450 likes | 464 Views
Explore the roles of the United Nations Secretariat headed by the Secretary-General and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), promoting stability, development, and human rights worldwide. Learn about the composition, voting system, responsibilities, members, and key functions of these vital UN bodies.
E N D
Internationale Organisationen Kapitel VI: Die Vereinten Nationen –Sonstige Organe Prof. Dr. Andreas Zimmermann, LL.M. (Harvard)
Das Sekretariat Article 97 UN-Charter The Secretariat shall comprise a Secretary-General and such staff as the Organization may require. The Secretary-General shall be appointed by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. He shall be the chief administrative officer of the Organization.
Das Sekretariat Liste der Generalsekretäre • TrygveHalvdan Lie (Norwegian) 1946–53 • Dag Hammarskjöld (Swedish) 1953–61 • U Thant (Burmese) 1962–71 • Kurt Waldheim (Austrian) 1972–81 • Javier Pérez de Cuéllar (Peruvian) 1982–91 • Boutros Boutros-Ghali (Egyptian) 1992–96 • Kofi Annan (Ghanaian) 1997–2006 • Ban Ki-Moon (South Korean) 2007–2016 • Antonio Guterres (Portuguese) 2017-
Das Sekretariat Article 99 UN-Charter The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.
ECOSOC Art. 55 UN-Charter With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote: • higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development; • solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; and international cultural and educational cooperation; and • universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.
ECOSOC Article 60 Responsibility for the discharge of the functions of the Organization set forth in this Chapter shall be vested in the General Assembly and, under the authority of the General Assembly, in the Economic and Social Council, which shall have for this purpose the powers set forth in Chapter X.
Zusammensetzung ECOSO (1) Art. 61 UN-Charter 1. The Economic and Social Council shall consist of fifty-four Members of the United Nations elected by the General Assembly. 2. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 3, eighteen members of the Economic and Social Council shall be elected each year for a term of three years. A retiring member shall be eligible for immediate re-election. 3. […] 4. Each member of the Economic and Social Council shall have one representative
Zusammensetzung ECOSOC (2) Council's 54 member Governments are elected by the General Assembly for overlapping three-year terms (2016) Afghanistan (2018), Algeria (2018), Antigua and Barbuda (2016), Argentina (2017), Austria (2017), Bangladesh (2016), Belgium (2018), Botswana (2016), Brazil (2017), Burkina Faso (2017), Chile (2017), China (2016), Congo (2016), Congo DR (2016), Czech Republic (2018), Estonia (2017), Finland (2016), France (2017), Georgia (2016) Germany (2017), Greece (2017), Ghana (2017), Guatemala (2016), Guyana (2018), Honduras (2017), India (2017), Italy (2018), Iraq (2018), Japan (2017), Kazakhstan (2016), Lebanon (2018), Mauritania (2017), Moldova (2018), Nigeria (2018), Pakistan (2017), Panama (2016), Peru (2018), Portugal (2017), Russia (2016), Rwanda (2018), Serbia (2016), Somalia (2018), South Africa (2018), South Korea (2016), Sweden (2016), Switzerland (2018), Trinidad and Tobago (2017), Togo (2016), Uganda (2017), United Kingdom (2016), United States (2018), Vietnam (2018), Zimbabwe (2017)
Zusammensetzung ECOSOC (3) Verteilgungsschlüssel • Afrika: 14 • Asien: 11 • Osteuropa: 6 • Lateinamerika und Karibik: 10 • Westeuropa und restliche Staaten: 13
Abstimmungsmodalität Article 67 UN-Charter • Each member of the Economic and Social Council shall have one vote. • Decisions of the Economic and Social Council shall be made by a majority of the members present and voting.
Zuständigkeiten Article 62 UN-Charter 1. The Economic and Social Council may make or initiate studies and reports with respect to international economic, social, cultural, educational, health, and related matters and may make recommendations with respect to any such matters to the General Assembly to the Members of the United Nations, and to the specialized agencies concerned. 2. It may make recommendations for the purpose of promoting respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all. 3. It may prepare draft conventions for submission to the General Assembly, with respect to matters falling within its competence. 4. It may call, in accordance with the rules prescribed by the United Nations, international conferences on matters falling within its competence.
Verhältnis ECOSOC/GV Article 66 UN-Charter 1. The Economic and Social Council shall perform such functions as fall within its competence in connection with the carrying out of the recommendations of the General Assembly. 2. It may, with the approval of the General Assembly, perform services at the request of Members of the United Nations and at the request of specialized agencies. 3. It shall perform such other functions as are specified elsewhere in the present Charter or as may be assigned to it by the General Assembly.
