WO Mick Stuart

1. WO Mick Stuart

2. RAF LC Objectives Leadership is the most cost effective way of improving operational effectiveness.   Leadership in the RAF can move from good to outstanding.   Our intent is to continue to discover, develop and deliver means of improving Leadership.

3. RAF LC Objectives By 2010 Leaders at all levels will: - Embrace Mission Command as an everyday practice. - Realise the importance of exercising each Leadership Attribute in achieving outstanding performance. - Realise the importance of being able to adopt a variety of Leadership styles and approaches.

4. RAF LC Objectives The RAFLC will: - Provide Leadership Policy for the RAF. - Align all Leadership Training Agencies to implement a coherent and consistent Leadership Development Strategy. - Provide practical support to Training Agencies and RAF personnel. - Sponsor education in Leadership and Research into RAF Leadership issues.

5. RAF Strategy Document

6. RAF LEADERSHIP CENTRE WEBSITE • Accessing the RAF Leadership Centre Website • http://www.cranwell.raf.r.mil.uk/live/RAF_Leadership_Centre /Index.htm

12. MISSION COMMAND

13. SCOPE • Origins. • Use and Development: 1805 to 2006. • Introduction to British Military Doctrine. • Principles of Mission Command. • ‘Mechanics.’ • Culture. • Threats and Opportunities.

14. Battle of Trafalgar21 Oct 1805

15. Band of Brothers

16. Nelson’s Orders for Trafalgar • ‘England expects that every man will do his duty.’ • ‘No captain will do so wrong if he puts his ship alongside that of the enemy.’

17. Jena and Auerstadt14 October 1806 PRUSSIA (Professionals and hot favourites) vs FRANCE (Upstart peasants – New Manager)

18. NAPOLEON BONAPARTE

19. SCHARNHORST • ‘We fought bravely enough, but not cleverly enough.’

20. CARL von CLAUSEWITZ ‘On War’(published posthumously 1832)

21. CLAUSEWITZ’ LEGACY • The Fog of War. • The Friction of War. • The importance of speed of decision making.

22. Findings of Scharnhorst’s ‘Board of Inquiry’ • The Prussian Army was run as a machine, with iron discipline, because the morale of the troops was low. • Officers tried to counter chaos of battle by using mathematical principles. • Nobody took action without orders. • Highly centralised and process-dominated. • It used ‘Befehltaktik’ – i.e. based on Orders.

23. Findings of Scharnhorst’s ‘Board of Inquiry’ • Napoleon was able to communicate very rapidly with his Marshals. • He explained his intentions, as well as what he wanted them to do. • He expected them to use their initiative. • They did! • The result was a very high tempo – a very fast ‘OODA loop.’

24. The OODA Loop Observation Orientation Action Decision

25. Reforms to the Prussian Army • The need for speed of decision making was recognised. • Officers were trained and authorised to make real-time decisions at low level. • Philosophy that it was better to act now with good intentions than to wait for the ‘right’ order. • Doing nothing was a greater sin than making the wrong decision. • Orders from above could not possibly give the officer on the ground all the guidance he would need.

26. Field Marshal Von Moltke • Father of ‘Auftragstaktik.’ • “Obedience is a principle, but the man stands above the principle.”

27. Auftragstaktik • Senior commanders should not order more than was absolutely necessary but should ensure the goal was clear. • In case of doubt, subordinate commanders should seize the initiative.

28. Franco Prussian War 1870

29. The Great War 1914

30. The OODA Loop Observation Orientation Action Decision

31. Sturm-Bataillione(Storm Battalion) • Storm Trooper • General Ludendorff • Auftragstaktik

32. Between the Wars

33. Germany (the Losers!) • Develops ‘an Army of 100,000 officers.’ • Training centred on ‘thinking obedience.’ • Trust becomes central to military doctrine. • Everyone expected to learn, and be able to do, the job 2 levels up. • Proves very effective in coping with and using the chaos of the battlefield.

34. British Army (the Victors!) • Reverts to ‘huntin’ shootin’ an’ fishin.’ • Prefers to try to control the chaos of the battlefield. • Designs a ‘Master plan.’ • Master plan specifies in great detail precisely what everyone has to do. • Yet, orders are not considered absolute. • Result is a lot of debating and delay – very slow OODA Loop.

35. The OODA Loop Observation Orientation Action Decision

36. Second World War

37. Royal Air Force Hugh Dowding – CinC Fighter Command Keith Park – AOC 11 Gp Trafford Leigh Mallory – 12 Gp Sqn Ldr ‘Sailor’ Malan Wg Cdr Stanford-Tuck

38. Royal Air Force • Unusually, prepares to fight the NEXT war. • Dowding designs ‘integrated defence system’ for Battle of Britain (NEC?). • Delegates responsibility for the fighting to Group Commanders. • Allows for a very fast OODA Loop. • One of the main reasons for the defeat of the Luftwaffe.

39. ‘In a nut-shell’ • Germany has outstanding first half using Auftragstaktik from the ‘off.’ • Big wins away in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Holland, Belgium France etc. etc. • Manager substitutes Befehltaktik for Auftragstaktik just after half time. • Germany loses away in Russia (Stalingrad City). • Loses to new Combined Services (US/UK). • Loses at home trying to play 2 games at once.

40. A Key Lesson… • ‘If an operating philosophy is to deliver a strategic advantage its application must be inculcated, practiced and seamlessly applied throughout the organisation.’

41. US Army Philosophy • Invest all authority and knowledge in the officers • No need to burden the troops with more information than they will need for the immediate future • Make the officers easily identifiable!

43. Cold War • Static posturing. • Everyone told what they had to do (Befehltaktik?). • Not ‘manoeuvre warfare.’ • Little need for Auftragstaktik. • But!! BAOR is seriously out-numbered and so…

44. Field Marshal Bagnall KCB GCB CVO MC* • 1986 – Introduces principles of Auftragstaktik to UK Military doctrine and influences NATO doctrine. • Doctrine becomes known as ‘Mission Command.’ • Great idea! • ……but nobody knows about it.

45. Principles

46. The 4 Enduring Tenets • Timely decision making • The importance of understanding the senior leader’s intent • A clear responsibility to fulfil that intent • An ability on the part of the subordinate to meet the superior’s intent

47. Required Leadership Styles • Decentralised decision making (formal delegation/empowerment) • Freedom (and speed) of action • Initiative

48. Required Followership • There is a fundamental requirement on everyone’s part to act (or decide not to act, if that is the right thing to do) within the framework of the Senior Leader’s intent • Waiting to be told is not an option!

49. Required Followership • Is designed to facilitate effective action under chaotic and confusing conditions. • Is based on trust. • Is intended to unify autonomy and alignment – ‘unity of effort’.

50. The Basic’s Telling someone ‘What to do’ AND Why? NOT ‘How to do it’