Biologische Grundlagen der Friedensforschung Mäusepocken - Simulationsspiel Gunnar Jeremias

1. Biologische Grundlagen der Friedensforschung Mäusepocken - Simulationsspiel Gunnar Jeremias

2. Das Szenario 2001 kreierteinForscherteam der Australian National University eine 100% tödlicheMäusepockenvariante. The dual-use problem in the biosciences:Mousepox Game

3. Das Experiment Idee: Infektiöses Verhütungsmittel für Mäuse. • Dazu: Stimulation der Bildung von Antikörpern, die sich gegen Eizellen richten: Unfruchbarkeit! • Import eines Gens, das die massenweise Bildung von des Cytokins IL-4 induziert. • Mäusepockenvirus: „Genfähre“. • Nebenwirkung: Die zellvermittelte Immunreaktion, d.h. der Angriff von T-Zellen auf infizierte Zellen, wurde völlig unterdrückt. • 100% Letalität auch bei Mäusen, die gegen Mäusepocken immun waren.

4. Die Entdeckung war nichtvorhergsehen. Die Forschunghatte rein friedlicheZweckeverfolgt. • Auftraggeber war einUnternehmen, das einMittelgegen die Mäuseplage auf den Marktbringenwollte. • EsgibtkeineTherapiemöglichkeit. • Das Missbrauchspotenzialliegtdarin, dass die Erkenntnisseohneweiteresauch auf anderePockenvirenübertragenwerdenkönnen. • Das Team entschiedsichzueinerKonsultationmitanderenAkteurenimBereich.

5. The decisions to be made What to do with the research results? Can the research results be kept secret? Who should/who mustn’t know about the research results? What are the consequences of sharing the results? What are the consequences of keeping results secret? What to do with the research project? Should the research be stopped? Is it legal to continue research? Should it be continued to develop defences against the new virus? What are international consequences of continuing research? The dual-use problem in the biosciences:Mousepox Game

6. A meeting is called to discuss these questions. The meeting has to take decisions on two questions: 1. What to do with the research results? 2. What to do with the research project? The participants: 1. Research Group (financed by industry) 2. Ministry of Defence 3. Industry group (finances the research group) 4. Nongovernmental organisation “Genewatch” 5. United Nations Your goal: try to find a majority for all your positions, but at least for one of your positions. The dual-use problem in the biosciences:Mousepox Game

7. Procedure for the meeting Receive instructions. (Do not share with other groups!) Group discussions: develop arguments for your positions (15 minutes). Consult with us, if necessary. Select speaker(s). First meeting: present your positions and arguments to whole group (maximum: 1-2 minutes each). Inter-group discussions/coffee break (20 minutes): negotiations - try to build coalitions! Second meeting: arriving at a common position. The dual-use problem in the biosciences:Mousepox Game

8. Rules Meeting will take decisions by consensus (or “consensus minus one” if consensus is impossible). Avoid isolation! Try to build coalitions! Try to stick to your positions but also be flexible in order to achieve your aims. You can and should consult with other groups at any stage of the game! Use all members of your team! The dual-use problem in the biosciences:Mousepox Game

9. Lessons learned All stakeholders in a political process have interests that can be defended upon ethical arguments. As a general rule consequences of research should be evaluated beforehand (ethical review committees,…). Dilemmas will occur, if this was not done, or if unintended results are produced. Guidelines for research have to be developed by society as a whole and by the international community: International treaties and conventions, National laws, Codes of conduct. The dual-use problem in the biosciences:Mousepox Game

10. Lessons learned ctd. Decisions about dual-use research have to be taken by scientists. In the information age, it is difficult and often impossible to keep knowledge secret. Secrecy can create mistrust. Openness, however, increases the likelihood of the spread of dangerous facts. The dual-use problem in the biosciences:Mousepox Game

11. Lessonslearnedctd. – The roleofscientists Provideinformationabout consequences of scientific work Tothepublic Todecision-makersandopinion-makers Tothegovernment Shape thedebateabouttheuseofscientificwork Warn of potential misuseofscientificdiscoveries Discussamongcolleagues Criticisecolleagues/ researchinstitutions (self-control) Criticisegovernment Makedecisions Aboutfuturecourseofresearchincludingstoppingcertainareasofwork Develop „better“ alternatives Allocationofresources The dual-use problem in the biosciences:Mousepox Game

12. Journal ofVirology; 2001 Feb;75(3):1205-10; Expression ofmouse interleukin-4 by a recombinantectromeliavirussuppressescytolyticlymphocyteresponsesandovercomesgeneticresistancetomousepox; Jackson RJ, Ramsay AJ, Christensen CD, Beaton, S, Hall DF, Ramshaw IA. • Links, Definitionen etc zu Dual Use Research ofConcern (DURC): • Boston University: http://www.bu.edu/orc/initiatives/durc/ • WHO: http://www.who.int/csr/durc/en/