her own killing, in the case of the aircraft becoming involved in an aerial incident is an unrealistic fiction.. Also the assessment that the persons affected are doomed anyway cannot remove from the killing of innocent people in the situation described its nature of an infringement of these people’s right to dignity. Human life and human dignity enjoy the same constitutional protection regardless of the duration of the physical existence of the individual human being. The opinion, which has been advanced on some occasions, that the persons who are held on board have become part of a weapon and must bear being treated as such, expresses in a virtually undisguised manner that the victims of such an incident are no longer perceived as human beings.

5. Kantian Legacy: German Basic Law • Article 1, paragraph 1: “Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority." • mentioned before right to life • Compare: “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. — That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed…”

6. Unconstitutional on grounds of dignity • life imprisonment without parole • law to shoot down airliners if used as weapons • first law legalizing abortion in 1975: court held embryos had dignity • early-term abortions still illegal, state declines to prosecute

7. Dignity: can’t give it away • peep shows once ruled to violate dignity of performer, regardless of her attitude • revised, but shows where performer cannot see viewers remain outlawed

8. See, e.g., also South Africa • Section 10 of constitution: • ”Everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and protected.“

9. exploring limitations of reason Reason goes astray thinking knowledge is something to be found “out there” reason imposes structures -- presupposed for reason to have any sort of experiences and to produce any sort of knowledge we experience world the way we do because reason imposes structures Kant’s “critical” philosophy

10. Good news, bad news reason not equipped to assess questions pertaining to God, freedom, and immortality – humility understanding human beings as beings with reason becomes central as theoretical reason faces limitations that come from within, so practical reason does too – will lead to “dignity” No other sources of value than humanity

11. Kant’s view of human agency: the will • Will = capacity to act on the representation of laws (G 4:412), that is on principles • principles = representations of laws = laws I made the guideline of my action • being a rational agent is to see one’s inclinations as possible grounds for action and to decide whether to adopt them as principles/maxims • willing differs from desiring, by involving the determination to act in pursuit of something

12. Categorical Imperative • Imperatives = objective principles = principle that constrain the will “as such,” will of each rational being • hypothetical imperatives presuppose an end and recommend action in its pursuit: “need to do X IF you want Y” • categorical imperative constrains will not relative to any end, but unconditionally

13. Categorical Imperative: a moral notion • Given centrality of reason, this is what morality is “all about” • CI is something whose worth we recognize by reason from within ourselves, and we recognize that worth as greater than the worth of any object of inclination • CI = practical law = imperative of morality = supreme moral principle

14. One formulation of the Categorical Imperative • “Act so that you use humanity in your person, as well as in the person of every other, always at the same time as end, never merely as a means (G 4:429) • how does Kant derive that? Why does this constrain any act of willing, simply because it is an act of willing?

15. The paragraph leading up to that statement “If then there is to be a supreme principle and, with respect to the human will, a categorical imperative, it must be one such that, from the representation of what is necessarily an end for everyone because it is an end in itself, it constitutes an objective principle of the will and thus can serve as a universal practical law.” • Merely restating what a categorical imperative is

16. Then: “The ground of this principle is: rational nature exists as an end in itself. The human will necessarily represents his own existence in this way; so far it is thus a subjective principle of human actions.” • Subjective: referring to the given person • end in itself: end whose worth is unconditional and independent of desire • Why does the human will necessarily think of its rational nature as an end in itself?

17. Point seems to be this: • Being a rational will means setting ends (goals) • by setting any end for itself, rational will thinks of something else (that end) as having value • For the will to adopt an inclination as a principle, for it to be motivated, it must endorse the end • rational will thus must think of itself as conferring value

18. Cont. • have reason to regard ends we set for ourselves as good, as having value, only to the extent that we esteem our capacity to set ends as something good • by assuming anything matters to us as an end, we must assume we matter in virtue of being able to set ends

19. Then: “But every other rational being also represents his existence in this way consequent on just the same rational ground that also holds for me;” • if you view yourself as having a value-conferring status in virtue of your power of rational choice, understand that anyone who has that power must have this same view of herself

20. Then: • “thus it is at the same time an objective principle from which, as a supreme practical ground, it must be possible to derive all laws of the will.” • What is it? • “rational nature exists as an end in itself”

21. Kant takes this to imply: • “Act so that you use humanity in your person, as well as in the person of every other, always at the same time as end, never merely as a means (G 4: 429) • Why does this follow?

22. Suppose I am treating somebody merely as a means • Then I am treating somebody merely as a means who must see himself as source of value • But capacity in virtue of which he must do so is the same capacity that I have • But disregarding that capacity the way I do here means to disregard a capacity that I must value

23. each rational nature must be taken seriously as end in itself – source of value • Moral law is one we put in place ourselves and obey (autonomy) • rational nature, ability to set an end, is our humanity -- humanity is our being human, not “humankind”

24. Key point By treating somebody merely as a means, I disregard capacity to value Which is a capacity I have myself Therefore I would disregard myself But as agent I am committed to valuing myself

25. Examples • duty not to commit suicide, not to lie, not to let one’s talent’s rust, to help others • masturbation -- using one’s own person only for the satisfaction of a desire • Self-esteem is crucial • drunkenness, snobbery, servility, excessive humility • to others: beneficence, being grateful as appropriate, refrain from excessive pride, gossip, mockery

26. How would this ground rights? • Reason falls into a contradiction with itself if it does not take seriously the implications of the fact that others are endowed with reason too • Protection owed to others is captured in terms of rights

27. What is dignity? • “Dignity” characterizes the kind of worth rational beings have in virtue of the following properties: • They set goals – choose principles of action. • This choosing, as an act of a rational being, is subject to the Categorical Imperative. • Thereby, rational beings are source of all other value: no other unconditional source of value.

28. To sum up • dignity is absolute worth grounded in the rational capacities for morality • not conditional on how well capacities are exercised • Not diminished through vice or bad action, nor increased through virtue or morally correct action

29. Cont. • wrongdoing may call for punishment (also death!), may be grounds for forfeiting some rights, but wrongdoer are not worthless • Respect need not be earned • morally worst have same dignity as morally best, although the former fail to live up to their dignity