Verhältnis ECOSOC/GV Article 60 UN-Charter Responsibility for the discharge of the functions of the Organization set forth in this Chapter shall be vested in the General Assembly and, under the authority of the General Assembly, in the Economic and Social Council, which shall have for this purpose the powers set forth in Chapter X.
Der Internationale Gerichtshof (IGH) – Kap. XIV (Art. 92-96)
Wahl der Richter Article 4 ICJ-Statute 1. The members of the Court shall be elected by the General Assembly and by the Security Council from a list of persons nominated by the national groups in the Permanent Court of Arbitration, in accordance with the following provisions. Article 8 ICJ-Statute The General Assembly and the Security Council shall proceed independently of one another to elect the members of the Court.
Zusammensetzung - Richter • Ronny Abraham, Frankreich, Präsident (bis 2018) • Abdulqawi Ahmed Yusuf, Somalia, Vizepräsident (bis 2018) • Christopher Greenwood, Vereinigtes Königreich (bis 2018) • Xue Hanqin, China (bis 2021) • Joan E. Donoghue, Vereinigte Staaten (bis 2024) • Giorgio Gaja, Italien (bis 2021) • Julia Sebutinde, Uganda (bis 2021) • Dalveer Bhandari, Indien (bis 2018) • Peter Tomka, Slowakei (bis 2021), • Patrick Lipton Robinson (bis 2024), • Hisashi Owada, Japan (bis 2021) • James Crawford, Australien (bis 2024) • Mohamed Bennouna, Marokko (bis 2024) • Kirill Gevorgian, Russische Föderation (bis 2024) • Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade, Brasilien (bis 2018)
Mitgliedschaft Article 93 UN-Charter 1. All Members of the United Nations are ipso facto parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice. 2. A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may become a party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice on conditions to be determined in each case by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.
Mitgliedschaft Article 35 ICJ-Statute 1. The Court shall be open to the states parties to the present Statute. 2. The conditions under which the Court shall be open to other states shall, subject to the special provisions contained in treaties in force, be laid down by the Security Council, but in no case shall such conditions place the parties in a position of inequality before the Court. 3. When a state which is not a Member of the United Nations is a party to a case, the Court shall fix the amount which that party is to contribute towards the expenses of the Court. This provision shall not apply if such state is bearing a share of the expenses of the Court.
Parteifähigkeit Article 34 ICJ-Statute 1. Only states may be parties in cases before the Court. 2. The Court, subject to and in conformity with its Rules, may request of public international organizations information relevant to cases before it, and shall receive such information presented by such organizations on their own initiative.
Zuständigkeit in Streitverfahren Art. 36 ICJ-Statute 1. The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it and all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in treaties and conventions in force. 2. The states parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning: a. the interpretation of a treaty; b. any question of international law; c. the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation; d. the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation. 3. The declarations referred to above may be made unconditionally or on condition of reciprocity on the part of several or certain states, or for a certain time.
Rechtsquellen Article 38 ICJ-Statute 1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law. 2. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex aequo et bono, if the parties agree thereto.
Einstweilige Maßnahmen LaGrand Fall ,ICJ Reports 2001, S. 502-503: “The context in which article 41 has to be seen within the Statute is to prevent the Court from being hampered in the exercise of its functions because the respective rights of the parties to a dispute before the Court are not preserved. It follows from the object and purpose of the Statute, as well as from the terms of article 41 when read in the context, that the power to indicate provisional measures entails that such measures should be binding, inasmuch as the power in question is based on the necessity, when the circumstances call for it, to safeguard, and to avoid prejudice to, the right of the parties as determined by the final judgment of the Court. The contention that provisional measures indicated under article 41 might not be binding would be contrary to the object and purpose of that article”.
Gutachten (1) Article 96 UN-Charter 1. The General Assembly or the Security Council may request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question. 2. Other organs of the United Nations and specialized agencies, which may at any time be so authorized by the General Assembly, may also request advisory opinions of the Court on legal questions arising within the scope of their activities.
Gutachten (2) Art. 65 ICJ-Statute 1. The Court may give an advisory opinion on any legal question at the request of whatever body may be authorized by or in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to make such a request. 2. Questions upon which the advisory opinion of the Court is asked shall be laid before the Court by means of a written request containing an exact statement of the question upon which an opinion is required, and accompanied by all documents likely to throw light upon the question.
