CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN BULGARIAN SEA WATERS

1. CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN BULGARIAN SEA WATERS as. prof. DSКirilN. Коlev аs. SyanaB.Lutzkanova Naval Academy“N. J. Vaptzarov”, Varna

2. INTRODUCTION In Greek, the word “crisis” has both the meaning of “emergency” and “judgment”. Maritime Security and Maritime Safety are very much interconnected and although the natural working context of institution’ and corporation’ activities are both Maritime Security and Maritime Safety Missions (Tasks) and subsequent their Maritime Security Crisis Management and Maritime Safety (natural / man-made disaster, etc.) Crisis Maritime Safety Management. Looking closely, at the definition of Maritime Security (or Safety) it is easy to appreciate the complexity of such an activity where a larger number of organizations, working processes and an ambiguous legal framework are involved. In order to simplify, Maritime Security (or Safety) is to be considered the combination of Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA) and Maritime Security (or Safety – SAR, Oil Spill Cleaning, etc.) Operations (MSO).

3. Theory of MSA and MSO Maritime Security and Maritime Safety implies information analysis and action at sea, and both complement each other. Maritime Security and Maritime Safety requires much more than just two components but, as far as institution’ and corporation’ participation in the overall Maritime Security (or Safety) system is concerned, those are the two main ones to consider and that will require specific doctrine. This means that MSA and MSO work together to accomplish Maritime Security (or Safety) but also that they are two independent activities. MSA and MSO may be carried out by different authorities that will in turn depend on a higher authority responsible subsequently for Maritime Security (or Safety) as a whole. It also means that they both need specific procedures and doctrine for their execution.

4. Theory of MSA and MSO • MSA and MSO, besides being independent activities, ought to be very closely related and the authority responsible for Maritime Security (or Safety) must ensure the efficient coordination of both. MSA is related to MSO because operations at sea must, in most cases, be based on the results of the information analysis conducted in the maritime domain. MSA triggers MSO. The information obtained during MSO (mostly Maritime Surveillance / Monitoring) will be a very valuable input to MSA. MSO feeds back MSA. • MSO take place on a case by case, while MSA is a permanent activity • MSO can be carried out as primary mission, or as secondary mission • Maritime Security Operation (MSO) may be classified as Surveillance, Reconnaissance “Scouting” and Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO) • MSO can be carried agency/service alone, in co-operation with other national agencies/services or in co-operation with other nations or internationalorganizations.

5. MARITIME SECURITY AND SAFETY MARITIME SECURITY MARITIME SAFETY MARITIME SECURITY OPERATIONS (MSO) ACTION AT SEA (Surveillance, Reconnaissance, MIO, …) EITHER AS PRIMARY / SECONDARY MISSION CASE BY CASE NAVAL, INTERAGENCY OR INTERNATIONAL MARITIME SITUATIONAL AWARENESS (MSA) PERMANENT INTERAGENCY, INTERNATIONAL MARITIME SITUATIONAL AWARENESS (MSA) PERMANENT INTERAGENCY, INTERNATIONAL MARITIME SAFETY OPERATIONS (MSO) ACTION AT SEA (Monitoring, SAR operation, Oil Spill Cleaning operation, …) EITHER AS PRIMARY / SECONDARY MISSION CASE BY CASE NAVAL, INTERAGENCY TRIGGERS TRIGGERS FEED BACK FEED BACK

6. CRISIS SOURCES (BACKGROUND) • Border disputes - The disputed area between Bulgaria and Romania is of seventeen kilometers the Black Sea waters. The disputed area should be settled as soon as possible to prevent it before becoming a problem. The dispute has resurfaced due to the recent discovery of significant gas resources by Exxon Mobil and Petrom of the Romanian coast. Romanian block Neptun approximately contains 100 billion cubic metres of natural gas, which may be surrounded by other attractive areas. For instance, neighbouring Bulgarian block Khan Asparuh

7. Continental Shelf & EEZ Continental Shelf Exclusive Economic Zone 200 nm 200 nm (+) seabed and subsoil + WATER COLUMN seabed and subsoil Needs to be proclaimed for enforcement ab initio and ipso facto (inherent right – no need for proclamation) most important differences are Fisheries, Search and Rescue (SAR) nation responsible zones

8. Role of Islands in CS/EEZ Delimitation • Islands do not generate full maritime zones when they are competing directly against continental land areas. • Median / Equidistance line is not applied. (Islands received partial or no effect / are enclaved or partially enclaved) • Example: Delimitation maritime CS/EEZ boundary lines between Turkey, Cyprus and Egypt.

