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CCSDS Security WG -

CCSDS Security WG - . I. Aguilar, D. Fischer CCSDS Fall 2012 Meeting, Cleveland, USA 15/10/2012. Motivation.

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CCSDS Security WG -

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  1. CCSDS Security WG - I. Aguilar, D. FischerCCSDS Fall 2012 Meeting, Cleveland, USA15/10/2012

  2. Motivation • The objective of this presentation is to share information concerning recent ESA activities and participation to conferences and workshops which is deemed relevant to the CCSDS Security Working Group. • Information. • Discussion of possible new areas for work.

  3. Topics • Physical Layer Security (IAS). • Ongoing Key Management Research at ESA-University of Waterloo (IAS/DF). • Directions in Authenticated Ciphers (DIAC 2012 Workshop) - Debriefing (IAS/DF). • ESTEL 2012 Conference - Debriefing (IAS). • SpaceOps 2012 Conference – Debriefing (DF).

  4. Physical Layer SecurityCryptographic spread spectrum (1) • As part of a general effort to strengthen TT&C links against denial-of-service attacks (jamming), ESA initiated research on two specific topics: • Cryptographic sequences to be applied on spread spectrum communications with multiple-user access capability and • Advanced synchronization techniques able to acquire such ultra-long codes under signal dynamic conditions (Doppler, jerk) experienced by various missions topologies as well as under stress (jamming). • Such research was funded with an activity of the ESA Technology Research Programme (TRP). Thales Alenia Space (Italy), a leading European supplier of ‘robust’ transponders, teamed up with Prof. J. Massey, a well-known authority on both pseudo-noise sequences and cryptography.

  5. Physical Layer SecurityCryptographic spread spectrum (2) • The research effort delivered good results. A family of pseudo-noise sequences that can provide both cryptographic strength and controlled cross-correlation, vital for multi-user access was identified. • Cryptographic Pseudo-Noise Sequences: • LetPNCRbe the cryptographically strong1 PN sequence that is assigned to every satellite. • LetPNMA(i)be the periodic1 PN spreading sequence whose first period corresponds to the phase of the maximal-length sequence that is assigned to theithsatellite. • Spreading sequencePN(i)used by the G/S for transmission to theithsatellite is the Hadamard productof PNCRand PNMA(i), i.e., PN(i) = PNCRPNMA(i).

  6. Physical Layer SecurityCryptographic spread spectrum (3) • Furthermore, techniques to quickly synchronize very long PN sequences were identified, analysed and evaluated. • Those techniques, based on frequency-domain signal processing algorithms (Generalized Zero Padding), have improved several orders of magnitude the performance compared with classical serial search techniques. • In combination with a clever 3-step acquisition protocol, they allow to transit from an already long PN sequence (2exp 22) to a cryptographic sequence in a few seconds. • Some details of the acquisition technique can be found on the following paper presented at MILCOM 2011. • Fast acquisition techniques for very long PN codes for On-Board Secure TTC transponders, L. Simone, G.Fittipaldi, I. Aguilar Sánchez.

  7. Physical Layer SecurityAdvanced TC Coding (1) • CCSDS Telecommand SpaceLink Protocol employs BCH code either in TED (triple error detection) or SED (single error correction) modes. • High integrity; • Somewhat limited coding gain; • Average White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) channel. • Such BCH codes are sub-optimal for spread spectrum modulations. • Poor performance under jamming, which produces burst errors. • Enhancement for cryptographic direct-sequence spread-spectrum modulation highly desirable. • Potential to increase robustness under interference/jamming. • Concatenation of convolutional (r=1/2, K=7) existing for a while in systems like TDRSS and used in missions like ATV • Improvement under AWGN condition; • Still too sensitive to burst errors.

  8. Physical Layer SecurityAdvanced TC Coding (2) • Can better codes be found to complement cryptographic direct-sequence spread-spectrum modulation? • Consider the particular requirements of TC protocol like the ability to encode from short (64 octets) to relatively large (1024 octets) blocks of data; • Consider most destructive jamming signals for direct-sequence modulation (e.g. pulsed jammer); • Consider coding literature; • Consider relevant CCSDS experience. • A study with Politecnico di Torino (Italy) and Univ. Politecnicadelle Marche (Italy) just initiated in September 2012. • Team has very strong record both on coding and CCSDS; • Targets mainly Binary Low Density Parity Check Codes (LDPC); • Considers as well NASA LDPC codes proposed for TC (in AWGN condition) but under jamming environment.

