Prospects for Intergovernmental Management

1. Prospects for Intergovernmental Management PA 524—Intergovernmental Administrative Problems, Summer 2013, Professor Mario Rivera

3. Intergovernmental Management (IGM) • Has a more limited focus that IGR • Problem-solving: activities often focus more on joint problem-solving than policy making (coordination) • Coping capabilities: Managing ongoing relationships and coping with systems as they are • Broader mix of actors: activities often include relationships among public/private/nonprofit sectors • Lead actors: policy/management professionals (mid- or low level) rather than administrative generalists (high-level) • Networks: Non-hierarchical communication networks & collaboration • Conflict resolution: bargaining, negotiation, cooperation, dispute settlement, coping

4. Constraints Beyond Control of IGM Actors • Financial - intergovernmental grant system • Lack of local control: Whoever controls resources sets priorities. This occurs at the federal/state level rather than the network level; Coercive rather than Cooperative Federalism • Need to be systematic: Difficult to systematically solve problems when priorities change frequently and there is no budgetary stability over long time periods • Distributional problems: implementation funding is often treated as “pork” • Administrative Costs: Grants and contracts management can be complicated for collaborative projects, especially in intergovernmental contexts entailing regulation • Flexibility in using grants: Network actors eed slack resources to participate in collaborative activities but legislatures/agencies provide limited discretion in how resources are used.

5. Constraints Beyond Control of IGM Actors • Legal • Federalism, separation of powers, due process, etc • Division of legislative responsibility • Divisions of jurisdictional authority (federal, state, local) • Bureaucratic • Organizations often promote stability rather than change • Turf guarding by individuals, agencies, level of government • Managing external relationships • Differing professional training and staff norms in organizations • Accountability • Multiple constituencies, multiple lines of responsibility, answerability • Dual versus interdependent (cooperative and coercive) forms of federalism Preceding section is adapted from Mark T. Imperial, “Strategies for Improving Coastal and Ocean Governance: Challenges and Opportunities,” Presented at The Coastal Society’s 20th Biennial Conference, St. Pete Beach, FL May 14 – 17, 2006

7. Principal-agent issues in IG administration • For example, local (county, city, COG) decision makers have two simultaneous roles. They are • Agents for their constituency, • so they have incentives to not increase taxes and to provide at least acceptable public goods, services. • Agents for higher government levels, • so they are expected to obey the injunctions of federal and state governments, even if their injunctions are unpopular among local constituencies. • Compelled to engage in games played by competing state and local governments with regard to intergovernmental transfers (e.g., Medicaid “maximization”); in so doing, they are neither serving federal nor local constituencies.

8. Federalism under the Bush Administration & since • The administration of George W. Bush, particularly post-9/11, seemed to defy traditional understandings of conservatism, as the president’s policies expanded the size, spending, and reach of a “nationalizing” federal government. For instance, the Patriot Act and the creation of the Department of Homeland Security both expanded the size and reach of the national government. And even before 9/11, President Bush’s No Child Left Behind Act expanded the federal government’s role in funding and regulating public education, historically a prerogative of state and local governments (in particular, school districts). • Bipartisan “bailout” policies at the end of this administration and during Obama’s, such as efforts to reform healthcare, along with the maintenance of ongoing military commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, indicate that the centralizing or nationalizing trend continues today. There is a continuing trend toward Coercive Federalism, in areas ranging from regulation to preemption, for substantive policy areas such as healthcare reform and taxation.

9. Federalist Tension In The U.S. Constitution • On the one hand, the “Supremacy Clause” (Article IV of the Constitution) indicates that the Constitution, and consistent national laws and treaties “shall be the supreme law of the land.” • On the other hand, the “reserved powers” as written into the 10th Amendment: “The powers not delegated to the US by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” • Constitutional separation and division of powers, and the balancing of power, means that the framers deliberately limited central authority. Power was to be shared by institutions of government. which would have to collaborate in order to get things done (e.g., fiscal legislation). In that sense, collaborative administration is structured in the Constitutional provisions for distributed powers. The Obama Administration has revived the WH Office of Intergovernmental Affairs (reading) and recast federalism as “collaborative federalism.”

10. The Growth of National Power “Necessary and proper” clause: • Congress authorized to enact all laws “necessary and proper” to carry out its responsibilities • Leads to theory of “implied powers” validated in McCulloch v. Maryland (1819), as we’ve seen. Also contributing to the growth of Federal power are the • Supremacy clause – national laws and Constitution are supreme laws of the land (Article VI), and the • Commerce clause – gives Congress power to “regulate commerce with foreign nations and among several states and with Indian tribes”

11. The Constitution and the growing power of the Federal Government The Commerce Clause— e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. U.S. (1964), a constitutional challenge to Title II of Civil Rights Act of 1964 • Prohibited racial discrimination/segregation in areas of public accommodation (private businesses)—justified by Congress & the Supreme Court with reference to the Commerce Clause General Welfare Clause “Congress shall have power to…provide for the…general welfare of the United States.” Constitutional basis for many national “social welfare” programs 14th Amendment – Government cannot deny “due process of the law” and “equal protection of the laws.” 16th Amendment – The National income tax

12. Intergovernmental Management Defined Against Backdrop of Evolving Managerial Forms • A dominant managerial form is that of the market-modeled “New Public Management” • “Steering, not rowing” government • Reduces direct delivery of services. These can be delegated or contracted to the market, non-profits, or other non-governmental partners • The government’s remaining critical role is that of defining strategic priorities and policies • Relies heavily on privatization and on market-modeled mechanisms and approaches • NPM has increasingly been superseded by Collaborative Public Management.