Gutachten (3) Request for Advisory Opinion, transmitted to the Court pursuant to article 65, paragraph 2 of the Statute, 10 December 2003 Dear Mr. President, I have the honour to inform you that, in accordance with Article 96, paragraph 1 of the Charter of the United Nations, the General Assembly, by resolution A/RES/ES-10/14 (A/ES/-10/L.16) adopted on 8 December 2003 at the 23rd Meeting of the Resumed Tenth Emergency Special Session (90 votes in favour, 8 against, 74 abstentions) decided to request the International Court of Justice, pursuant to Article 65 of the Statute of the Court, to urgently render an advisory opinion on the following question: “What are the legal consequences arising from the construction of the wall being built by Israel, the occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, as described in the report of the Secretary General, considering the rules and principles of international law, including the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and relevant Security Council and General Assembly Resolutions? "
Gutachten (4) I.C.J. Pleadings, Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt Pursuant to resolution WHA 33.16 adopted by the World Health Assembly on 20 May 1980 and in accordance with Article 96, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations, Article 76 of the Constitution of the World Health Organization and Article X, paragraph 2, of the Agreement between the United Nations and the World Health Organization, I have the honour to lay before the International Court of Justice the following questions : "1. Are the negotiation and notice provisions of Section 37 of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the World Health Organization and Egypt applicable in the event that either party to the Agreement wishes to have the Regional Office transferred from the territory of Egypt ? 2. If so, what would be the legal responsibilities of both the World Health Organization and Egypt, with regard to the Regional Office in Alexandria, during the two-year period between notice and termination of the Agreement ?"
Gutachten (5) ICJ, Judgments of the Administrative Tribunal of the I .L.O. upon complaints made against the U. N. E.S. C. O., Advisory Opinion of October 23rd, 1956 I.C. J. Reports 1956, p. 77 [p. 86] “In view of this there would appear to be no compelling reason why the Court should not lend its assistance in the solution of a problem confronting a specialized agency of the United Nations authorized to ask for an Advisory Opinion of the Court. Notwithstanding the permissive character of Article 65 of the Statute in the matter of advisory opinions, only compelling reasons could cause the Court to adopt in this matter a negative attitude which would imperil the working of the régime established by the Statute of the Administrative Tribunal for the judicial protection of officials“.
Verhältnis IGH-SR (1) Art. 36 UN-Charter 3. In making recommendations under this Article the Security Council should also take into consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court.
Verhältnis IGH-SR (2) United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, Judgment, I.C. J. Reports 1980, p. 3., para. 40: Whereas Article 12 of the Charter expressly forbids the General Assembly to make any recommendation with regard to a dispute or situation while the Security Council is exercising its functions in respect of that dispute or situation, no such restriction is placed on the functioning of the Court by any provision of either the Charter or the Statute of the Court. The reasons are clear. It is for the Court, the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, to resolve any legal questions that may be in issue between parties to a dispute; and the resolution of such legal questions by the Court may be an important, and sometimes decisive, factor in promoting the peaceful settlement of the dispute.
Verhältnis IGH-SR (3) ICJ, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua(Nicaragua v. United States of America), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 392, Rn. 98: Nor can the Court accept that the present proceedings are objectionable as being in effect an appeal to the Court from an adverse decision of the Security Council. The Court is not asked to say that the Security Council was wrong in its decision, nor that there was anything inconsistent with law in the way in which the members of the Council employed their right to vote. The Court is asked to pass judgment on certain legal aspects of a situation which has also been considered by the Security Council, a procedure which is entirely consonant with its position as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. As to the inherent right of self-defence, the fact that it is referred to in the Charter as a "right" is indicative of a legal dimension; if in the present proceedings it becomes necessary for the Court to judge in this respect between the Parties […] it cannot be debarred from doing so by the existence of a procedure for the States concerned to report to the Security Council in this connection.
Verhältnis IGH-SR (4) ICJ, Certain expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2 of the Charter), Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962, I.C. J . Reports 1962, p. 151 [168] “In the legal systems of States, there is often some procedure for determining the validity of even a legislative or governmental act, but no analogous procedure is to be found in the structure of the United Nations. Proposals made during the drafting of the Charter to place the ultimate authority to interpret the Charter in the International Court of Justice were not accepted; the opinion which the Court is in course of rendering is an advisory opinion. As anticipated in 1945, therefore, each organ must, in the first place at least, determine its own jurisdiction. If the Security Council, for example, adopts a resolution purportedly for the maintenance of international peace and security and if, in accordance with a mandate or authorization in such resolution, the Secretary-General incurs financial obligations, these amounts must be presumed to constitute "expenses of the Organization".
Verhältnis IGH-SR(5) Security Council Resolution 748 (1992) The Security Council […] Determining in this context that the failure by the Libyan Government to demonstrate, by concrete actions its renunciation of terrorism and in particular its continued failure to respond fully and effectively to the requests in resolution 731 (1992), constitute a threat to international peace and security, […] Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 1. Decides that the Libyan Government must now comply without any further delay with paragraph 3 of resolution 731 (1992) regarding the requests contained in documents S/23306, S/23308 and S/23309;.
