510 likes | 639 Views
Collaborative Supply Chains in Retail Industries (Reference: notes by Taylor Randall, 2002 and added case studies by jmd.). Lo205: 2006. Value chains have always consisted of product flows and information flows. Product flows. Distributor. Retailers. Consumer. Manufacturer.
E N D
Collaborative Supply Chainsin Retail Industries(Reference: notes by Taylor Randall, 2002 and added case studies by jmd.) Lo205: 2006
Value chains have always consisted of product flows and information flows. Product flows Distributor Retailers Consumer Manufacturer Information flows Potential for information technology to transform information flows to create new business or streamline old business.
Common Business Propositions #1 - Business built on information content Information flows alone have significant value. Examples: iVillage, web communities. #2 - Direct sales and distribution Eliminate intermediaries Examples: Web Van, eToys, Amazon #3 - Streamlined transactions Automated purchasing functions exchanges Examples: E-bay, Exostar, Ventro Group
4 lessons emerging from the dot.com crash...
Lesson 1: History shows that innovative business success depends on a solid technological infrastructure .… this takes time. They who fail to learn from history are doomed to repeat it.
History Quiz: Who said it and when? “You may go to an average store, spend valuable time and select from a limited stock at retail prices… or have our Big Store of World Wide Stocks come to you.” a) Jeff Bezos - business plan of Amazon.com 1995. b) Bill Gates - on retail plans for Microsoft 2000. c) Vice President of Wal-mart e-tailing 1998. d) none of the above.
History Quiz: Who said it and when? Answer: d) none of the above From Sears-Roebuck Catalog 1915 Catalog regarded by economists as a “radical transformation in the marketing and distribution of consumer goods.”
Sales Growth History of Sears Roebuck Richard Sears begins to sell watches to railroad station agents. High Growth First large general Sears catalog. What happened here?
The King Road Drag Invention leveled and packed muddy roads. Made auto transportation possible.
Sales Growth History of Sears Roebuck D. Ward King invents the “King Road Drag” Richard Sears begins to sell watches to railroad station agents. High Growth Sears installs pick and ship plant (10x productivity increase) First large general Sears catalog. Congress mandates “Parcel Post” as long as you have good roads So what was the greatest innovation the catalog? or the King Road Drag?
Technological change happens in 3 phases: 1. Creation of infrastructure 2. Arrival of enabling technologies 3. Business built on the previous 2 “A lot of people jumped the gun. They tried to skip the first two phases.” Roger McNamee, Integral Capital Partners 2000
Can you identify the key technological infrastructure for your business? Direct Grocery Delivery Stage of Development Sears Creation of Infrastructure Roads ??? Arrival of enabling technologies Pick System ??? Postal Service Construction of business Catalog Sales home delivery
Lesson 2: Because infrastructure changes slowly old companies still hold power. Even when American voters are most angry, they re-elect 88% of their politicians. Vital Statistics of Congress.
Incumbent power comes from existing infrastructure. Examples of incumbent power: Politicians have political action committee dollars. 3 times as expensive to acquire a customer “on-line” as it is to acquire a customer with physical stores. Over 60% of all traditional retailers had data processing and customer service capabilities before going on-line. In 1925 Sears opened retail stores by 1930 retail store sales had outpaced catalog sales.
Sales Growth History of Sears Roebuck D. Ward King invents the “King Road Drag” Richard Sears begins to sell watches to railroad station agents. Sears opens first retail stores First large general Sears catalog. Congress mandates “Parcel Post” as long as you have good roads Sears installs pick and ship plant (10x productivity increase)
Lesson 3: The parameter estimates in e-business plans are so far off, even worst case sensitivity analysis isn’t bad enough…. Incorrect estimates lead to adoption of the unprofitable business models.
Example: Revenue Model for a Campus Intranet Provider Advertising Model vs. Software Model 1 school 1 school Advertising Software # Schools 1 Install $250,000 # Users Per School 8000 Maintenance $50,000 Active Usage 65% Sessions/Day 2 Page views/Session 12 Images/Page 4 Days year 180 CPM/1000 views $25 Total Revenue $2.25 M
Example: Revenue Model for a Campus Intranet Provider 1 school Phase I Phase II Actual # Schools 1 750 1200 1200 # Users Per School 8000 8000 8000 7000 Active Usage 65% 65% 80% 50% Sessions/Day 2 2 2 .5 Page views/Session 12 12 12 5 Images/Page 4 4 4 1.5 Days year 180 180 180 180 CPM/1000 views $25 $25 $45 $3 Total Revenue $2.25 M $2.2 B $6.3 B $8.5 M Business Valuation $250 M $500 M ? Under actual numbers software model makes more sense.
Lesson 4: In many cases it is hard to sell the value of improved information flow without the accompanying product flow.
Example: Business to Business Purchasing Fragmented Manufacturers Distributors Hospitals Problem: Fragmentation makes purchasing function too complex (multiple shipments and invoices to track, pricing problems. Opportunity: Use New IT to consolidate invoicing and purchasing function
Example: Business to Business Purchasing B2B Exchange Question: How much is the improved information flow worth? Benchmark: Traditional Distributor gets 17% to 30% margin
New Propositions Use technology to make old infrastructure more efficient. #1 Enhance existing products and services with internet technology. #2 Use technology to reduce costs of coordination within companies. #3 Use technology to reduce transaction costs between business partners.
