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Wildlife trade and trafficking. Mike Shanahan / IIED. November 2013. http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/11/15/ivory-crushed-denver/3563633/. November 2013. China and France follow suit, Hong Kong approves plan to destroy massive stockpile over next two years (NPR, 2/17/14).
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Wildlife trade and trafficking Mike Shanahan / IIED
November 2013 http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/11/15/ivory-crushed-denver/3563633/
November 2013 China and France follow suit, Hong Kong approves plan to destroy massive stockpile over next two years (NPR, 2/17/14)
White House moved to strengthen enforcement of laws and extend bans on trade in Feb. 2014 • extend ban on the commercial trade of elephant ivory • “All commercial imports/exports of ivory products will be prohibited” (with a few exceptions). • “Sales of any ivory products within the U.S. will also be severely restricted.” • “strengthening domestic and global enforcement of wildlife trade laws • working with international partners to combat the global poaching trade” (Walsh, Time, 2/11/14)
“Illegal wildlife trafficking—the unlawful slaughter of endangered animals to trade their valuable parts—has risen alarmingly in recent years. • > 30,000 elephants killed in Africa in 2014 for their ivory • 1,000 rhinos killed in South Africa alone • increasing evidence linking illegal wildlife trading with corruption, terrorist groups and organized criminal networks.” ivory stock seized recently at the autonomous port in Lome, Togo (west African), Emile Kouton, AFP/Getty Images / February 4, 2014) (Paramaguru, Time 2/14/14)
Feb. 2014: Leading nations met in London for highest-level talks ever on illegal trade in wildlife products. • Outcome London Declaration: “countries agreed for the first time to renounce the use of products from species threatened with extinction. • eradicate market for illegal wildlife products • ensure effective legal frameworks and strengthen law enforcement • trafficking in illegal wildlife products in the same category as trafficking in drugs, arms and people.” Photo: Dan Kitwood/Getty Images. Protesters outside Conference (Paramaguru, Time 2/14/14)
A mixed history of bans and intermittent legal sales • 1989 ban on int’l trade in ivory: Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) • Effective in the west • Less effective in Asia (cultural and medicinal use) • 1999: Botswana, Namibia, and Zimbabwe permitted to sell to Japan about 110,000 pounds from existing legal stocks of raw ivory • Stocks from animal deaths from natural causes or control programs • Raised $5M for elephant conservation. • Sales followed from Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa.
Do the sales of legal stockpiles help or hurt conservation? • Empirical evidence is mixed: Did the 1999 sales encourage on poaching? (Fischer, 2003/2014) • Yes: Environmental Investigation Agency (nongovernmental UK org) • No: UN Environment Programme and the TRAFFIC network (monitors wildlife trading) • Issue interactions between segregated/separated markets: legal and illegal trade.
Do the sales of legal stockpiles help or hurt conservation? • Sales of legal stockpiles: • Rationale: adding supply decrease prices in the market for ivory decrease return to poaching (figure) • Hope: satisfy some illegal demand without triggering resurgence in legal demand. • two crucial assumptions: • illegally produced goods and legally sold confiscated goods are truly interchangeable • consumers are indifferent to both wildlife populations and the nature of the market
Do the sales of legal stockpiles help or hurt conservation? • Sales of legal stockpiles: • Unintended consequences: increase legal ivory supply decrease stigma of ivory ownership increase demand for new ivory increase prices and the return to poaching. • More likely if • demand is malleable; i.e. demand for ivory isn’t the same as any other good • consumers care about the source of their ivory, the state of the elephant population, or just how others perceive it.
Do the sales of legal stockpiles help or hurt conservation? • Sales of legal stockpiles: • unintended consequences: • decrease stigma for existing consumers (previous slide) • laundering may bring illegal goods to legal markets; legal sales may lower the costs of illegal supply by making monitoring more difficult
Similar dynamics are at play for other goods • “blood” diamonds from war-torn areas like the Democratic Republic of Congo • stigma in demand; laundering in supply. • Other products with segregated markets • GMO-free (genetically modified organisms), cruelty-free, or organic produce; • certified, sustainably harvested timber; • drugs; and guns.