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Learn about access matrices, access control lists, protection rings, security classes, and access control policies in network security authorization.
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COEN 350: Network Security Authorization
Fundamental Mechanisms:Access Matrix • Subjects • Objects (Subjects can be objects, too.) • Access Rights • Example: • OS • Subjects = Processes • Objects = System Resources • Access Rights: read, write, execute
Fundamental Mechanisms:Access Matrix • Example: • DBMS • Subjects = Users • Objects = Relations • Access Rights: retrieve, update, insert, delete
Fundamental Mechanisms:Access Matrix • Access Matrix: • Row for each object • Column for each subject • Entry is a set of access rights. • Later Security Models: • Allow for administrative operations that change the access matrix. • Example: Owner of file can give permissions to others.
Fundamental Mechanisms:Access Matrix • Access Control Lists • ACL for each object. • Lists all the subjects and their rights. • Capabilities • Capability list for each subject. • Contains all the objects and the rights of the subject.
Fundamental Mechanisms:Access Matrix • Authorization Relation • Database table with fields owner, access mode, object. Subject Access Mode Object Bob Owner File 1 Bob Read File 1 Bob Write File 1 Alice Read File 1 Alice Owner File 2 Alice Read File 2 Alice Write File 2 Bob Read File 2 Bob Write File 2
Fundamental Mechanisms:Intermediate Controls • Access matrix too storage intensive • Access matrices make it hard to change policies. • Mechanism 1: Groups • Ideally, all access privileges mediated through group membership. • Negative permissions implement exceptions
Fundamental Mechanisms:Intermediate Control • Protection Rings • Example: • Group processes and system resources into four categories • Operating System Kernel • Operating System • Utilities • User Processes • Access to an object is only granted to a subject of lower level. • Unix only has two levels. • Sometimes protection rings have hardware support.
Fundamental Mechanisms:Security Classes • Each object has a Security class (Security Label) • Denning: • Information Control Policy consists of • Security Classes • “Can flow” relationship • Join operation • Join A B combines rights and restrictions of both. • US DoD Security Levels • Top Secret • Secret • Confidential • Unclassified
Fundamental MechanismsAccess Control Policies • Discretionary Access Control (DAC) • Specifies authorization solely based on object and subject identity. • Flexible and simple. • Difficult to control information flow. • (Classical) Mandatory Access Control (MAC) • Each user and object has a security level. • Security level reflects trust that user will not pass information to users with lower level clearance. • Access to an object based on security level.
Fundamental MechanismsAccess Control Policies • (Refined) Mandatory Access Control (MAC) • Security Levels and Compartments. • Example: • CRYPTO for cryptographic algorithms. • COMSEC for communication security. • Possible to have top secret clearance in CRYPTO and unclassified clearance in COMSEC • Discretionary policies typical in low security (academic) environments. • Mandatory policies typical in high security (military) environments. • Neither policy adequate for commercial systems.
Fundamental MechanismsAccess Control Policies • Role Based Access Control (RBAC) • Regulate user’s access to information based on the activities the users execute in the system. • “Role” is a set of actions and responsibilities associated with a particular working activity. • Access based on role, not identity of user.
Fundamental MechanismsAccess Control Policies • Role Based Access Control (RBAC) • User authorization is broken into two tasks: • Granting roles to users • Granting rights to roles • Roles can be hierarchical • Engineers inherent employee rights. • User can login with the least privilege for a set of particular tasks. • Roles make it easier to enforce separation of duties: “No single user can subvert the system by herself/himself.”
Covert Channels • A mechanism to circumvent automatic confinement within a security perimeter. • Example: • Person with TOP SECRET clearance runs (inadvertently) Trojan horse. • Trojan horse has free access to files in the compartment. • Trojan horse cannot write down to an unclassified file. • But: Trojan horse can do things that are visible from the outside and thus send contents of TOP SECRET files through a covert channel. • T.H. either runs or waits. System load will vary. Small bandwidth channel. • T.H. can or cannot use shared resources. To send a bit, T.H. fills up the printer line to send 1 bit, or empties it for a 0 bit.
UNIX Woes: SUID programs • Programs can execute the setuid system call. • Executable runs as if executed by user. • Sendmail uses setuid to implement email. • User can cause programs to run as root with input they provide. • Favorite targets of buffer overflow attacks.