Spaceflight Safety Survey: A Sampling of Attitudes Towards Spaceflight Safety

1. Spaceflight Safety Survey:A Sampling of Attitudes Towards Spaceflight Safety An Independent Study of the Space Special Interest Group of the National Society of Black Engineers

2. Disclaimer Statement • The opinions expressed in this document represent the work and ideas of the Space Special Interest Group of the National Society of Black Engineers and should not be interpreted as opinions of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, any of the Agency’s Field Centers, or any of its contractor organizations. • Further, the results expressed in this survey do not represent the views of NASA/Johnson Space Center or any of its contractor organizations. They are the personal opinions of the employees surveyed.

3. Survey Population • 123 Civil Servants and Contractors at Johnson Space Center • Survey conducted onsite during the fall 2004 Safety and Total Health Day • Part of the NSBE booth • Respondents took the survey while visiting the booth • Demographic information collected: • JSC Directorate • Job Function • Civil Servant or Contractor • Years of Experience • Education Level

4. Survey Scenario • You are the Program Manager of the Crew Exploration Vehicle and you have just learned about a problem in the vehicle’s development. The crew escape system will not work during launch if there is a booster failure during the first three minutes of powered flight. There is a 1 in 50 chance of such a failure.

5. Survey Response Options • Option 1. Make no design changes – remain on schedule and on budget and accept the risk. • Option 2. Order a CEV redesign to correct the flaw in the escape system. The schedule will slip by one year and CEV production will go over budget by one billion dollars. • Option 3. Order a booster redesign to reduce the number of possible causes of a booster failure. The schedule will slip by three months and CEV production will go over budget by 500 million dollars. The risk of a booster failure will be cut in half.

6. Survey Response Options • Option 4. Order a change in the launch preparation process to increase the likelihood of detecting problems that could cause a booster failure. You will remain on schedule but CEV production will go over budget by 100 million dollars. The risk of a booster failure will be cut by one-third. You will also add ten days to the launch processing cycle.

7. Similarities to Challenger • Launch vehicle failure during first few minutes of ascent • Late identification of a design defect • “Neither Thiokol nor NASA expected the rubber O-rings sealing the joints to be touched by hot gases of motor ignition, much less to be partially burned. However, as tests and then flights confirmed damage to the sealing rings, the reaction by both NASA and Thiokol was to increase the amount of damage considered "acceptable." At no time did management either recommend a redesign of the joint or call for the Shuttle's grounding until the problem was solved.” (Rogers, 1986)

8. Launch Escape in US Spacecraft • Launch is riskiest phase of flight • Mercury – Launch Escape Tower • Gemini – Ejection Seats • Apollo – Launch Escape Tower • Shuttle – No Launch Escape System • CEV requirements were not set during time of survey, but have since been established: • Abort capability from the time the hatch is closed on the launch pad until CEV insertion into Earth Reference Orbit • Survey now compares attitudes of JSC personnel against Exploration Systems Mission Directorate requirements (only Option 2 meets CEV requirements)

9. Assessment of Options • Option 1: Make no design changes – remain on schedule and on budget and accept the risk. • Pros • Leaves the CEV program on schedule and on budget • Cons • Clearly schedule and budget driven • Results in loss of vehicle and crew if booster failure in first three minutes of flight

10. Assessment of Options • Option 2: Order a CEV redesign to correct the flaw in the escape system. The schedule will slip by one year and CEV production will go over budget by one billion dollars. • Pros • Aggressive action to correct design flaw • Cons • $1 Billion over budget, 1 year behind schedule: risk program cancellation • Gap between Shuttle retirement and CEV may make it difficult to convince managers to allow a year delay

11. Assessment of Options • Option 3: Order a booster redesign to reduce the number of possible causes of a booster failure. The schedule will slip by three months and CEV production will go over budget by 500 million dollars. The risk of a booster failure will be cut in half. • Pros • Minimal schedule impact • Budget impact not as severe • Safer launch vehicle • Booster may attract new customers (since safer) • Cons • Lot of money to still have risk from original problem • Political fallout if lose crew/vehicle after spending $500 M could be severe

