Lecture 6

1. Lecture 6 Beijing & Taiwan Strait Crises 1954 &1958

2. Deterrence • To discourage the competitor through fear. Countries built armies, formed alliances, and issued threats to deter other countries from attacking. Deterrence by nuclear threat is also an extension of balance of power; • 2 phases of deterrence • Perception of external threat; • Formulation & execution of a counterresponse.

3. Characteristics of Deterrence in Taiwan Strait Crises • Two sides applied deterrence against each other, often simultaneously but without knowing what the other was doing(2 defenders); • Constant flux throughout 1950s; • Mixed means both states deployed to achieve deterrence • Strategic deterrence • Extended deterrence • Conventional deterrence • Absence of cross-cultural comparison

4. Indicators for opponent’s hostile intentions • Conflicting security interests • Matrix of power potentials • Nature of adversary decision making • Military intangible

5. Elements guiding the execution of deterrence strategy • Weighing costs versus gains • Availability of counterthreats • Willingness to take risks • Credibility of warning & signaling • Timing • Flexibility

6. Beijing’s Perception on threat • “three-front” threat: Korean peninsula, Taiwan strait & French Indochina; • Dulles’ alliance-building activities in Asia, SEATO (early Sept. 1954); • US-Taiwan Alliance

7. Beijing’s announcement on “Liberating Taiwan” • Immediately & publicly proclaim its intention to liberate Taiwan to deter the US from forming a military & political alliance with Chiang; • 23 July, 1954, editorial of Renmin Ribao marked the beginning of massive propaganda campaign.

8. Mao’s evaluation on US & Soviet • No longer feared the US because of China’s military success in Korea; • More support from Soviet than in Korea

9. Beijing’s Strategy • Attack on Dachen but to start by assaulting Yijiangshan, and to shell Jinmen to cover the offensive; • Sept. 3, 1954, began shelling Jinmen; • Demonstrating China’s strength & China’s determination to challenge the US commitment to the KMT, and hoped to eliminate the KMT troops on the islands.

10. Eisenhower’s Taiwan policy • “unleashed Chiang”; • Maintaining the military strength of Taiwan as a US strategic asset; • Reluctant to sign a bilateral military pact between Taiwan & US; • Shelling Jinmen on Sept. 3 began to change Eisenhower’s thinking.

11. Washington’s contradictory thinking • Chinese seizure of Jinmen or Mazu would immediately damage US prestige in the region and threaten US security interests in the long run; • US military action in the Strait “would alienate world opinion and gravely strain our allies, both in Europe and with ANZUS”; • Measures to avoid direct US involvement.

12. Washington’s action • UN resolution calling for a cease-fire; • Mutual security treaty with Chiang signed on 5 Dec. 1954; • 28 Jan. 1955, Formosa Resolution, authorizing the president to deploy armed forces to protect Taiwan, the Penghus, and “related positions & territories of that area now in friendly hands.” • Nuclear threat; • Withdrawal combined with a naval blockade;

13. Beijing’s feedback on Washington’s nuclear threat • Taking the US nuclear threat seriously; • Preparations against possible US nuclear attack, Guo Moruo’s speech; • Not sure how willing Moscow would be to retaliate for a US nuclear strike against China; • Diplomatic solution to the tension in the Taiwan Strait; • Determined to build China’s own atomic bomb shortly after the crisis was over.