Strengthening Counter-Terrorism Cooperation with Pakistan

1. “EYES ONLY” President and Vice President of the United States Nov 15, 2011

2. The Issue • In light of the near collapse of counter-terrorism cooperation between The CIA and the ISI, how could the US Maintain cooperation and strong ties in the short term while increasing influence over ISI and bolster civilian institutions in the medium term.

3. Vital National Interests: • No nuclear 9/11: loss, theft of nuclear weapon or nuclear material to thieves, Taliban or al Qaeda sympathizer and ISI or custodians that could fuel. • No takeover of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal by radical Islamic extremists seizing control of the country or a substantial part of the country. • No splintering of nuclear arsenal with collapse of the state that would then allow takeover of parts of the arsenal by Islamic extremists or loose nukes. • Vital/extremely important: • No sanctuary/safe haven for headquarters, organization, training of al Qaeda and equivalent global terrorists for 9/11’s and 9/11’s plus. • No nuclear war between India and Pakistan: deaths of millions or tens of millions; puncture of nuclear taboo; change our world. • No South Asian arms race. • Other extremely or important interests that are engaged and that may be more probably engaged by developments in Pakistan: • Stability of transit routes through Pakistan to Central Asia for military operations and energy resources. • Stable, civilian governance of Pakistan, loosely along democratic lines, with resolution to multiple internal insurgencies (FATA, NWFP, Balochistan, Kashmir, insofar as these are drivers of international instability and exacerbate threats to above mentioned risks).

4. Strategic objectives PRIMARY OBJECTIVES 1. Prevent attacks on the US interests at home or abroad, including US forces in Afghanistan 2. Encourage Pakistan to act as a stabilizing force in the region 3. Long-term stability of Pakistan’s government to ensure the security of nuclear arsenal SECONDARY OBJECTIVES • Improved democratic governance within Pakistan • Long-term sustainable development in all regions of Pakistan

5. Critical Facts & Assumptions FACTS Intelligence ties reaching a nadir • The United States has been asked to steeply reduce the number of CIA operatives, Special Operations forces working in Pakistan, and put on hold C.I.A. drone strikes aimed at militants in northwest Pakistan. • The cuts threatened to badly severely hamper American efforts to combat militants who use Pakistan as a base to fight American forces in Afghanistan and plot terrorist attacks abroad. • Given the reluctance of the Pakistani military to root out Qaeda and Taliban militants from the tribal areas, increasing CIA drone strikes are indispensable to achieving the goal of killing militants. • The Pakistani army firmly believes that Washington’s real aim in Pakistan is to neutralize the nation’s prized nuclear arsenal. • The ISI is seeking more visibility into the nature of C.I.A. covert operations in the country, and demanding that the drones strikes return to its original, more limited scope and remain focused narrowly on North Waziristan, the prime militant stronghold. • The Pakistanis are concerned about American efforts to gather intelligence on a number of militant groups with ties to Pakistan's intelligence agency,includingLashkar-e-Taiba and the Haqqani network • The lack of a robust counter-terrorism relationship between the ISI and the CIA will give al Qaeda and other groups more space when planning attacks on the U.S. and Europe. ASSUMPTIONS • A global intel network is required to counter transnational terrorist threats -- No single agency can possibly have access to all necessary information • Locals can infiltrate Islamist terrorist groups more easily than non-locals • Intel relationship essentials: trust, common interests & perceived benefits • Third Party Rule... state sensitivities obstacle to intel cooperation oversight • Afghanistan, India & Pakistan security challenges are inextricably linked • Current level of political uncertainty & corruption is source of great concern • Impact on human rights & civil liberties of past intel cooperation activities

6. Options 6

7. Recommendation and Next steps • Maintain cooperation and strong ties with ISI • Seek to increase influence over ISI through joint exercises, training, and funding incentives • Use existing provisions in Kerry-Lugar and other bills to strengthen civilian governance and alternative intelligence institutions • Ensure greater civilian control and accountability over disbursement of funds • Direct greater funding and support to Intelligence Bureau within the Ministry of Interior and Pakistani Police • Continue to press ISI on support for anti-US insurgent groups • Generate pressure with evidence of complicity and irrefutable actionable intelligence (such as pictures of Quetta Shura) • Develop stronger accountability mechanisms • Support military efforts in Swat and Waziristan • Continue to provide drone data

8. Option 1 - Detail • Option 1: Reduce dependence on ISI • Steer funding over time away from ISI to supporting civilian government and alternate security agencies in the police and Interior Ministry’s Intelligence Bureau • ISI has funded insurgent groups in Afghanistan and terrorist groups who have attacked US allies (e.g. India) • US funding has not significantly increased leverage over the ISI • Seek to establish greater human intelligence presence independent from ISI in Pakistan • ISI has at times been selective in its intelligence sharing and hesitant to target some of al Qaeda’s leadership • Increase scope of actions outside ISI approval • Drone attacks have been successful despite public Pakistani opposition • While ISI has leverage to hurt US interests in counter-terrorism and in Afghanistan, even when “cooperating” it has funded US enemies and shown limited appetite for targeting al Qaeda in some areas of the country

9. Option 2 - Detail • Option 2: Increased cooperation • Seek a relationship similar to the US-Jordanian relationship • Embedding of US personnel with domestic intel teams • Permanent US personnel presence • Greater and more open two-way intelligence sharing • Encourage this greater cooperation through additional funding and fewer conditions • Address military anger over conditions in Kerry-Lugar • Prove long-term commitment by assuring ISI that conditions in K-L are not an “escape clause” for the US to pull out down the road • Subtle effects of closer cooperation should begin to address some human rights and governance concerns • Training exchanges and closer cooperation may influence officers with US values more so than increased isolation

