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“Dilma Rousseff’s First Year in Office: Challenges & Positive Results” David Fleischer

“Dilma Rousseff’s First Year in Office: Challenges & Positive Results” David Fleischer Political Science Inst. University of Brasília "Why Brazilians Like Dilma Despite The Bad News?” Brazil Institute Woodrow Wilson Center Washington, DC January 11, 2012. Public Opinion Surveys:

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“Dilma Rousseff’s First Year in Office: Challenges & Positive Results” David Fleischer

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  1. “Dilma Rousseff’s First Year in Office: Challenges & Positive Results” David Fleischer Political Science Inst. University of Brasília "Why Brazilians Like Dilma Despite The Bad News?” Brazil Institute Woodrow Wilson Center Washington, DC January 11, 2012

  2. Public Opinion Surveys: Dilma’s Approval Rating Improves Better than Previous Presidents  after their third month in office Dilma Rousseff 2011 47% Lula 2003 43% FH Cardoso 1995 39% Itamar Franco 1992 34% Fernando Collor 1990 36%

  3. Datafolha . D i l m a 2 0 1 1 L u l a 2 0 0 3 . Gov’t. EvaluationMar.JuneAug.AprilJuneSept. Good/Excellent 47% 49% 48% 43% 42% 45% Regular 34% 38% 39% 40% 43% 42% Bad/Terrible 7% 10% 11% 10% 11% 10% DK/NR 12% 3% 2% 7% 4% 3%

  4. CNI / Ibope D i l m a 2 0 1 1 L u l a 2 0 0 3 . Evaluation of PresidentMar.JulySept.Dec. Mar.JuneSept.Dec. Approve 73% 67% 71% 72% 75% 70% 69% 66% Disapprove 12% 25% 21% 21% 13% 18% 24% 25% DK/NR 14% 8% 8% 7% 12% 11% 8% 9% D i l m a 2 0 1 1 L u l a 2 0 0 3 . Evaluation of Gov’t.Mar.JulySept.Dec.Mar.JuneSept.Dec. Good/Excel. 56% 48% 51% 56% 51% 43% 43% 41% Regular 27% 36% 34% 32% 36% 38% 40% 43% Bad/Terrible 5% 12% 11% 9% 7% 11% 14% 14% DK/NR 11% 4% 4% 3% 6% 8% 4% 2%

  5. Because Dilma Rousseff was elected on the “coattails” of Lula’s popularity in Oct. 2010,  80% approval rating Many thought her government would be “Lula’s third term” Only in part:  16 cabinet ministers were holdovers from Lula’s government

  6. BUT Dilma “came into her own” up front  strong human rights positions - Domestic  “Truth Commission” - International  “Responsibility while Protecting” - Libya & Syria

  7. Some of Dilma’s “torture colleagues” who were special guestsat her inauguration reception at Itamaraty.

  8. - Dilma did not “ignore” corruption accusations - Lula & Cardoso “looked the other way” - cabinet “housecleaning” - SIX ministers replaced - PMDB (3), PR, PCdoB & PDT - all were Lula holdovers - these parties did not leave the coalition

  9. Strong majority in Congress - Lula campaigned to defeat PSDB & DEM senators in 2010 - Opposition weakened (new PSD in Oct. 2011) - can not convoke CPIs Some “strains” with PMDB coalition partner - austerity budget cuts - release of budget items & federal appointments In 2011, Dilma Gov’t. approved almost everything - Minimum Wage calculation - DRU - “Truth Commission” - Super Cade (anti-trust/pro-competition)

  10. Some “defeats”: - forest code vote (modifications in 2012) - petroleum royalties (modifications in 2012) - New “health tax” - rejected

  11. ChamberSenate Parties2010201120102011 Governent3584024964 PT 79 85 8 13 PMDB 90 78 17 18 PSD0047002 PSB 27 29 2 4 PDT 23 27 6 5 PR 41 37 4 8 PP 40 39 1 5 PTB 21 20 7 6 PCdoB 12 13 1 2 Other 25 27 7 1 Opposition1371023016 PSDB 59 51 16 10 DEM 56 27 13 5 PPS 15 11 0 0 Other 7 13 1 0 Other17821

  12. The Economy: - GDP declines – 7.5%(2010)  2.9%(2011)? - IPCA inflation in 2011  6.50% (upper limit) - IPC-C1 was 5.98% - New job creation reduced - Consumer buying down slightly - IP was up +2.5% YoY in November/11 - Unemployment very low  5.2% in Nov/11 - Average salaries have increased - Strong demand for certain job skills - Selic rates down – 12.5%  11.0%

  13. December 2011  January 2012 Cabinet Reform in January (or February):

  14. - Ministers should “step down” to run for Mayor - Haddad (PT) Education São Paulo - Mercadante (PT), S&T  Education(?) Maybe PSB  S&T - Bezerra (PSB) Integration Recife - accusations: budget amendments, nepotism?  “friendly fire”?? ???  Integration - Iriny Lopes (PT) Women  Vitória - This Ministry might be “preserved”

  15. - Other ministers might be “replaced”: - Labor, Paulo Roberto Pinto (PDT) interim - MTPS?? - Cities, Mário Negromonte (PP) - might be dismembered (??) - Culture, Ana Hollanda (PT) - Ag. Development, Afonso Florence (PT) - MDIC, Fernando Pimentel (PT) - accusations: “enrichment” as consultant  “friendly fire”??

  16. Might lose cabinet “status”: • - Fishing (PT)  Agriculture • - Ports (PSB)  Transportation • - Sec. Women (PT)  Justice (probably not) • - Human Rights (PT)  Justice • - Social Equality (PT)  Justice • - Strategic Affairs (PMDB)  Planning • - Tourism (PMDB)  MDIC •  Accommodate the PSD in Cabinet

  17. What to watch for in 2012?

  18. Municipal elections in October - PT “accommodation” with allied parties - task Lula might reassume in March - PMDB, compete “head-to-head” with PT in 14 of 26 state capital cities - in 2008, competed in only eight capitals - PSB, might expand its “coverage” in 2012 - PSDB, DEM & PPS – might decline -- 2012  2014(??) - expansion at municipal level means party elects more deputies in 2014 (& vice-versa)

  19. Finalization of legislation: - Forestry Code - Petrol Law – distribution of royalties - Law “regulating” World Cup (2014) & Olympics (2016)

  20. Foreign Affairs: - Dilma to visit Washington in March - Rio+20 in June - G-20 financial/economic debate  European “problem”  Reform of IMF & World Bank  “Currency Warfare” - UN decisions on Syria & Iran  Human Rights investigations  Iranian nuclear program  Increased sanctions possible(?)

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