1 / 9

AGEC/FNR 406 LECTURE 15

AGEC/FNR 406 LECTURE 15. Pesticide Leaching Potential from Field Crops. Possible Interventions. 1. Moral suasion . 2. Government provision of goods. 3. Damage prevention . 4. Command and control. 5. Economic Incentives.

guy
Download Presentation

AGEC/FNR 406 LECTURE 15

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. AGEC/FNR 406 LECTURE 15 Pesticide Leaching Potential from Field Crops

  2. Possible Interventions 1. Moral suasion 2. Government provision of goods 3. Damage prevention 4. Command and control 5. Economic Incentives

  3. Economic Incentives 1. Tax (per-unit penalty) 2. Subsidy (per-unit reward) 3. Transferable Permits (market-based)

  4. Focus on case of negative externality and compare: 1. Command and control (direct regulation) 2. Tax 3. Subsidy

  5. MAX SMC = PMC + MD PMC PMB=SMB Q M Q Command and Control Set limit on emission or specify technology

  6. SMC = MC + tax MC Tax = MD Q Pigouvian Tax Set tax = marginal damage rate

  7. Subsidy Often used in conjunction with technology MSC (Tech 1) MSC (Tech 2) MPC (Tech 2) MPC (Tech 1) Subsidy

  8. Command and Control Consists of government-specified rules and regulations, often with fines and charges for violations. Most effective: 1. When monitoring costs are high 2. When optimal emission is near zero 3. During random or emergency events

  9. Drawback of C+C: If marginal abatement costs are different for different pollutors, then C+C will lead to an inefficient allocation of clean up burden among different producers.

More Related