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Developing a Comprehensive GENI Cyber Security Program

Developing a Comprehensive GENI Cyber Security Program. Adam Slagell (slagell@illinois.edu) GEC 7, Duke & RENCI March 17, 2010. What is a “comprehensive security program”?. About operational security & incident response Not GENI software stack, authN/Z mechanisms, etc

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Developing a Comprehensive GENI Cyber Security Program

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  1. Developing a Comprehensive GENI Cyber Security Program Adam Slagell (slagell@illinois.edu) GEC 7, Duke & RENCI March 17, 2010

  2. What is a “comprehensive security program”? • About operational security & incident response • Not GENI software stack, authN/Z mechanisms, etc • Not writing code, but developing processes & policies • Describes mechanisms for prevention & detection of security incidents • Including roles for different parties • Focuses on collaborative, cross-organizational efforts • Has plans to react to incidents • What do all the stakeholders do? • Many roles, with different responsibilities. • Materials and processes to disseminate plans

  3. How do we develop our security program? • Understand assets, threats & risks • Perform risk analysis • Develop security policy architecture • Includes high-level policies, standards, guidelines, procedures and agreements • More about social processes than technology specific • Develop security architectures • Monitoring tools for incident response • Configuration guidelines and standards • Especially for centrally located or shared assets • Education, Training, & Compliance • Not clear this early what that means for GENI • Need to understand roles and responsibilities first

  4. Performing a risk assessment • Identify assets and their value • Very qualitative • Identify threats & vulnerabilities • Determine probability and impact of threats • Select countermeasures • Limited options here: policies, hardening guidelines, collaborative monitoring tools

  5. Developing security policies • Many types of policies • Agreements: with researchers, aggregates, universities, partners, etc • Policies about monitoring, processes for IR, organizational roles and responsibilities • Best practices for researchers, aggregate security, updates • We can’t wait for risk assessment first! Spiral 3 coming! • Need a interim policies, Vic discussed some of the content • Base off of lessons learned in OSG, PlanetLab, etc

  6. Developing security architectures • Most assets not owned centrally by GENI • System is going to evolve organically, less amenable to top-down approach • What can we define? • IDS, tools for collaboration, logging & monitoring infrastructure • Maybe are aggregates connected, and how do we provide isolation • How are centralized resources hardened (e.g., CA’s, clearing houses) • Not clear what may be centrally controlled by GMOC • We can provide guidelines in any case

  7. Where are we now? • NCSA started work after GEC 6 • Caveat: 1/3 FTE total • We created incident response use cases • Long list of potential things a GENI IR team may encounter • E.g., Request from LE, experiment used for attack, etc • Welcome feedback, go to our wiki page • Stakeholder and asset identification • Qualitative values of assets • Tangible and intangible • First, first draft; needs feedback!

  8. We need you! • We cannot evaluate criticality of assets in isolation • Need input on the methodology • Need input from all stakeholders on actual assed values • Are we complete? • Some assets may be obsolete as they will no longer exist • May be new things since we read docs • May just not be creative enough • Feedback is vital before we start evaluating impact of threats.

  9. Timeline for feedback • Asset Valuation and Risk Assessment report v. 0.1 • When: Now • Where: on our project wiki space • Asset Valuation and Risk Assessment report v. 0.2 • Added some threats, incorporated feedback • When: May 1, 2010 • Asset Valuation and Risk Assessment report v. 0.3 • Risk analysis of partial list of threats, incorporated feedback • When: June, 2010 • Interim Operational Security Plan 0.1 • When: during the month after & during GEC 8

  10. A modest proposal • Observations • There are a LOT of GENI documents • There are lots of versions of each • They are spread out everywhere • Some people don’t even upload them to the GENI wiki • Security and operations need to think holistically • I spend an inordinate amount of time searching for new docs • People in OMIS likely interested in similar docs • Proposal • Utilize the email list more. • Send a note with link and summary when you create a new doc (or make major revisions)

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