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COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE OF TRANSPORTATION IN METRO VANCOUVER: CIVIL SOCIETY’S CONTRIBUTION

COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE OF TRANSPORTATION IN METRO VANCOUVER: CIVIL SOCIETY’S CONTRIBUTION. Peter Boothroyd, Professor Emeritus University of British Columbia August 2009. Transportation Governments & Quasi-governments Vancouver Region Government of British Columbia (Province)

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COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE OF TRANSPORTATION IN METRO VANCOUVER: CIVIL SOCIETY’S CONTRIBUTION

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  1. COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCEOF TRANSPORTATIONIN METRO VANCOUVER: CIVIL SOCIETY’S CONTRIBUTION Peter Boothroyd, Professor Emeritus University of British Columbia August 2009

  2. Transportation Governments & Quasi-governments • Vancouver Region • Government of British Columbia (Province) • Departments • TransLink (South Coast British Columbia Transportation Authority) • Municipalities • Metro Vancouver (“federation” of 22 muni’s, electoral area, First Nation) • Agricultural Land Commission • Universities • Government of Canada • Departments • Airport Authority • Port Authority • First Nations

  3. Civil Society Transportation Interests Vancouver Region WEAKSTRONG <-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------> PedestriansBicyclists Transit ridersTransit workers TruckersCar drivers Railway companies <-----------------------------------Neighbourhoods-----------------------------------> Construction businesses/ unions/professionals/banks Retailers Land developers AcademicsEnvironmentalists Mass media

  4. “The Lying Game”EUR Business, June 2003, 60-62 by Bent Flyvbjerg (Aalborg U., now Oxford U.)

  5. “The Lying Game” • “Our survey, the first and largest of its kind, looked at several hundred [large public works] projects in more than 20 countries. • “… transport, the main focus… • “… there seemed to be a formula at work: underestimated costs + overestimated revenues + undervalued environmental impacts + overvalued economic development effects = project approval.”

  6. “The Lying Game” • “Many project proponents don’t hesitate to use this Machiavellian formula for project approval, even if it means misleading parliaments, the public and the media about the true costs and benefits of projects. • “Nine times out of 10, costs begin to soar after projects have been approved… • “For rail projects, for example, half of all projects have cost overruns of 45 per cent and higher… [Ridership] for half of all rail projects is more than 50 per cent lower than forecasted…”

  7. “The Lying Game” • “But are the proponents of these projects intentionally deceiving governments and taxpayers…? In an uncomfortable number of cases the answer is yes. • “Either the people who do the forecasts of costs and benefits are incredibly incompetent, which is unlikely, or they deliberately manipulate costs and benefits to help projects get approved.”

  8. “The Lying Game” • “The professional expertise of engineers, economists, planners and administrators is certainly indispensable to building the infrastructures that make society work. Our studies show, however, that their claims about costs and benefits mostly cannot be trusted and should be carefully examined by independent specialists and organizations.”

  9. “Delusions of Success”Harvard Business Review, July 2003, 57-63 by Dan Lovallo and Daniel Kahneman

  10. “Delusions of Success” • “In planning major initiatives, executives routinely exaggerate the benefits and discount the costs, setting themselves up for failure. • “Most large capital investment projects come in late and over budget, never living up to expectations. More than 70% of new manufacturing plants in North America, for example, close within their first decade of operation.”

  11. “Delusions of Success” • “We don’t believe that the high number of business failures is best explained as the result of rational choices gone wrong. Rather… managers make decisions based on delusional optimism rather than on a rational weighing of gains, losses and probabilities. They overestimate benefits and underestimate costs.”

  12. “Delusions of Success” • “Executives’ overoptimism can be traced both to cognitive biases– to errors in the way the mind processes information– and to organizational pressures. • “The optimistic biases of individual employees become mutually reinforcing, and unrealistic views of the future are validated by the group.”

  13. “Delusions of Success” • “Recent studies have shown that when people are asked simple questions requiring them to take an outside view, their forecasts become significantly more objective and reliable.”

