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Publishing in Top-Tier Management Journals in top-tier management journals

Publishing in Top-Tier Management Journals in top-tier management journals. Professor Xiao-Ping Chen Editor-in-Chief, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes Foster School of Business University of Washington. A list of top-tier management journals:.

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Publishing in Top-Tier Management Journals in top-tier management journals

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  1. Publishing in Top-Tier Management Journals in top-tier management journals Professor Xiao-Ping Chen Editor-in-Chief, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes Foster School of Business University of Washington

  2. A list of top-tier management journals: • Administrative Science Quarterly (ASQ) • Academy of Management Review (AMR) • Academy of Management Journal (AMJ) • Journal of Applied Psychology (JAP) • Strategic Management Journal (SMJ) • Journal of International Business Studies (JIBS) • Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes (OBHDP) • Organizational Science (OS) • Personnel Psychology (PS)

  3. Mission statement (OBHDP) Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes publishes fundamental research in organizational behavior, organizational psychology, and human cognition, judgment, and decision-making. We are interested in articles that investigate these topics as they pertain to individuals, dyads, groups, and other social collectives. For each topic, we place a premium on articles that make fundamental and substantial contributions to understanding psychological processes relevant to human attitudes, cognitions, and behavior in organizations.

  4. Criteria for evaluation (OBHDP): 1. Importance of Problem/Question2. Incorporation of Relevant Theory3. Mastery of Pertinent Research4. Development of Hypotheses*5. Methodological Rigor*6. Statistical Analyses*7. Legitimacy of Conclusions*8. Writing Clarity and Organization9. Relevance to Behavior in Organizations10. Relevance to Judgment and Decision-Making

  5. Mission Statement (AMJ) Academy of Management Journal To publish empirical research that tests, extends, or builds management theory and contributes to management practice. All empirical methods -- including, but not limited to, qualitative, quantitative, field, laboratory, and combination methods -- are welcome. To be published in AMJ, a manuscript must make strong empirical and theoretical contributions and highlight the significance of those contributions to the management field. Thus, preference is given to submissions that test, extend, or build strong theoretical frameworks while empirically examining issues with high importance for management theory and practice.

  6. Evaluation criteria (AMJ) • Appropriateness for AMJ         • Clarity of exposition         • Technical adequacy         • Theoretical contribution (i.e. testing, creating, or extending theory)         • Empirical contribution         • Interestingness, innovativeness, and novelty         • Potential implications for practice         • Potential significance of contribution         • Magnitude of contribution relative to length        

  7. To cooperate or not to cooperate? Individual decision making in team contexts ---- My journey to find ways of inducing cooperation in social dilemmas Michael Johnson, PhD

  8. What is a social dilemma It is a situation in which members of a group face conflict between maximizing individual interest and maximizing group interest Two typical situations: Public goods dilemma: small scale; large scale Resource dilemma: small scale; large scale

  9. A two-person dilemma Your Partner’s Choice C D $70 $100 Your C $70 $20 Choice $20 $40 D $100 $40

  10. My approach to find ways to induce cooperation Psychological approach • Use of pledge • OBHDP 1994, 1996 • Perceived criticality • OBHDP 1996, 1998 • Social norm • OBHDP 1999 • Use of sanctions • GPIR 2009 • Tolerance • OBHDP 2003, in progress • Strategic alliance • AMR 2003 Cross-cultural approach • Individualism-collectivism • AMR 1998 • JIBS 2005 • Norm vs. attitude • IJIR 2007 • Meaning of cooperation vs. competition in China • MOR 2011

  11. 4-person Social Dilemma Game Each participant receives \1,000, and decides how much of it to give to the group fund. Group Fund 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８

  12. 4-person Social Dilemma Game The money given to the group fund is doubled. Group Fund 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８

  13. 4-person Social Dilemma Game And allocated equally among the four members. Group Fund 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 年 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 平 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 成 ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ ８ \1,600 \1,000 \1,300 \1,700

  14. A 4-person public goods research paradigm Mean Contribution of Other Members Your Contribution 0 1 2 3 … 10 0 10 11.5 13.0 14.5 … 25.0 1 9.5 11.0 12.5 14.0 … 24.5 2 9.0 10.5 12.0 13.5 … 24.0 3 8.5 10.0 11.5 13.0 … 23.5 ………………… 10 5.0 6.5 8.0 9.5 … 20.0 Your Payoff = (10 – C) + 2* [(n-1) MC + C] / n

  15. Sequential Choice in a Step-Level Public Goods Dilemma: The Effects of Criticality and Uncertainty Xiao-Ping Chen, Winton Au, & Samuel Komorita (1996). OBHDP, 65(1), 37-47.