12. Assessment of Options • Option 4: Order a change in the launch preparation process to increase the likelihood of detecting problems that could cause a booster failure. You will remain on schedule but CEV production will go over budget by 100 million dollars. The risk of a booster failure will be cut by one-third. You will also add ten days to the launch processing cycle. • Pros • Improves the ability to detect problems • Negligible cost • Cons • Still loses crew/vehicle when fails to detect problems • Potential increase in pad aborts • Aborts may weaken public confidence • Budget overruns and schedule impacts from pad aborts • Pushes problem from engineering to operations

13. Columbia and Challenger • Both accidents clearly linked to budget and schedule pressure • “Thiokol was selected to receive the NASA contract to design and build the Solid Rocket Boosters on November 20, 1973…Costs were the primary concern of NASA's selection board, particularly those incurred early in the program.” (Rogers, 1986) • “…most of the Shuttle Program’s concern about Columbia’s foam strike [prior to destruction of the vehicle] were not about the threat it might pose to the vehicle in orbit, but about the threat it might pose to the schedule.” (CAIB Report, 2003)

14. How Do We Currently React to Schedule and Budget Pressure? • Survey forces respondents to choose in the context of schedule and budget pressure • Collected chosen option along with demographic data: • JSC directorate • Job function • Civil service or contractor employment status • Years of work experience • Highest level of education completed

15. Respondent Demographics

16. Respondent Demographics

17. Respondent Demographics

18. Respondent Demographics

19. Respondent Demographics

20. JSC Overall Response

21. Response by Directorate

22. Response by Directorate • Option 1 not popular • Option 2 more popular, but in most cases not a majority • Engineering and Space and Life Sciences have opposite views for Options 2 and 4 • Chief Financial Office and Shuttle Program Office like Option 4 • Procurement, Flight Crew Operations, and Mission Operations reject Option 4 • No real pattern

23. Response by Job Function

24. Response by Job Function • No real pattern • Clerical supports Option 2 more than any other group • Admin is greatest source of Option 1 support

25. Response by Employment

26. Response by Employment • Option 1 not popular among contractors • 19% of civil servants selected Option 1 • 38% of both civil servant and contractor respondents chose combination of Options 1 and 4 (closer to on schedule/budget than Options 2 or 3) • Highest plurality for Option 2, but never a majority choice

27. Response by Experience

28. Response by Experience • Those with the most experience are divided between Options 2, 3, and 4; plurality choice for Option 4 • The reverse is the case in the immediately preceding age bracket, 11-20 years • 1-10 years experience show a greater tendency to choose Option 1, but in all cases it is a small minority choice • Very little change in the selections for Options 2, 3, and 4 between 1-20 years experience • No pattern emerges

29. Response by Education

30. Response by Education • Tendency to select Option 1 increases to double percentage digits only for those with an associates or bachelors degree; others avoided Option 1 • No correlation between the choice of any particular option and an education level

31. Conclusion/Recommendations • No one insisted that crew safety required implementing all three actions: • Redesigning the CEV escape system • Redesigning the booster • Changing the launch preparation processes to detect causes of booster failure • Nothing precluded this choice • Less than twice the impact of Option 2 • (1.6B over budget, 15 months behind schedule, 10 days extra launch processing per mission)

32. Conclusion/Recommendations • Are budget and schedule sometimes the only reason that some known safety deficits are not corrected with actual spacecraft? • Are some solutions never even suggested because the engineers believe the budget or schedule impacts make their solutions nonviable from the beginning? • Only pattern that can be observed in the survey data is that there is no pattern

33. Conclusion/Recommendations • Variation in responses suggests there may not be a coherent Agency vision with respect to how to balance the competing drivers of safety, budget, and schedule • Worth posing the question as to whether the expectations of line engineers, managers, Headquarters personnel, and White House and Congressional stakeholders are properly aligned with respect to issues of safety, budget, and schedule • Give this same survey at other NASA centers, NASA Headquarters, OMB personnel, and Congressional staffers and compare the results to the JSC survey data

34. Conclusion/Recommendations • May also be useful to conduct expanded versions of survey at JSC to obtain larger sample sizes to answer additional questions: • Is there a difference of opinion between technical civil servants and technical contractors? • What is the percentage of former civil servants among the contractors? Is there a difference in response between these contractors and contractors who were never civil servants? • Is there a difference in the responses of certified versus non-certified flight controllers? • Is there a difference in the responses of line engineers and program office managers within a given space vehicle program?

35. Questions?