Summary Lessons from the dot.com crash 1 - Successful businesses built on new technology take time. 2 - Incumbents may be more successful using technology. 3 - Carefully consider the estimates in your business models. 4 - Carefully evaluate the value attached to information flows.
Choosing a business model for internet retailing Lecture by Taylor Randall (2002)
Two basic choices Inventory Ownership Drop-shipping Wholesaler Wholesaler Retailer Retailer Customer Customer What factors influence the choice of supply chain?
Supply Chain options on the Internet* Drop-shipped 30.6% *The state of eRetailing 2000. Supplement to “eRetailing World” March 2000.
Motivating Example: Meet Spun.com • “Cheap tricks” • Start-up capital: $825,000 • 200,000 CD titles available for immediate shipment • No inventory
One supply chain type not dominant within or across industries Hold Inventory Drop-ship CDNow.com Spun.com CDs Retail Category General Retailing Amazon Value America
BANKRUPT BANKRUPT Business results not consistent Hold Inventory Drop-ship CDNow.com Spun.com CDs Retail Category General Retailing Amazon Value America
Making Supply Chain Choice: Theory • Considerations in favor of drop-shipping: • Reduced investment into fulfillment capabilities • Wider product selection • Lower fulfillment cost • No inventory obsolescence • Benefits due to inventory pooling Hybrid strategy? • Considerations in favor of inventory ownership: • Higher product margin • More control over stocking decisions • More control over product offering • Avoid encroachment of customers • Ease of order consolidation • Lower technology investment
Factors Influencing Inventory Choice Own Drop-Ship Immature Large Low variants Low uncertainty Lower Lower Development of Industry Firm Size Product Variety Demand Uncertainty Product Transportation Costs Product Obsolescence Risk Mature Small High variants High uncertainty Higher Higher
Sample Description • Survey of 64 publicly held e-tailers • 56 responses, 54 usable responses (84.4%) • Between 60% and 70% of e-tailing revenue. • Financial data from COMPUSTAT data base • Example Companies • Amazon.com Pets.com • Barnes&Noble.com Egghead.com • CDNow.com Delias.com • Fogdog.com Autobytel.com • Webvan.com Buy.com • 36 companies choose to hold inventory (67%) • 11 bankrupt companies (20%)
Likely to drop-ship Likely to own inventory 0 1 Elected to drop-ship Elected to own Model Recommendation Own Not own Rational 21 firms Irrational 4 firms Own Actual Choice Irrational 4 firms Rational 17 firms Not own Measure of rational supply chain choice
Irrational supply chain choice is associated with bankruptcy! Irrational Supply Chain Choice and Probability of Bankruptcy Rational Irrational Difference Choice Choice 0.10 0.37 0.27* Probability of Bankruptcy *statistically significant difference Poor supply chain choice one of factors associated with failure.
Summary • Research results: • – theoretically obtained criteria for inventory choice, • – confirmed hypothesis empirically, • – linked inventory choice and firm performance.
Supply Chain Choice Parameters in Grocery Industry Market Trends: 2% of all sales will be over internet $100 per order 20 or 30 times per year. 5% margin on food. 60 items per order $25 delivery charge Existing Store Depot Fixed Costs per Year $20,000 $10 million Picking Labor Per Order $20 $5 When do you use a existing store and when do you use a depot?
Case Study: Online Grocery Retailing (by JMD, 2003) • In 2000 Jupiter Media Matrix predicted online-grocery sales in 2001 to be 2 billion, and in 2005 to 7 billion in the US market. • But there have been many failures: • Streamline.com (2000) • ShopLink.com (2000) • Priceline.com quit grocery service (2000) • Kozmo.com and PDQuick.com (2001) • Webvan and HomeRuns.com (2001)
Case Study: Online Grocery Retailing (by JMD, 2003) • Peapod Inc. is now the largest in US. • They were rescued from bankrupcy by Dutch supermarket chain Royal Ahold in April 2000. They invested 73 mil. • Peapod uses a hybrid order fulfillment model: stand alone distribution centers and Ahold’s supermarkets.
Case Study: Online Grocery Retailing (by JMD, 2003) • Peapod’s characteristics: • Average customer order is 130 dollars. • They charge 9.95 delivery fee • They had a profit in their Chicago center in 2001.
Case Study: Online Grocery Retailing (by JMD, 2003) • E-grocers in Europe have done better • Datamonitor analyst think the global market is worth 55 billion by 2005, and the UK market is 9.2 billion of that. • Tesco.com is one of the most successful in the UK.
Webvan case (by JMD, 2003) • Webvan shut down in 2001 • They had purchased HomeGrocer.com for 1.2 billion in 2000. • They had 750,000 customers, 2000 employees, almost 50% of US market share. • They could not turn a profit because of their distribution system. They built 26 high tech automated distribution centers (cost 1 bil.) • They hoped to cut 40 labor costs on handling groceries. But they did not have enough orders to cover fixed costs. They lost 5 to 30 dollars per order in operating costs.
