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Warfare and Humanitarian Ethics Assassinating Al Qaeda Leaders in AF-PAK September 2012. Legal Arguments: Distinction.
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Warfare and Humanitarian Ethics Assassinating Al Qaeda Leaders in AF-PAK September 2012
Legal Arguments: Distinction • Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Section, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.” • Combatants are “All organized armed forces, groups and units which are under a command responsible to that Party for the conduct or its subordinates”
Legal Arguments: Proportionality • Loss of civilian life cannot be excessive “in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated” • “Excessiveness” depends on the strength of the evidence linking the target to the attack on allied Forces(ISAF) and his ranking within Al Qaeda • Links to AQ do not confer combatant status • When in doubt, treat non-classifieds as civilians
Moral Arguments • Just War theory proscribes attacks for purposes of revenge, deterrence, and “good consequences” (e.g., killing one leader to save many civilians) • There should be evidence that the target is an imminent threat, preferably a military leader, and that the principles of proportionality and distinction are also met • Could create unforeseeable consequences
Political Arguments • Leads to retaliatory attacks against ISAF targets • Weakens international norms against assassination, making it more common • Increases sympathy and recruitment for terrorist groups (“martyrdom effect”) • Might erode domestic support • Might alienate allies
A Textbook case In Yemen • Target: QaedSalimSinan al Harethi • Background: • Yemini citizen and senior Al Qaeda member • believed to have been behind the U.S.S. Cole bombing and an attack on a French oil tanker • Wanted since the Cole incident (2000) • Indications of continued fundraising and planning for future Al Qaeda terrorist attacks • In December 2001 Yemeni SF launched a failed raid against al Harethi; 18 soldiers were killed • On Nov. 3, 2002 a Hellfire missile fired from a U.S. Predator killed Harethi and five associates in a car on an isolated road 100 miles east of Sana’ • Four passengers were members of AbdenAbyan Islamic Army, an AQ “affiliate” • The fifth was an American recruiter for AQ • They were thought to be en route to a target • Yemeni and American officers had been monitoring al Harethi’s phone traffic in preparation for an attack • Evidence was collected after the attack to verify the identities of the killed • Positively identified the target (but not the passengers) • Cooperated with local government • Took due care to collect accurate intelligence • Proportional use of force • Non-combatants were almost fired upon on two previous occasions • Command to fire was given when the target was isolated • Identities confirmed after the fact • U.S. acknowledged its role • Assessment
Not all cases are textbook cases • Phoenix Program - Vietnam: 8,000 assassinations, many based upon personal vendettas • Op. El Dorado Canyon – Libya: Failed assassination attempt on Moammar Gadhafi, 15 civilian casualties • OEF – Afghanistan: 3 men killed with Hellfire, one mistaken for bin Laden • OEF – Pakistan: Numerous civilians killed in cross-border raids, missile strikes • OIF – Iraq: Failed decapitation strikes against Saddam and his coterie resulted in numerous civilian deaths • OIF – Iraq: Dozens of civilians killed in 50 attacks that relied on inaccurate Thuraya GPS coordinates
Recommendations to Minimize Civilian Casualities Deliberation • Establish a special court to quickly evaluate potential targeting cases • Decide if strike is lawful • Ascertain that the target is a threat to ISAF security and high-value status • Ensure other means of neutralizing the target have been exhausted • Ensure operation fits with broader political objectives and foreign policy • Assess unintended consequences
Recommendations to Minimize Civilian Casualities Planning • Vet intelligence properly • Multiple sources • Cooperate with local government if possible • Take measures to minimize collateral damage • Time, location, weapon, attack azimuth • Ensure there is a reasonable chance for tactical success • Use sufficient force to minimize need for follow-on attack