CISC 210 - Class Today

1. CISC 210 - Class Today • Recap • Lab Status • Exam Question Reminder • Cain and Abel • Extreme Security • DRM as a baseline • Type 1 cryptosystems • Nuclear command and control • Group Problem R. Smith - University of St Thomas - Minnesota

2. Recap • Projects, Reading • Recap: Firewall Lab • Recap: Public key cryptography • Digital Signatures and Certificates • Group Problem R. Smith - University of St Thomas - Minnesota

3. Exam Question Reminder • I need one exam question from each project • No “true vs false” • MUST be covered in your presentation! • Good ideas: • Define a key term – not something in the book • List major elements – not in the book • Describe a problem/solution presented in the project • E-mail the exam question on Monday (paper deadline) R. Smith - University of St Thomas - Minnesota

4. Cain and Abel • A general purpose, PC-based hacking program • Lots of hash calculations, hash cracking • Some network oriented scanning • Danger, Will Robinson! R. Smith - University of St Thomas - Minnesota

5. Extreme Security • ... Whenever someone is willing to go to a whole lot of hassle to meet some deceptively simple security goals R. Smith - University of St Thomas - Minnesota

6. Digital Rights Management • DVD Goal: copy protection • To get a copy, you have to buy the original on its original, physical media • You can’t copy the data off and play it. • The media only plays on approved readers • You can’t remix it • Alternative: Modern “Soft” Music Goal • To play a copy, you must buy a license R. Smith - University of St Thomas - Minnesota

7. Elements of DVD CSS • Two sets of keys • Disk-specific key • Each DVD product has its own encryption key • If you retrieve the key, you can decrypt the MPEG • Vendor-specific key (for DVD player manufacturers) • There are a bunch of preestablished keys • Each vendor gets one of those keys • Creating a disk • Generate the DVD-specific key • Encrypt the movie with the DVD-specific key • Encrypt a separate copy of this key with each vendor key • Save the encrypted vendor keys on the DVD itself R. Smith - University of St Thomas - Minnesota

8. Playing a DVD • Load DVD into the player • Player searches the encrypted vendor keys • What if a vendor key gets leaked? • It finds its own encrypted key • Decrypt the DVD-specific key using its Vendor-specific key • The DVD-specific key decrypts the MPEG • (Spot the Plaintext) R. Smith - University of St Thomas - Minnesota

9. Satellite TV • I did a big presentation on this for BlackHat • Basically, people could get free TV • Hacked the smart card in the satellite set top box • Most of the technology is now obsolete • Well, for this particular target of attack • Techniques may still work against other Smart Card apps R. Smith - University of St Thomas - Minnesota

10. Type 1 cryptosystems • Federal law requires Type 1 crypto • For handling diplomatic communications • For Top Secret information • For intelligence information • Rules to address almost every crypto mistake reported over the past thousand years or so • National Security Agency • They set the rules • They evaluate all Type 1 crypto devices • If they don’t like it, the device gets junked R. Smith - University of St Thomas - Minnesota

11. Type 1 Crypto • Major Objectives • Message secrecy is mostly embodied in the key • No bypassing or leaking, even between channels • Self protecting (shuts down if there’s tampering) • 100% accurate operation and feedback • If things work, the indicators show that they worked • If something fails, the indicators show that it failed • Goals (nice-to-have) • A “safe standby” where internal data is protected • Machine yields no secrets after being erased • Keys themselves are encrypted when outside a device R. Smith - University of St Thomas - Minnesota

12. Other things • Physical control requirements: “CCI” • Why? • Type 1 algorithms are classified SECRET • Why? R. Smith - University of St Thomas - Minnesota

13. So how do we do all this? • How do we detect/protect against tampering? • How do we avoid leaking and/or bypass? • How do we make things 100% accurate? • Front panel indicators • Path of the key material • Erasure behavior R. Smith - University of St Thomas - Minnesota

14. Safe when unattended? • “Safe standby” • Loaded with keys, but keys are inaccessible • Algorithms usable but inaccessible • Not passing traffic • Safe for travel • “Unclassified” but kept from mishandling • No algorithms readable R. Smith - University of St Thomas - Minnesota

15. Nuclear command and control • Goals • No false positives • No false negatives • EVER • Techniques • Specialized processes and equipment • Coded electronics in the triggers • Two-person control on all triggers • PALs – permissive action links R. Smith - University of St Thomas - Minnesota

16. Separation of Duty • Two person control always maintained R. Smith - University of St Thomas - Minnesota

17. The Actors • Enemy attackers • President • EWO – Emergency War Order • PALs – Permissive Action Links • US Stratcom / US Spacecom • Base/wing/sub commanders • Missile crew commanders • Individual missiles R. Smith - University of St Thomas - Minnesota

18. The process • President gives the order • PAL codes released by the President • Stratcom/Spacecom distribute the order • PAL code included • Launch officers receive the order • Launch controllers decode/verify the order • Controllers install PAL codes • Controllers coordinate the final checklist • Both do things in parallel • If one stops, the nukes won’t fire • Both controllers do final launch together R. Smith - University of St Thomas - Minnesota

19. Opening the Orders • Both on the crew must open the safe R. Smith - University of St Thomas - Minnesota

20. The Launch Key • Two separate keys, turned at the same time R. Smith - University of St Thomas - Minnesota

21. What can go wrong? • LOTS of movies on this • Erroneous attack detection • Bogus Presidential attack order • Bogus attack cancellation • Stratcom/Spacecom attacks on its own • Wing commander acts on its own • Launch controllers act alone • One launch controller acts alone • Nuke gets stolen R. Smith - University of St Thomas - Minnesota

22. “Group problem” • How can I send an encrypted message • Destination: 2 other people (Bob sends to Alice and Tina) • No secret already shared with all three • Assume they’ve shared public keys • Each has public keys for the other two. • Pull out a piece of paper • Construct an answer • Show me the format of the encypted message • Show me how it’s constructed (a flow diagram) • Show me how it’s decoded (a flow diagram) • Put the group names on it R. Smith - University of St Thomas - Minnesota

23. That’s it • Questions? Creative Commons License This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 United States License. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/us/ or send a letter to Creative Commons, 171 Second Street, Suite 300, San Francisco, California, 94105, USA. R. Smith - University of St Thomas - Minnesota