10. Option 3 - Detail • Option 3: Smarter status quo • The current approach is providing benefits • CT: Cooperation on high value targets (KSM, al Libi), implicit acceptance of drone strikes against high-value targets • Afghanistan: Ongoing offensives in Swat and Waziristan, some increased cooperation on the border • Dramatic changes in policy likely to harm our interests • ISI likely to continue to pursue its interests in Afghanistan and resist US embedding even with increased funding and reduced conditions- interests exceed funding • Isolation of side-stepping of ISI is a limited option given ISI leverage: intelligence flows from ISI critical for CT, significant ability to hurt US interests in Afghanistan • Small steps are possible • Encourage greater training exchanges and joint operations to increase influence • Use existing Kerry-Lugar and other provisions to strengthen civilian control slowly over time • Provide actionable intelligence (such as pictures of Quetta Shura) and develop stronger accountability mechanisms

11. Legal Constraints and Congressional Oversight • Legal constraints around cooperation with ISI: No recent change; as defined by the National Security Act of 1947, Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Annual Intelligence Activities Authorization Act, etc. • Congressional Oversight: The Kerry-Lugar Act • No security-related assistance (including offers to sell major defence equipment) be provided to Pakistan without an annual certification requirement that Pakistan Government, including by any elements within the Pakistan military or its intelligence agency, is ceasing support to extremist and terrorist groups, and preventing al-Qaeda, the Taliban and associated terrorist groups from operating in the territory of Pakistan • Includes requirements for civilian control of certain assistance • Monitoring • Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report • Comprehensive Regional Strategy Report • Detailed Semi-Annual Monitoring Reports • GAO Reports • Pakistani Army reaction: Concern about the impact on national security and efforts by members of the Gilani government to weaken the army and the ISI

12. Pakistani Intel Agencies Inter-Services Intelligence (premier intelligence & security organization) • Constitutionally, accountable to Prime Minister; however, most officers are from the Army... where their loyalties & interests lie • Musharraf exercised firm control until end of 2007; now unclear • Jul 08: decision to bring under interior ministry revoked within hours • Nov 08: government disbanded ISI’s political wing • Collects domestic & foreign intelligence, maintains a special military-trained action group & conducts political espionage Intelligence Bureau (main domestic intelligence & espionage agency) • Conducts political surveillance • No formal arrest powers, but police arrest at request of IB officials • IB granted control of government censorship programs in 1996 Military Intelligence • Focused on military/weapons installations & border control security • Routine operations are similar to the ISI & IB

13. ISI Controversies • Critics assert ISI operates autonomously without civilian or military control • US placed Pakistan on terrorist watch list in 1993 for failing to buy back Stinger missiles from Mujahedeen; removed after Nasir’s tenure as ISI chief • Appears to be divisions regarding sympathy towards militant groups • India claims ISI supports Kashmir separatists with training, arms, logistics • India accused ISI of masterminding 1993 Mumbai bombings • US warned Pakistan to cease terrorist operations in India in the late 1990s • ISI tolerated, perhaps encouraged, AQ operating in its borders after 9/11 • Mark Mazzetti & Eric Schmitt (NY Times) reported US agencies concluded • ISI officers helped plan the 2008 Indian embassy bombing in Kabul • ISI deeply involved in Pakistani domestic politics since late 1950s • Allegedly rigged 1990 election to defeat Bhutto’s Pakistani Peoples Party • PPP accused ISI of assassinating Shahnawaz Bhutto in 1995 • Mehran Bank corruption scandal: top leaders profited by depositing ISI • Foreign exchange reserves in private instead of state-owned institutions • Alleged Cases of Torture & Restricted Civil Liberties • 2006: Asian Human Rights Commission ID’d 52 torture/detention centers • 2008: 9th straight year Freedom House rated Pakistan’s military-dominated government as “not free” in political rights & civil liberties

14. ISI-Jihadi Links Admiral Mullen/General Petraeus have acknowledged known ISI ties to militants—including the Taliban and Al Qaeda ISI’s S-wing Media reports: U.S. and Pakistani officials state the ISI provides strategic planning assistance, money, arms to some militants Zardari’s government not in full control of all elements Alleged S-wing support to three main Taliban affiliated groups Mullah Mohammad Omar’s network in Quetta, Pakistan Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s militant network Jalaluddin Haqqani’s network DNI Blair: the ISI engages each militant faction independently Alleged assistance with bombing of Indian Embassy in Kabul (substantiated by US intelligence) and Mumbai attacks (less clear) 14

15. US Aid to Pakistan US Direct, Overt Assistance Provided to Pakistan • $16.5B from 1947-2007 ($4.5B for military programs) • Critique: consulting fees & admin overhead account for large part of aid "Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009” • Triples aid to $1.5B per year over 5 years to help strengthen democratic institutions, make military answerable to civilian gov’t, promote human rights • Sticking point: DoS must periodically certify Pakistan’s government Post 9/11 Aid Actions • Congress incrementally lifted 1998 nuclear test aid sanctions after 9/11 • Congress waived 1999 coup-triggered aid restrictions through FY02 • FY03-08 POTUS certified aid would facilitate transition to democratic rule • Sanctions removed after POTUS certified democratic gov’t restored in 08 POTUS designated Pakistan as a major non-NATO ally of US in 2004 • DoS claims since 2005, FMF funds “solely for CT efforts, broadly defined.” • Critics argue incompatible with US-India goals due to dual purpose of mil-aid