Netgrocer.com case (by JMD, 2003) • Netgrocer delivers only non-perishable goods and maintain only one warehouse in US. • They send packages by Federal Express instead of maintaining a fleet of vans. • They are the only e-grocer that can efficiently server both suburban and rural populations. (seniors, students, military). • Thier site is visited by 12-15 million per year. Company sales 25 mil. in 2000. Grown 65% since 1996. Employs 65. Profitable 2002. • Aggressive customer acquisition, repeat purchasers, online promotions. Offer hard to find grocery items. Delivered in 24 hours. • Peapod is giving it’s package delivery customers to Netgrocer. Netgrocer is also partners with manufacturers like Nabisco, Nestle, Gerber, Parmalat, Mead Johnson.
Tesco.com case (by JMD, 2003) • Tesco.com is largest online grocer in world. Has order fulfillment operation to 250 Tesco stores (have 690 stores in UK) can reach 94% of population. Start 1996. • 1 mil. customers, 70,000 orders per week, 422 mil. in annual sales. (3rd largest portal in UK). • Going into other markets: electronics, clothes, wine, baby products. • In Ireland, starting in So.Korea. • Will enter US market with Safeway food retailer. Also will pay 22 mil. for 35% share in GroceryWork.com and relaunch under Safeway brand. Safeway local stores will handle order fulfillment. Safeway has 1500 stores in the US.
LeShop.ch case (by JMD, 2003) • LeShop sales were 6 mil. Swiss francs in 2000. 50% increase over 1999. Since they have grown 30% each month. Revenues for the 1st half of 2001 were 5.5 mil. Swiss francs. • Average spending is 152 Swiss francs. 16,000 have been customers, 76% make repeat purchases. Bon appetit Group is a 54% major partner. 70 employees. Offer 4500 supermarket products. • 400 orders per day. Have a fulfillment center in the Bremgarten region. Store fresh foods and employees select. But they distribute incoming orders to packing zones. The shipping box goes to the packing zone, so employees to not take trolleys through the aisles. They pack orders simultaneously. Use Express Post to send. Charge a delivery fee of 12 Swiss francs.
LeShop.ch case (by JMD, 2003) • LeShop sales were 6 mil. Swiss francs in 2000. 50% increase over 1999. Since they have grown 30% each month. Revenues for the 1st half of 2001 were 5.5 mil. Swiss francs. • Average spending is 152 Swiss francs. 16,000 have been customers, 76% make repeat purchases. Bon appetit Group is a 54% major partner. 70 employees. Offer 4500 supermarket products. • 400 orders per day. Have a fulfillment center in the Bremgarten region. Store fresh foods and employees select. But they distribute incoming orders to packing zones. The shipping box goes to the packing zone, so employees to not take trolleys through the aisles. They pack orders simultaneously. Use Express Post to send. Charge a delivery fee of 12 Swiss francs.
Given online grocers in US are struggling, will the web-based home-delivery company ever turn a profit? (by JMD, 2003) • Yes – but grocers must focus on high-end markets, limit delivery schedules and make partnerships with bricks-and-mortar grocers. • Instead of maintaining expensive inventory and warehouses, Peapod uses Royal Ahold stores (Stop & Shop and Giant Food) for its inventory. Low entry costs, builds cust. base. • Tesco also uses local supermarkets to fill orders and not central warehouses. • The model that has been working is an existing popular grocery chain builds it’s own online ordering system and uses it’s own stores as the warehouse.
Given online grocers in US are struggling, will the web-based home-delivery company ever turn a profit? (by JMD, 2003) • No – Studies have shown that Americans do not like going to the grocery store, but they do not want someone else picking their tomatoes. • Roger Blackwell says <the mass-market home delivery model will not work because few people are home in the day when the people who deliver want to work>…also he says, ”You should not try to use the Internet..to compete in an industry where the existing competitors are giants with highly efficient distribution systems.”
Why did Tesco.com become a success while Webvan failed? (by JMD, 2003) • Webvan tried to reinvent the whole infrastructure. Wanted to build 26 warehouses costing 35 mil each. The warehouses would have to serve large areas with high order volume to cover costs. Also had to spend on brand building. • Fast expansion • Revolutionary customer • Free delivery • Tesco extended its supermarkets with online grocery orders. They had brand, suppliers, advertising, a database of 10 mil. Card club members. They use the store-picking model. They can serve an area of 100,000 people and break even on small volumes. • Slow expansion of infrastructure • Obtain traditional customers • Charge a delivery fee (covers cost of vans and drivers).
What future challenges will Tesco.com face? (by JMD, 2003) • They must depreciate costs to their offline business. • Growing competition from Sainsbury (UK). They use a hybrid model with 36 stores for building customer base, but also has warehouses (picking centers for delivering goods to customer door). Ocado is the UK version of Webvan. Orcado just uses the warehouse model. • Tesco’s success in UK may not translate to the US because the US does not have any grocery chains with national status. Also the population in the US is more heterogeneous, with ethnically diverse demands for goods. This means listing more items to serve smaller groups.