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T.M. Maleva O.V. Sinyavskaya Is it possible to raise fertility level in Russia? Results of new empirical studies. “Family in the Stream of Changes: Demographic Challenges to Social Policy” International conference Moscow, November 28-29,.
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T.M. Maleva O.V. Sinyavskaya Is it possible to raise fertility level in Russia? Results of new empirical studies “Family in the Stream of Changes: Demographic Challenges to Social Policy” International conference Moscow, November 28-29,
How to overcome the shortage of demographic data? Surveys of households as a source of demographic, economic and social behavior data Survey «Parents and children, men and women in families and society» (Russian GGS) Part of the Generations & Gender International Program (GGP) 1 respondent = 1 household Representative of the Russian Federation More than 2000 variables with info on respondent, his/her partner, parents, children and household members First wave Financed by RF PF, MPIDR, IISP Mid 2004 Second wave Financed by RF PF, UNFPA, Sberbank Mid 2007 Panel 7,880 2007 11,111 2004 11,261
Births within the lastthreeyears based on the number of children in a family
32 Second or subsequent child 68 28 First child 72 30 Total 70 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 city rural Which factors influence fertility? Fertility within the last three years depending on the type of settlement, percent
Fertility within the last three years in 5-year age groups of women, percent
Fertility within the last three years based on respondent’s and her partner’s employment status, percent
100% Higher, 20 90% 23 26 Including incomplete 80% 70% Completed vocational 38 60% 36 34 50% Primary vocational 40% 21 18 16 30% Secondary 20% 11 11 11 10% 14 13 12 No secondary 0% total First child Second and subsequent child 4 No secondary ed 3 Secondary 2 Primary vocational Deviation from mean , times 1 Completed vocational 0 Higher до 20 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 -1 Educational level of women who gave birth within the last three years, percent Age-adjusted fertility deviations in groups of women with various levels of educational, times
Actual number of children born per woman, decile groups of household, per capita incomes
Reproductive IntentionsProportion of women intending to have a child depending on the current number of children per family and type of settlement, percent in a group
70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 All women No children One child Two and more children General intentions, % in a group For 3 years, % in a group General, % total For 3 years, % total 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 under 20 20–24 25–29 30–34 35–39 40–44 3 years with no children 3 years with one and more children General with no children General with one and more children Intentions of women to have a child depending on the current number of children in a family, percent Distribution of women intending to have a child depending on their age and the current number of children per family
Proportion of women intending to have a child depending on the availability of a partner and current number of children, percent per group
Relative variation of actual and expected (if overall intentions are realized) number of children by mother’s age and educational levelActual number of children Expected number of children
Actual and potential number of children per woman of different religiosityActual number of children Potential number of children
Actual and potential average number of children per woman, decile groups Share of women intended to give birth (Right scale) Actual number of children (Left scale) Average actual number of children (Left scale) Potential number of children (Left scale) Average potential number of children 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 D e c i l e g r o u p s (Left scale)
Factors influencing reproductive behavior and reproductive intention Legend: “+” -relevant factor (regardless of direction) “ –” - statistically insignificant “0” -no relevant data
What is to be done?Lessons for social policy • Russia today has the capacity to boost fertility. Assuming all respondents desiring to have children in the future give birth to just one child, fertility may increase from 1.2 to 1.5 children per woman in the next three years. • Apart from low income, poor housing may prove to be a barrier to increased fertility (second and further births). • Economic fertility-boosting measures are not a cure all. Social factors are of no less importance, even though at times they are unrelated to the growth of economic wellbeing. • Family policy geared solely toward officially registered marriages may leave out large populations with a certain fertility potential. • Fertility growth unaccompanied by changes in labor relations, the introduction of flexible working schedules for women, development of child-care and educational facilities for children, may result in the fertility potential of well-educated and employed women remaining unfulfilled or a number of women significantly reducing time and effort in the labor market.
What is to be done?Lessons for social policy • Society should be prepared to accommodate the fact that Islamic populations will respond first to social fertility-boosting measures. • In order to take action, it is important to be informed. Sociologic research is needed to answer the following questions: • Are the intentions of respondents regarding future births likely to be fulfilled? • Which factors will boost fertility, and what are the barriers to boosting fertility? • Which factors will produce immediate and measurable effects and which will have “delayed” actions? • Will current trends be influenced by measures featured in the 2006 National Program? • And finally, will social and economic factors produce an unequal effect on population behavior today and reproductive intentions for the future? To be continued basing on the second wave…