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Shorter Quasi-Adaptive NIZK Proofs for Linear Subspaces. Charanjit Jutla, IBM Watson and Arnab Roy, Fujitsu Labs of America. El-Gamal Encryption. a ∗ g , x ∗ g , x · a ∗ g ≈ a ∗ g , x ∗ g , x ′ · a ∗ g (DDH)
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Shorter Quasi-Adaptive NIZK Proofs for Linear Subspaces Charanjit Jutla, IBM Watson and Arnab Roy, Fujitsu Labs of America
El-Gamal Encryption • a ∗ g , x ∗ g , x · a ∗ g≈ a ∗ g ,x ∗ g, x ′ · a ∗ g(DDH) • a ∗ g , x ∗ g, x · a ∗ g≈ a ∗ g , x ∗ g, (c ∗ f + x · a ∗ g) • c ∗ g , fc ∗ g , f • (El-Gamal Encryption of c ∗ f) • a, x, c :: a = a ∗ g , = x ∗ g , = c ∗ g , = c ∗ f + x · a ∗ g • x, c :: = x ∗ g , = c ∗ g , = c ∗ f + x ∗ a x, c :: (, , ) = a
El-Gamal Encryption • Public Parameters: g, a, f D and CRS CRS-gen(g, a, f ) • Honest Party: • Choose x, c at random, generate , , and proof π Adv • (Need to hide x, c from Adv.) • Replace πwith simulated proofπ‘ • So, x and c no more needed in proof gen. • a ∗ g , x ∗ g, (c ∗ f + x · a ∗ g) ≈a ∗ g , x ∗ g, x · a ∗ g • c ∗ g , fc ∗ g , f • CRS-gen better be a polynomial time Turing Machine. • 4. c ∗ f not needed in simulation to Adv.
Comparison with Groth-Sahai • n : the number of equations • t : the number of witnesses
Conceptual Comparison • n : the number of equations • t : the number of witnesses
Dual-System IBE with a hint from QA-NIZKs • A fully-secure (perfectly complete, anonymous) IBE follows under SXDH. • Only 4 group elements. • (shortest under static standard assumptions) • Recently and independently CLLWW-12 : 5 group elements and larger MPK. • Dual-system IBE (Waters 08) has built-in QA-NIZK and obtains effective simulation soundness using smooth hash-proofs.
Quasi-Adaptive NIZK Definition • (K0, K1, P, V) is a QA-NIZK for a distribution D on collection of relations Rρ if there exists a PPT simulator (S1, S2) such that for all PPT adversaries A1, A2, A3: • (Completeness) Pr[ λ←K0(1m); ρ ←D; ψ← K1(λ; ρ ); (x;w) ← A1(λ; ψ ; ρ ); π ← P(ψ; x;w) : V(ψ; x; π ) = 1 if Rρ(x;w)] = 1 • (Computational-Soundness) Pr[λ←K0(1m); ρ ←D; ψ← K1(λ; ρ ); (x; π) ← A2(λ; ψ ; ρ ) : V(ψ; x; π) = 1 and not (∃w : Rρ(x;w))] ≈0 • QA ZK Pr[λ←K0(1m); ρ ←D; ψ← K1(λ; ρ ): A3 P(ψ; .;.) (λ; ψ ; ρ) = 1] ≈ Pr[λ←K0(1m); ρ ←D; (ψ, τ) ← S1(λ; ρ ) :A3 S2(ψ; τ; .; *) (λ; ψ ; ρ) = 1]
Novel Quasi-Adaptive NIZK • Can the CRS depend on defining matrix, i.e. g,f, a ? • Yes, g,f, a are defined by a trusted party, who can also set CRS for NIZK depending ong,f, a • Problem:g,f, a are not constant, but are chosen according to some distribution. • The hardness of DDH (hence encryption security) depends on this choice.
Novel Quasi-Adaptive NIZK • Can the CRS depend on defining matrix or g, f, a ? • Yes, g, f, a are defined by a trusted party, who can also set CRS for NIZK depending on g, f, a • Problem: g, f, a are not constant, but are chosen according to some distribution. • The hardness of DDH (hence encryption security) depends on this choice. • CRS can depend on defining matrix, but CRS-gen must be a single efficient machine for the distribution of defining matrix. • Most applications can use this notion.
QA-NIZK for Hard Linear Subspaces Prover CRS Verifier CRS