Verhältnis IGH-SR (6) ICJ, Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States ofAmerica), Provisional Measures, Order of 14 April1992, Para. 40 -41 Whereas both Libya and the United Kingdom, as Members of the United Nations, are obliged to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with Article 25 of the Charter; whereas the Court, which is at the stage of proceedings on provisional measures, considers that prima facie this obligation extends to the decision contained in resolution 748 (1992); and whereas, in accordance with Article 103 of the Charter, the obligations of the Parties in that respect prevail over their obligations under any other international agreement, including the Montreal Convention; Whereas the Court, while thus not at this stage called upon to determine definitively the legal effect of Security Council resolution 748 (1992), considers that, whatever the situation previous to the adoption of that resolution, the rights claimed by Libya under the Montreal Convention cannot now be regarded as appropriate for protection by the indication of provisional measures
Verhältnis IGH-SR(7) ICJ, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 16 89. Undoubtedly, the Court does not possess powers of judicial review or appeal in respect of the decisions taken by the United Nations organs concerned. The question of the validity or conformity with the Charter of General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) or of related Security Council resolutions does not form the subject of the request for advisory opinion. However, in the exercise of its judicial function and since objections have been advanced the Court, in the course of its reasoning, will consider these objections before determining any legal consequences arising from those resolutions.
Verhältnis IGH-SR(8) [Fortsetzung Namibia] 115. Applying these tests, the Court recalls that in the preamble of resolution 269 (1969), the Security Council was "Mindful of its responsibility to take necessary action to secure strict compliance with the obligations entered into by States Members of the United Nations under the provisions of Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations". The Court has therefore reached the conclusion that the decisions made by the Security Council in paragraphs 2 and 5 of resolutions 276 (1970), as related to paragraph 3 of resolution 264 (1969) and paragraph 5 of resolution 269 (1969), were adopted in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter and in accordance with its Articles 24 and 25. The decisions are consequently binding on al1 States Members of the United Nations, which are thus under obligation to accept and carry them out.
Verhältnis IGH-SR(9) ICJ, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2010, p. 403 47. There is, therefore, nothing incompatible with the integrity of the judicial function in the Court undertaking such a task. The question is, rather, whether it should decline to undertake that task unless it is the organ which has taken the decision that asks the Court to do so. In its Advisory Opinion on Certain Expenses of the United Nations, however, the Court responded to the question posed by the General Assembly, even though this necessarily required it to interpret a number of Security Council resolutions (namely, resolutions 143, 145 and 146 of 1960 and 161 and 169 of 1961) (Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1962, pp. 175-177). The Court also notes that, in its Advisory Opinion on Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations (Article 4 of the Charter) (I.C.J. Reports 1947-1948, pp. 61-62),
Verhältnis IGH-SR(10) [Fortsetzung Kosovo] …it responded to a request from the General Assembly even though that request referred to statements made in a meeting of the Security Council and it had been submitted that the Court should therefore exercise its discretion to decline to reply (I.C.J. Pleadings, Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations (Article 4 of the Charter), p. 90). Where, as here, the General Assembly has a legitimate interest in the answer to a question, the fact that that answer may turn, in part, on a decision of the Security Council is not sufficient to justify the Court in declining to give its opinion to the General Assembly. 48. Accordingly, the Court considers that there are no compelling reasons for it to decline to exercise its jurisdiction in respect of the present request.
Verhältnis IGH-SR(11) Art. 94 Abs. 2 UN-Charta: Kommt eine Streitpartei ihren Verpflichtungen aus einem Urteil des Gerichtshofs nicht nach, so kann sich die andere Partei an den Sicherheitsrat wenden; dieser kann, wenn er es für erforderlich hält, Empfehlungen abgeben oder Maßnahmen beschließen, um dem Urteil Wirksamkeit zu verschaffen.
Treuhandrat (Arbeit eingestellt) Artikel 77 UN-Charta (1) Das Treuhandsystem findet auf die zu den folgenden Gruppen gehörenden Hoheitsgebiete Anwendung, soweit sie auf Grund von Treuhandabkommen in dieses System einbezogen werden: a) gegenwärtig bestehende Mandatsgebiete; b) Hoheitsgebiete, die infolge des Zweiten Weltkriegs von Feindstaaten abgetrennt werden; c) Hoheitsgebiete, die von den für ihre Verwaltung verantwortlichen Staaten freiwillig in das System einbezogen werden. (2) Die Feststellung, welche Hoheitsgebiete aus den genannten Gruppen in das Treuhandsystem einbezogen werden und welche Bestimmungen hierfür gelten, bleibt einer späteren Übereinkunft vorbehalten.