  16. Payoff Matrix for Step-Level Public Goods Paradigm ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Number of others choosing J Your choice 0 1 2 3 ------------------------------------------------------------- J 0 0 20 20 P 10 10 10 30 ------------------------------------------------------------- Note. J denotes contributing endowment of 10 points; P denotes keeping endowment.

  17. Criticality is defined as the extent to which a person’s contribution will have an effect on providing the bonus (public good). A member of a group is critical in two types of situations: • person p’s contribution is both necessary and sufficient to provide the public good, or • person p’s contribution is necessary but not sufficient for the provision of PG.

  18. Chen, Au, and Komorita (1996) Number of cooperators before you Your position0 1 2 3 1st(1,0) 2nd(2,0) (2,1) 3rd(3,1) (3,2) 4th(4,2) (4,3)

  19. Hypotheses: H1: Members in an objectively critical position will be more likely to contribute than members in a less critical position, if the level of uncertainty is low; H2: When uncertainty is high, subjects (in both objectively critical and noncritical positions) will be less likely to contribute than when uncertainty is low.

  20. Chen, Au, and Komorita (1996) Mean contribution rate -------------------------------------------------------------------- Number of cooperators before you Your position0 1 2 3 2nd.58 .69 3rd .81 .44 4th.91 .24

  21. Perceived Criticalness (Mean Ratings on 9-Point Scale) Uncertainty Criticality Low Medium High Mean High 8.09 6.91 5.90 6.97 Low 3.46 6.26 5.94 5.22 Mean 5.93 6.59 5.78

  22. Conclusions Objective criticality seems to induce cooperation through perceived criticalness: If criticality evokes the perception of criticalness, cooperation will be enhanced, but if criticality does not evoke perceived criticalness (e.g., inhibited by high uncertainty), then the effects of criticality on cooperation may be attenuated. Therefore, it is perceived criticality that exerts direct effect on cooperation

  23. Tolerance of free-riding: The effects of defection size, defection pattern, and social orientation in a repeated public goods dilemma Xiao-Ping Chen and Daniel G. Bachrach (2003). OBHDP, 90, 139-147

  24. Behavioral Tolerance of Free Riding The extent to which a member of a group or organization is willing to keep making contributions to establish or maintain a public good when some other members are not doing so. Three conditions to be satisfied: Tolerance must occur in situations where there are repeated interactions among members, because one-time interactions leave no room for showing tolerance. It must occur in situations where at least one member free rides. Given that the first and second conditions were met, the member still cooperates (contributes to the public good).

  25. Study variables and hypotheses Defection size: 1 or 2 members Defection pattern: fixed or diffused Hypothesis 1: Group members would be more willing to tolerate free riding when there are fewer than more other members who defect. Hypothesis 2: Defection pattern would influence group members’ tolerance for free riding such that a fixed pattern and a diffused pattern would have different impact on their level of tolerance.

  26. Mean cooperation rate (SD) in experimental conditions Condition Trial blocks ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Defection Defection Blk1 Blk2 Blk3 Mean Size Pattern ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 Fixed .34 (.38) .29 (.38) .27 (.35) .30 (.35) 1 Diffused .51 (.33) .38 (.36) .38 (.36) .42 (.31) 2 Fixed .24 (.33) .24 (.38) .24 (.38) .24 (.35) 2 Diffused .30 (.29) .43 (.32) .43 (.32) .39 (.29) Mean .35 (.33) .34 (.36) .33 (.36) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

  27. Conclusions • The effects of defection size were unexpected. In the early stages (trial block 1) of member interaction, participants were sensitive to the number of others who were free riding, and they were more tolerant when only one rather than two other members were defecting. But the effect of defection size diminished quickly with increased member interactions (trial blocks 2 and 3) • Members were more tolerant of free riding when other members took turns to defect (the diffused pattern) than when the same members continued to defect over several trials (the fixed pattern), regardless of the defection size in the group.

  28. Unintended consequences of cooperation inducing and maintaining mechanisms in public goods dilemmas: Sanctions and moral appeal Xiao-Ping Chen, Madan Pillutla and Xin Yao, Group Processes and Intergroup Relations (2009), 12 (2), 241-255.