9. MARITIME DELIMITATION BETWEEN ROMANIA AND UKRAINE (Serpent Island) Judgment of International Court of Justice, 3 February 2009 Line between the claims of each country Maritime boundary lines Romania claim – RED LINE Ukraine claim –BLUE LINE

10. EEZ 200 nm LIMIT CANNOT BE UNILATERALLY APPLICABLE 140 nm Five of the six Black Sea Coastal states have ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. After the dissolution of the USSR, Georgia, The Russia Federation and Ukraine confirmed the validity the USSR-Turkey maritime boundary delimitations. In 1997 Turkey and Bulgaria agreed upon their boundary. Romania and Ukraine resolved a long-stated dispute on the delimitation of the continental shelf and their exclusive economic zones through the International Court of Justice in 2009. The boundaries between Romania and Bulgaria, Ukraine and Russia, and Russia and Georgia are not agreed upon and are drawn on the map as median or equidistant lines

11. CRISIS PRECONDITIONS The 2008 Russia – Georgia War • Border disputes after armed conflict – Which is jurisdiction of Abkhazia Black sea waters?

12. HOW TO ACHIEVE MARITIME DELIMITATION? • should be on the basis of international law • Should not infringe upon 3rd parties’ rights (Provisional arrangements until final delimitation is also possible) ICJ or Arbitration Bilateral Agreement IF NO DELIMITATION IS ACHIEVED OVERLAPPING & DISPUTED CLAIMS Overlapping entitlements to maritime rights and jurisdiction

13. CRISIS PRECONDITIONS • Illegal activities (illegal fisheries, terrorist activity, organized crime activity, drug trafficking, illegal migrants, arms traficking, smuggling,) Illegal fishery case on 30 may 2011. The incident occurred early Friday (30 may 2011) when the Turkish flagged fishing boat, intentionally or not unintentionally – crossed into Romania’s exclusive economic zone for fishing purposes. The Romanian coast guard spotted the boat and called on it to stop, but the instead took evasive action. The pursuit continued for a few hours and ended when the Romanian coast guard stopped the boat in the Bulgarian exclusive economic zone. The crew of the fishing boat meanwhile communicated with Turkish officials, saying their boat had been seriously hit and was at risk to sinking. After the call reached Ankara, the Turkish Foreign Ministry contacted Romanian authorities for information, with the demand of protecting the security of the Turkish fishermen. Romanian officials confirmed the incident and informed Ankara that there had been no casualties.

14. DELIMITATION METHOD IN INTERNATIONAL LAW In state practice and in jurisprudence of international courts pertaining to CS/EEZ delimitation, equidistance line is modified / adjusted by giving due to a number of circumstances in order to produce an equitable result.

15. Circumstances taken into account for DELIMITATION • GEOGRAPHICAL CIRCUMSTANCES • general configuration of the coasts, • location of the coasts and their relationship (oppositeness and adjacency) • the length of the coastlines • distance between the respective coasts • the location of the land frontier/its direction towards seaward extension • the presence of islands and their size and positions

16. Circumstances taken into account for DELIMITATION • NON-GEOGRAPHICAL CIRCUMSTANCES • geological and geomorphological factors • fishing resources and history of fishing • environmental facts • navigational rights and interests • defense and security interests • economic circumstances • historical rights • Common mineral deposits and history of oil/gas development in the area

17. CRISIS PRECONDITIONS • Illegal activities (illegal fisheries, terrorist activity, organized crime activity, drug trafficking, illegal migrants, arms traficking, smuggling,) Terrorist Attack during Maritime Transport Ships at sea are at risk becoming targets for a terrorist attack for several reasons: a)security countermeasures onboard are usually limited to high-pressure water hoses or high-powered sirens to ward off potential attackers b) the number of crew available for defense is rather low c) external security support is only available with considerable time delay, if at all.

18. CRISIS PRECONDITIONS Coordinated Terrorist Attacks on Multiple Development and Exploration Sites Oil or gas exploration occurs usually in fields encompassing many individual exploration sites, stretching over large distances in remote areas. It is difficult to prevent intrusion from the outside, since attackers can use speed-boats (e.g. Nigeria), 4 WD vehicles (e.g. Saudi Arabia) or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). Consequently terrorists can carry out coordinated attacks on individual oil and gas exploration sites within the field. The amount of explosives required for such an attack is relatively small (e.g., it has been shown that 5 kg THT for a single site is sufficient), enabling one individual to carry several such devices at once

19. STRUCTURAL DAMAGE (OVERPRESSURE ISO-CURVES) RESULTING FROM THE DETONATION OF A SHAPED CHARGE (5kg TNT) ATTACHED TO A PIPELINE SECTION The destruction of a pipeline resulting from the detonation of a shaped charge: the pipeline is totally destroyed (red and yellow contours).

20. LOGISTICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR A COORDINATED ATTACK ON MULTIPLE OIL-/GAS EXPLORATION SITES

21. CRISIS PRECONDITIONS Suicide Attack of an Offshore Platform Offshore platforms are subject to increased protection as a part of the national framework of critical infrastructure, i.e., the airspace and the approach by sea is subject to continuous surveillance and optional military intervention. However, as the terrorist attack on the USS Cole in Yemen in 2000 demonstrated, even a battle ship with enhanced technical and operational capabilities to ward off an enemy attack has proven to be vulnerable to a suicide boat attack.

22. OFFSHORE PLATFORMS AND FPSO (Example)

23. STRUCTURAL DAMAGE (OVERPRESSURE ISO-CURVES) TO AN OFFSHORE PLATFORM RESULTING FROM A SUICIDE BOAT ATTACK WITH 1,000 kg TNT ONBOARD The damage to an offshore platform due to the attack with a boat detonating 1,000 kg TNT upon impact at one of the columns carrying the structure. The platform suffers extensive structural damage (red and yellow overpressure iso-curves), rendering it inoperable.

24. LOGISTICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR A SUICIDE TERRORIST ATTACK AGAINST AN OFFSHORE PLATFORM

25. CRISIS PRECONDITIONS Illegal immigrants The routes used for smuggling and trafficking people to Europe are not exactly clandestine in nature; they can be mapped quite well combining various types of materials available. These routes overlap, in part, those used to smuggle drugs, cigarettes, and stolen cars. Turkey is one of the main gateways to Europe for immigrants from Syria, Iraq (especially Kurds), Iran, Afghanistan, and many other Asian countries, including China. The smuggling routes go either overland to Bulgaria and Greece, and from there to Albania, Macedonia, and Bosnia, or directly by sea to Greece. In Italy, the destination is more often than not the open coast of Apulia in its southeastern corner. This area can be easily reached by speed boats from the other side of the Adriatic Sea from which the shortest distance is some 60 miles.

26. CRISIS PRECONDITIONS Oil Spills There are 1000 offshore installations in the EU (including Norway), and nearly half are in the UK. Most offshore oil and gas installations in Europe are in UK, Norway, the Netherlands and Italy. Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Spain, Greece, Romania, Bulgaria and Poland have fewer, and more are planned in Cyprus and Malta. (Photo V. Dimitrov, Bulgarian maritime gas drilling installation)

27. THE MARITIME SECURITY/SAFETY SPECTRUM The international and interagency dimension of Maritime Security/Safetyis strategic in nature because of the global effects of the existing risks and threats and the enormous amount of security/safety activities that need to be coordinated. The allied (NATO, EU) navies need to agree on a common concept of use for naval assets, gather expertise and develop specific capabilities to confront their responsibilities in the field of Maritime Security/Safety.

28. THE MARITIME SECURITY/SAFETY SPECTRUM Involvement of navies TRADITIONAL NAVAL WARFARE MARITIME SECURITY AGAINST GLOBAL THREATS HIGH INTENSITY LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS AGAINST ORGANISED CRIME STANDING SECURITY CONTROL MEASURES (ISPS Code, MARITIME SURVEILLANCE) LOW INTENSITY Threat level Port Activity Shipping, Trade, Energy Transport Search and Rescue Environmental Protection Fisheries Inspection Border Police Illegal Immigration Drug trafficking and smuggling Piracy International Terrorism Proliferation of WMDs

29. THE MARITIME SECURITY/SAFETY SPECTRUM There are a common relationship between navies’ involvement in Maritime Security/Safety missions and level of the risks and threats; the higher the risks and threats the more likely it is navies will be involved in maritime security/safety missions. Therefore can establish three basic levels: • Standing Security Control Measures; • Law Enforcement Operations against Organized crime • Maritime Security against Global Threats

30. STANDING SECURITY CONTROL MEASURES In this regard, navies should consider : • Orientating traditional surveillance missions into the field of Maritime Security. • Orientating the structure, procedures and systems of existing Maritime Surveillance Centers to the management of Maritime Situational Awareness. • Developing, national legislation permitting, interagency co-operation agreements and mechanisms in order to enhance the co-ordination of the different Maritime Security activities. • Actively co-operating with each other, from the international perspective.

31. LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS AGAINST ORGANIZED CRIME This type of operation is normally under the responsibility of Police Forces, Coast Guard or the like, especially inside territorial waters. There are some consideration that should be taken into account: • A close relationship should be maintained between navies and Law Enforcement Agencies, either to provide the required support or at least to avoid interference by any naval asset in the area of operations for other reasons. • Consider the possibility and convenience of developing interagency agreements for the execution of joint civil and military Maritime Security Operations.