13. Collaborative Public Management (CPM) Collaborative Public Management (CPM) describes the process of facilitating, and operating in multi-organizational arrangements to solve problems that cannot be solved or easily solved by either single sectors or single organizations. It means co-production, cooperation to achieve common goals, and work across boundaries in multi-sector relationships, including public-private partnerships. Cooperation and collaboration are based on the values of reciprocity, trust, and mutuality, which overweigh those associated with hierarchical power and univocal authority. In networked organizations, people are tied horizontally by shared vision, mission, and purpose, and shared commitment. The following features predominate with CPM: • Horizontal rather than vertical management processes • Peer and Collegial relations rather than Superior/Subordinate relations • Extended leadership roles across departments, organizations (‘patron’ federal agencies and state counterparts in the reading)

14. Public-Private Partnerships (as in the case) • A bridging mechanism between the NPM and Collaborative Public Management • Arrangements between government and private sector for the purpose of providing public infrastructure, community facilities, and related services, whereby there is sharing of investment, risk, responsibility, and reward between partners. • The reasons for establishing such partnerships generally involve the financing, design, construction, operation and maintenance of public infrastructure and services. • The private sectoris engaged as a partner where and when neither public ownership nor market provision is feasible. • Public sector gains access to a range of private sector capabilities and skills that can make for more efficient and cost-effective public service. • The private sector takes on a range of risks, including legal liability, that under traditional public procurement would be borne by the public sector

15. Robert Agranoff’s typology of networks • There is progressively tighter or denser coupling in networks as one progresses from informational to developmental and outreach and action networks. An informational network limits exchange to information, knowledge, policy deliberation, and the like, still based on organizational sources principally. A developmental network relies on these exchanges as well as joint program development and capacity building to carry out solutions principally at the originating organization. • An outreach network incorporates these features, including information exchange and policy design, but also involve joint programming, resource exchange, and pooling of resources and services, including client bases, to create new programming at the network level as well as among partnering organizations. The most complete integration occurs in outreach networks, which incorporate these other functional levels while creating quasi-institutional frameworks for network-level collaborative functioning.

16. Features of Network/Partnership Management • Networks facilitate the coordination of actions and the exchange of knowledge and fiscal and human resources among actors; • Network membership can be drawn from any combination of public, private, and non-profit sector actors; • Networks and network actors may carry out multiple policy functions at the same time (e.g., environmental advocacy and advocacy for healthcare reform); • Although networks are mostly defined at the inter-organizational level, they are also described in the contexts of the individuals, groups, and organizations that comprise them; • Network structures allow for government agencies to serve in roles other than lead organizations—engaging the themes of boundaries, non-encroachment, control, effective versus formal influence. • Network mechanisms include interest-group coalitions, regulatory subsystems, grants and contract agreements, and public-private partnerships. • There are significant developmental and opportunity costs to the creation of collaborative networks, particularly as these become tightly coupled. • Effective network management requires new sets of administrative skills.

17. Features of Network Governance • Governance in this context is defined as achieving direction, control, and coordination of a network of organizations with varying degrees of autonomy in order to advance the objectives to which they jointly contribute. There is even less of a control connotation than is the case of the notion of “steering” under the New Public Management. • Network Development is Intentional—Organizations get together and consciously try to find ways to improve governance • Network-based Governance has Emergent features: Organizations are forced to adapt to changing behavior of other organizations or changes in the political, social, or economic environment; Self-organization is common, as it is in many complex adaptive systems. • Governance occurs in polycentric network structures: Behavior is typically voluntary and not legislated top-down. Nor is it purely bottom-up, because organizations have power differentials and are at different levels of government outside the cooperative relationship. Adapted from Mark T. Imperial, “Strategies for Improving Coastal and Ocean Governance: Challenges and Opportunities,” Presented at The Coastal Society’s 20th Biennial Conference, St. Pete Beach, FL May 14 – 17, 2006

18. Convergent Administrative Paradigms in Network Management

19. Macro-Level Governance Forms

20. Questions • How do we square the centralizing or nationalizing tendencies of post-9/11 federalism and IGR with the decentralizing thrust of collaborative network management? • What about the role of strategic alignment and goal congruence among federal, state and local governments with respect to disaster response and counter-terrorism? In networks like the Youth Services Collaborative? • If disaster response (as with Katrina, or in the event of pandemics or terrorist attacks) requires the mobilization of local response with key supports from the federal government, there is a corresponding need for mixed forms of governance and management. Kettl calls for integration of leadership mechanisms with emergent local responses, which often entails collaboration among first responders. How do we find and set that balance? Recalling the New Bedford Harbor, the California Adoption sase, and the Youth Services case, how was an intergovernmental balance found, or how could such a balance have been established? Or established better, or earlier?