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BANGLADESH FLOODS – 2004

BANGLADESH FLOODS – 2004. Situation Overview. A Rolling Emergency. Main wave of monsoon flooding, started 8 July  early, destroying some of the Aus rice crop Followed earlier floods in Haor Areas in April that destroyed 80% of Boro rice crop

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BANGLADESH FLOODS – 2004

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  1. BANGLADESH FLOODS – 2004 Situation Overview DER Briefing, 19 Sep 04

  2. A Rolling Emergency • Main wave of monsoon flooding, started 8 July  early, destroying some of the Aus rice crop • Followed earlier floods in Haor Areas in April that destroyed 80% of Boro rice crop • Jamuna (Brahmaputra Basin in spate at same time as Surma/Meghna Rivers • Highest floods for many years (since 98 & 88) – overtopping many embankments, etc. • Long duration (3 weeks) & rising more than once • Slow recession across country, especially in the centre, where standing water then STAGNATED…

  3. DER Briefing, 19 Sep 04

  4. DER Briefing, 19 Sep 04

  5. DER Briefing, 19 Sep 04

  6. Losses (Govt figures, 16 Aug 04) DER Briefing, 19 Sep 04

  7. Losses (Govt figures, 16 Aug 04) DER Briefing, 19 Sep 04

  8. CURRENT RIVER FLOOD SITUATION DER Briefing, 19 Sep 04

  9. Current rainfall: in some areas 200-300% above normal 5 DAY FORECAST DER Briefing, 19 Sep 04

  10. Worst Case Flood Scenario: Brahmaputra / Jamuna & Ganges / Padma in spate at same time, bringing Meghna Basin into flood. DER Briefing, 19 Sep 04

  11. Assessments Conducted • A number of individual agency assessments, but focussing on that agencies’ specific geographical or sectoral areas and information needs • DER Sub-group Quick Assessment, 23-27 Jul 04 • 31 districts in 6 geographical zones – to district level • Convened key agencies in each district and had them consolidate their info to achieve consensus on impact • Use of short (4 page) RENA format for reporting • Centre for Policy Dialogue assessment, Aug 04 • DER Post-Flood Needs Assessment, 5-14 Sep 04 • Others ? DER Briefing, 19 Sep 04

  12. VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS MAPPING DER Briefing, 19 Sep 04

  13. Vulnerability Analysis (1) • Percentage of upazila flooded > 0.5 metre on 3 dates (19th July, 24th July & 3rd August): • If 60-100% of area flooded = Extremely Severe • If 30-60% of area flooded = Very Severe • If 15-30% of area flooded = Severe • If <15% of area flooded = Moderately Severe DER Briefing, 19 Sep 04

  14. DER Briefing, 19 Sep 04

  15. Vulnerability Analysis (2) • Existing Poverty Incidence – based on the percentage of the population in severe poverty (i.e. living on <1800 Kcal /day): • If 37-55% = Extremely Poor Upazila • If 31-37% = Very Poor Upazila • If 25-31% = Poor Upazila • If 0-25% = Moderately Poor Upazila DER Briefing, 19 Sep 04

  16. DER Briefing, 19 Sep 04

  17. Combine the two data-sets… DER Briefing, 19 Sep 04

  18. Vulnerability Analysis (4) • 72 of affected upazila in Priority ONE (High Need) • 65 of affected upazila in Priority TWO (Moderate Need) • 175 of affected upazila in Priority THREE (Lower Need) DER Briefing, 19 Sep 04

  19. DER Briefing, 19 Sep 04

  20. DER Post-Flood Needs Assessment, 5-14 Sep 04 • Objectives: (1) Identify the short, medium and longer term NEEDS of the poor (2) Obtain detailed information on the NEEDS in each sector (3) Report accurate, independently verified information • 27 districts in 8 zones – down to upazila level • 8 field teams with 80 members from 16 agencies • Investigating needs in 3-6 affected upazila per district, through focus group discussions, key informant interviews, and document review • To submit comprehensive (14 page) reports on each district and affected upazila, by sector • Still ongoing – aiming for final report on 22 Sep 05

  21. DER Briefing, 19 Sep 04

  22. About the Assessment • Weaknesses: (1) Timeframe for such an in-depth assessment was inadequate (2) Where all the right questions asked for by each Sector Group ? (3) Questionnaire should have been “field-tested” beforehand: • Some questions too non-specific, others repetitive • Repetitive questions made the interviews & FGDs too long Others ? • Strengths: (1) Coverage of the country and affected areas – WIDE (2) Investigation down to upazila and community level – DEEP (3) Coverage of sectors – COMPREHENSIVE (4) Independent multi-agency approach / scope for team initiative Others ?

  23. Impact (1) • Findings of the DER Quick Assessment are valid • In health, nutrition and wat/san sectors it is hard to distinguish acute from chronic needs (the indictors are already so low & the services so poor), e.g. • 20-25% are chronically food insecure  malnourished, yet there is no proper national programme • <40% of Bangladeshis have any form of sanitary latrine • Arsenic contamination vs. unsafe surface water sources • Preventable illnesses & health problems abound • Health centres are under-staffed, funded, & equipped • Diarrhoea, dysentery, ARI & skin/eye infections increased (x 6) post-flood, but seem under control

  24. Impact (2) • The economic impact of the flood is severe – on SME and on rural & urban livelihoods • In the absence of agricultural work & day-labour opportunities, unemployment is very high • The poor have got poorer & further into debt (@ 120 % interest pa !) • Loss of crops, livestock feed & fisheries was high • Seeds are available but not always affordable • There is widespread infrastructure damage – mainly to roads, bridges, culverts & embankments • River erosion is a severe & continuous problem

  25. Preliminary Conclusions (1) • Govt response was fair, under the circumstances • Shelters, ambulances & rescue boats are lacking • The relief effort so far, has been provided very widely but not deeply – the poorest affected families need more & for much longer • Farmers faced a serious seed shortage – the Govt is addressing this quickly & effectively • Even so, impact on agriculture will last >1 year • Most areas will need food aid until the aman rice harvest (Dec 04), some until the boro (May 05) • Infrastructure/school damage could be addressed through FFW & CFW, to provide employment

  26. Preliminary Conclusions (2) • People are not hopeless – they survived the floods & are helping themselves, but they lack options • The poorest are living on relief; they need help not to slip further into poverty  employment and credit at reasonable rates  support to cottage industries / small farmers  subsidised education / exemption from exam fees • Assistance is needed (but yet to be provided) to help poor families repair/rebuild their homes  raised concrete plinths will reduce vulnerability • Assistance is needed for restocking, reconstruction & repair of public infrastructure (health centres, schools-cum-shelters) & to be more flood resilient

  27. The Future • Bangladesh is still not equipped to deal with such major floods which are a regular occurrence • Govt immediate response capacity is lacking • No rescue boats • Too few suitable flood shelters • No emergency funding for quick response • Mitigation of future floods and river erosion • Use of vegetation to protect earth embankments • Properly engineered / surfaced river embankments • Creation of new canals & culverts (must be kept clear) • Regular dredging of the rivers • Integrated management of the great South Asia rivers

  28. “We know what to do; but we are just not doing it.” A District Deputy Commissioner – Bangladesh DER Briefing, 19 Sep 04

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