  14. Delusion and Deception Misaligned ↑ | Deception Delusion & Deception Incentive | rail projects Alignment | road projects | Relatively Error Free Delusion Aligned ↓ weather forecasts ← - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -→ GoodPoor Ability to Learn from Decision (includes how frequently decision type presents itself) From:B. Flyvbjerg, M. Garbuio, D. Lovallo. 2009. “Delusion and Deception in Large Infrastructure Projects.” California Management Review. 51:2: 17-194.

  15. Vancouver Case #1“SkyTrain” Expansion to the East • In 1990’s, the plan for a 2nd rapid transit line to eastern suburbs was suddenly changed by the Province from a surface line (“Light Rail Transit”) to total grade separation (“SkyTrain”). • Civil society groups opposed the additional costs, and the impact on transit system and urban design.

  16. “SkyTrain” Expansion to the East(more) • Internal Provincial report on the change: “… [T]he most relevant information advanced in support of the SkyTrain option was misleading, incomplete, or unsubstantiated… • Cost comparisons appear to have been contrived to favour SkyTrain over LRT; • no ridership (demand) analysis was reported to justify the high capacity system; • air quality and transportation benefits are unsubstantiated; …” (Memo from Alan Greer, April12, 1999, released following a “Freedom of Information” request)

  17. Vancouver Case #2Tunnel to the South • Rapid transit in a tunnel to the airport and a southern suburb: promoted in 2001-- by a bank (Macquarie), the CEO of the regional transportation authority (TransLink), the airport authority (semi-private), the construction industry (including trades), and the Province. • Promises of funding support from the Province and federal government: linked to the 2010 Winter Olympics bid. • Costs and benefits of cheaper alternatives (e.g. along the surface of an abandoned rail-line): not studied. • Civil society organizations and some local politicians objected to: inadequate planning; cost to the transit system, to riders, and to taxpayers.

  18. Tunnel to the South(more) • Public-private partnership (P3) established to design/build/operate/maintain the line. Plans thus deemed to be secrets – even kept from elected city councillors. • TransLink Board (local politicians appointed by the Greater Vancouver Regional District) had 3 closely decided votes on whether or not to support plan. Impact on local taxes primary concern. • In response, the Province changed the Board, appointing non-politicians. • TransLink now desperate for funds to operate system. Further expansions in doubt.

  19. Canada Line Thousands jam rail line for a first glimpse and free ride Newspaper headline 17-08-09

  20. Vancouver Civil Society’s Contributions Rail Mega-Projects • Near term: an “outside” view provided to local councillors– to no avail . • Long term: • “bridging “social capital: modestly weakened by cynicism; • social learning about transportation planning: modestly increased.

  21. Vancouver Civil Society’s Contributions Freeway Mega-Projects 1960’s: Proposed downtownfreewaystopped by neighbourhood (Chinatown) & environmentalists 2000’s: Regionalfreeway expansion debated, but proceeding

  22. Provincial government unveils $3.3-billion project to span the Fraser River with 10 lanes The provincial government has scrapped its plan to twin the Port Mann Bridge in favour of a building a new 10-lane crossing over the Fraser River, at a cost of $3.3 billion. Premier Gordon Campbell said the new bridge, which will be built to accommodate rapid bus service, expanded cycling and pedestrian lanes and a possible light rail line, will ease congestion clogging the crossing and commuter delays by about one-third. Vancouver Sun 05-02-09

  23. Vancouver Civil Society’s Contributions Urban Design • Cyclists: gaining road space • Neighbourhoods: -- calming traffic -- increasing density

  24. Collaborative Governance of Urban Transportation: Challenges • Tragedy-of-the-commons dynamic: strong • Affected natural environment: unseen/global • Economic stakes: high • Power differentials: immense • Technical experts: accept delusion, deceit • Civil society oriented to public-interest lacks funding

  25. Result Individual neighbourhoods: becoming more livable • better for walking, cycling, transit; thus, more sustainable • this trend supported by all civil society interests BUT… Region as a whole: continuing to sprawl • costs to farmland, servicing, mobility • because road and rail mega-projects are supported by dominant interests

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