  29. Chen, Pillutla, and Yao (2009) Experiment 1 Condition Stage 1Stage 2 Control 4.46 5.34 Reward-No reward5.55 3.44 Punish-No punish 5.56 4.28

  30. Experiment 2: Mean Cooperation (SD) in Stages 1, 2, 3, and Mean (SD) Trust in Others in Stage 2 of the Three Experimental Conditions --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Contribution Trust Conditions (Stage 1) (Stage 2) (Stage 3) (Stage 2) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Punish 3.89 5.96 2.63 2.88 Reward 5.00 6.12 3.50 3.09 Sanction 4.45 6.04 3.07 2.98 Appeal 5.34 6.28 5.01 3.72 Control 4.89 4.58 3.03 3.34 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

  31. Conclusions: Sanctions resulted in higher rates of cooperation than when they were not applied in the short term. When sanctions were removed, cooperation rates fell to a level lower than that achieved when they were not applied. Trust in others was undermined by the introduction of sanctions. Moral appeals increase cooperation and they do so in a sustainable fashion.

  32. Chen & Li (2005), JIBS Research question: What is the cross-national differences in cooperative decision-making in mixed-motive business contexts (territorial behavior)? 1. Who will be more cooperative: Chinese or Australians? 2. Who cares more about whether the business partner is of the same or different cultural heritage: Chinese or Australians? 3. How does culture exert influence on individual decision making?

  33. Theoretical frameworks Individualism–Collectivism (Triandis, 1995) • Collectivism can be defined as a social pattern that consists of closely linked individuals who see themselves as parts of one or more collectives, • Individualism can be defined as a social pattern that consists of loosely linked individuals who view themselves as independent of collectives. • Horizontal-vertical Individualism-collectivism • HI, VI, HC, VC

  34. Theory • A critical defining attribute of the “cultural syndromes” (Triandis, 1995) is the degree to which individualists and collectivists distinguish between in-group and out-group members in social interactions. • What are the boundaries between in-group and out-group ? • Experimental Manipulation: • ‘in‐groupness’ VS ‘out‐groupness’ • ‘compatriot’ business partners VS ‘non‐compatriot’ business partners in a foreign territory

  35. Theory Institutional vs. Individualistic view of culture (Yamagishi, 2003) • Assumes an external incentive for collectivists’ cooperation within groups. The long-term conditioning of the externally driven cooperative behavior therefore becomes more vulnerable to, or less likely to endure in, situations where such external incentives are removed than in situations where such incentive is absent in the first place (Chen, Pillutla, and Yao, 2009).

  36. Hypotheses • Hypothesis 1: When complete strangers are involved in a mixed-motive game, Chinese will be less cooperative than their Australian counterparts. • Hypothesis 2: Chinese will be more cooperative with stranger compatriots in a foreign territory than with stranger compatriots in their home country, or with non-compatriots regardless of the geographic location, whereas Australians will not differ across conditions.

  37. Hypotheses • Hypothesis 3: Chinese and Australians will differ on cultural values such that Chinese will score higher on the vertical dimension of individualism– collectivism whereas Australians will score higher on the horizontal dimension of individualism–collectivism. • Hypothesis 4: The country-level effects on Chinese and Australian cooperative decision-making in mixed-motive contexts will be mediated by individual cultural value orientation.

  38. Study 1 • Culture: Country as the proxy; Territory: foreign • Partner: either compatriots or non-compatriots • Decision-making context: two person prisoner’s dilemma (Bolle, 1990) • Sample • Australian (n=86) • Chinese (n=98)

  39. ResultsMean Competitiveness

  40. Study 2 • Sample: Australian (n=122), Chinese (n=151) • Cultural Value Orientation 32-item scale of Singelis et al. (1995) • Horizontal Individualism (HI), Vertical Individualism (VI), • Horizontal Collectivism (HC), and Vertical Collectivism (VC). Task: 5-person public good dilemma game

  41. ResultsMean Competitiveness

  42. Conclusions 1. Chinese seemed to treat stranger compatriots more cooperatively in a foreign territory than they treated non-compatriots or stranger compatriots at home. 2. Chinese scored higher on VI than Australians, who scored higher on HI. 3. Observed national differences in decision-making were fully mediated by individual cultural values: people who were more vertically individualistic were less cooperative ; whereas people who were more horizontally individualistic were more cooperative

  43. Questions? Thank you!

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