  9. Physical Layer SecuritySecret channels • C. Shannon, the father of Information Theory, among other key works established the foundations of secret channel capacity; • A.D. Wynerbuilds on previous Shannon work on secret channels and produces another seminal paper • The Wire-Tap Channel, Bell System Technical Journal, 1975.

  10. Physical Layer SecurityWhy bother? • The design of proper ‘channel codes’ can increase the Rate of Equivocation (term defined by Shannon) of the eavesdropper; • In theory, no need for data encryption with such codes on a wireless channel! • Unbreakable, regardless of attacker’s computing power; • Mobile communications research community is very actively working on this subject; • Authentication also possible; • The cryptographers contender to quantum encryption, working on RF! • In the absence of my personal database on this topic (hard disk with all my files undergoing encryption at ESTEC!) present some slides from Vince Poor (Princeton) covering the topic. • http://wireless.vt.edu/symposium/2012/keynote/poor.html

  11. On-going Key Management ResearchESA NPI (1) • ESA and the University of Waterloo (Canada) are working together on key management research for space missions under the ESA Network Partnering Initiative (NPI). • Each partner funds 50% of the research. • Research can be for a Ph.D. or post-doc. • Dr.MarcioJuliato (Univ. of Waterloo) is the lead researcher. • Project Co-supervisors: • Prof. Catherine H. Gebotys (Univ. of Waterloo); • I. Aguilar Sánchez (ESA/ESTEC). • Project Details: • Schedule: • 3-years, initiated summer 2011, • of which 1-year stay at ESTEC with visits to ESOC.

  12. On-going Key Management ResearchESA NPI (2) • 3 Phases: • Phase 1, focusing on providing scientific basis for the determination of crypto periods for TC and TM secure communications links on space missions based on symmetric algorithms; 2 generic missions considered with GEO and LEO orbits; • Phase 2, looking at the use of trusted modules for key management/recovery; • Phase 3, investigating more complex mission topologies like those relying on space networks and the application of asymmetric algorithms to support key management. • Results of first phase: • Draft Technical Report produced; • Paper recently presented at IEEE AESS ESTEL 2012 Conference. • On the Specification of Symmetric Key Management Parameters for Secure Space Missions, MarcioJuliato, Catherine Gebotys, Ignacio Aguilar Sanchez.

  13. Directions in Authenticated Ciphers (DIAC 2012 Workshop) (1) • This workshop is part of ECRYPT, the European Network of Excellence in Cryptology; this is a network funded by the European Commission Seventh Framework Programme. • This workshop gathered top cryptographers and practitioners in industry and academia like • B. Preneel, Univ. KatoliekLeuven (Belgium); • P. Rogaway, Univ. of California at Davis, USA; • J. Daemen, STM Microelectronics, AES father; • A, McGrew, CISCO, USA (AES-GCM father); • The following website provides relevant information: • http://hyperelliptic.org/DIAC/ • ESA presented a ‘white paper’ with a view to inform the research community and possibly trigger their interest about the particular requirements, issues, constraints and concerns of authenticated encryption: • Authenticated encryption in civilian space missions: context and requirements, I. Aguilar Sánchez, D. Fischer

  14. Directions in Authenticated Ciphers (DIAC 2012 Workshop) (2) • Feedback: • Space considered a user community at one (tough) end of the spectrum of user requirements (T. Lange dixit); • At opposite end one can find the so-called ‘lightweight cryptography’ (e.g. embedded processors); • Some surprise shown by the anticipated need for a MAC longer than 128 bits (D. McGrew); • Doubt raised about the true security strength given by a particular MAC length, triggered by conversation with P. Rogaway; apparently a 128-bit MAC would give 128-bit security (not 64-bit); question still to be solved! • NIST and some top non-European Universities (USA, Japan) actively involved in the Workshop; • Possibly a new competition for an advanced AE algorithm in the pipeline; certainly, a lot of interest by represented parties; however, who would fund it?

  15. ESTEL 2012 Conference • See http://www.estelconference.org/ • Organised by IEEE Aerospace and Electronic Systems Society in Europe (a first!); • Broad scope: satellites, launchers, navigation, earth observation, ground systems, satellite networks,… • A Special Track on Security and Privacy… • Covering a broad range of security issues, well beyond space missions. • But a good Security Session in general program with papers like • Marcio’s paper on Key Management; • Cryptographic Transforms for a Lightweight and Efficient DVB Link-Layer Security Extension, Michael Nosterning, University of Salzburg; • Ignacio’s paper on Telecommunication Mission Security, including PR campaign for CCSDS Security!

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