32. MARITIME SECURITY AGAINST GLOBAL THREATS The navies must prepare to act: • Developing Maritime Interdiction Operation (MIO) capabilities. • Engaging with national legal and jurisdictional structures in order to establish the appropriate links to enable such operations to proceed as required. • Actively participating in those international force created for the enhancement and promotion of concepts and measures related to the fight against this specific type of risk and threat, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

33. POSSIBLE MARITIME SCENARIOS FOR NAVAL FORCES There are four types of Maritime Security Scenarios: • Baseline Maritime Security. • Pre-planned Maritime Security. • Maritime Security in Support of Existing Security Strategies • Maritime Security as part of Another Operation Arrested group illegal immigrants (Joint Naval-Border Police Exercise SEEBREEZ)

34. PRE-PLANNED MARITIME SECURITY MSO may take different forms. Depending on the desired end state, they may range from simple reconnaissance, to marking or shadowing up to MIO or neutralization of the threat. All these different types of operations, triggered by MSA results, are termed Pre-planned Maritime Security Operations. The first two scenarios described above apply to regional and sub-regional theatres, whether national or international. Boarding team in the action. Bulgarian Navy exercise

35. MARITIME SECURITY IN SUPPORT OF EXISTING SECURITY STRATEGIES In this regard navies should consider activity to: • Determine and analyze which scenarios are more vulnerable from the Maritime Security point of view and more critical to the national and international interests. • Study and engage in possible international initiatives to apply Maritime Security to such scenarios. • Study and consider the scope and development of appropriate Maritime Security capabilities to complement those traditionally provided by naval forces. • Be prepared to participate in Capacity Building initiatives as a prerequisite to being able to extend Maritime Security.

36. MARITIME SECURITY AS PART OF ANOTHER OPERATION The following guidelines could be used by all navies: • Fit all units (surface and air) with AIS receivers in order to be able to create a local MSA picture, especially in those areas where the required coastal infrastructures are not available. • Consider the possibility of liaison with theatre coastal authorities in order to support the development of such capabilities (MSA Capacity Building). • Consider the particular Maritime Security requirements of such deployments (systems, training, etc), not only during the planning phase of the mission but also during the design of future naval units (MIO personnel and material oriented compartments, communication systems, etc).

37. FRONLINE IMPLICATIONS OF MSO There are a number of areas inn which units can take action in support of MSO: • Planning. • Posture at Sea. • Action Required • Understanding Maritime Law • Capability • Equipment and Training Bulgarian oil spill cleaning ships in the action

38. CONCEPT OF INTEGRATED PHYSICAL PROTECTION Concept of Integrated Physical Protection on maritime assets includes: • State-of-the-Art technical and operational countermeasures, enabling the managementto reduce the probability of success of a terror attack. • Increased emphasis on Institutional and Corporate Security/ Safety Culture • Continuous Security and Safety Training at all levels of personnel. • Regular Threat and Risk Assessment in order to identify, qualify and quantify risks and countermeasures in a changing environment • Evaluation and update ofstrategies and countermeasures based on risk analyses by considering the cost-benefit factor • Strengthen the co-operation with related government security/safety agencies and first responders

39. OPERATIONAL SECURITY/SAFETY MEASURES • Technological developments: Build Multifunctional Maritime Crisis Management Centre (of course in Naval Academy) with integrated 3D-Vulnerability Assessment using advanced geographical information systems and combining satellite monitoring data with ground-based data sets; Real-time information exchange capability for instant notification of rapid-response teams (counter-terrorist unit, emergency medical care teams, fire-fighting brigade, oil spill cleaning units, SAR units, border police mobile teams, etc.), deployment and re-deployment UAV equipped with automatic weapons and unmanned helicopters capable of image processing (monitoring maritime spaces

40. OPERATIONAL SECURITY/SAFETY MEASURES • Logistics:Shortening lead time between beginning of crisis event and restoration; Maintaining adequate inventory of custom-made spare parts; Strengthen physical protection at critical functions, based on 3D Vulnerability Analysis; Enhanced physical access control (e.g. intelligent smart cart-based systems); Secure data communication (e.g. encryption); Progressively restricted access areas upon approaching high value target areas (Onion skin principle); Enhanced GPS-3 or Galileo-based positioning devices for vehicle fleet; Real-time vehicle monitoring (vehicle movement data; vehicle tampering alert; open voice communication between dispatchers, drivers and customers). Bulgarian fire-fighting team in the action

41. OPERATIONAL SECURITY/SAFETY MEASURES • Training and Policy:Implementation of Industrial Corporate Security/ Safety Awareness Programs (ICSAP) to develop a security/safety culture and policy; Security/Safety training for all personnel, security/safety strategies for human resource management and administration; Insider identification strategies and co-operation with First Responders (drills, exercises and training); Contingency emergency planning, crisis and disaster management on all levels; Global communication and marketing of security/safety as a preventive tool; Social and humanitarian support programs as preventive tools Bulgarian SAR teams in the action

42. CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN BULGARIAN SEA WATERS as. prof. DSКirilN. Коlev аs. SyanaB.Lutzkanova Naval Academy“N. J. Vaptzarov”, Varna