PERSPECTIVES ON SPACE SECURITY ASSESSING the Sit & EXPLORING THE OPTIONS

1. PERSPECTIVES ON SPACE SECURITYASSESSING the Sit & EXPLORING THE OPTIONS Kiran NAIR Centre for Airpower Studies New Delhi

2. SCOPE • Confine to the present & foreseeable future. • Inclusive of; → Prevailing Military Dynamics. → Prevailing Legislative Dynamics. → Prevailing Civil & Commercial Dynamics. → Prevailing Environmental Dynamics. • Wider Perspective - Common rather than collective space security.

3. Common ↔ Collective Nonetheless, core (& tougher) issue is Space Security. Semantic noise secondary (& easier) issue. Finally, goal “… which approaches offer the most productive path towards achieving a space environment free of threats to all peaceful uses of space …” • Original Wilsonian concept of “Collective Security” concept not likely to apply in space. • Normal Interpretation: Connotates coalition of states or groups for securing interests. → OS accptd as “common heritage”, comn area beyond state jursdcn & less suited to indvdual or collective interests & more to common. →Common utility & dependency on space rising. States, individuals, industry etc incrsngly depend on space. Widen concept to incld variety of common intrst & concerns of present times. → Conditions mature for co-op transition to seek solutions to common problems; secure common rather than competing intrsts. Eg Space debris.

4. Space Security • Defined as “secure and sustainable access to and use of space; and freedom from space based threats”. – Space Security 2003 • Confine myself largely to secure & sustainable use of space & measures possible for freedom from space based threats. • Explore the determinants of insecurity in space.

5. Prevailing Military Dynamics • Unlike CW era, greater no. of nations draw military capabilities from satellites. • Visions of ‘Force Application’ wpns in space. • Concerns over ‘Counter Space Ops’ leading to weaponisation of space. • Concerns over emerging technologies of BMD, consequent ‘shooting galleries’ in space etc. • BLUF: Not much headway in reducing concerns on account of the above. • Mil dynamics related to national dynamics and individual perceptions of self defence etc. Little common ground.

6. Prevailing Legislative Dynamics • Semantic noise on terms like peaceful uses, weapons, delimitation of outer space etc. • Legal lacunae in OST & other legsltion being targeted for fulfilling indvdl self-interests. • Negotiations on legal instrument for banning weapons in space at CD deadlocked since 1998. • In brief, prevailing legislation widely perceived to be inadequate & in need of change. For eg, OST bans only nuclear & WMD, hence KEASAT tests etc, etc. • Fairly well known.

7. Other Significant Dynamics • More (& diverse) stake holders in space today. Greater inter-relation & complexity. Eg no clear demarcation of mil, civil or cmrcl use sats. • Increasing debris in space. • Traffic congestion in space. • Conflicts over distribution of space resources. • Legislation based on Cold War era & focus largely on regulating military affairs of states. • As opposed to the above;

8. An Unconventional View • FA Wpns : No wpns after 05 decades; too ambitious in next 05 years. • CS Wpns: No sys with known oprnl utility. At least nothing akin to aircraft within 1st two decades of air flight. • No sats destroyed in warfare till date, though capabilities did exist. • ASAT tests; great source of concern, but on a comparative scale – → No of ASAT tests during Cold War average less than 2/yr as opposed to 01nuclear test/week in same time frame. → Last ASAT test in 1985. Jan 11, 2007: ??? • No known cases of mil interference in sat ops as opposed to over 1,374 reported incidents (till 2005) in civil & commercial arena.

9. Mil msns most useful & suited to space already there: Sats for info/FE; no shared global desire for their elimination. • Mil dynamics, areas of intense national interst, less common vulnerabilities, less scop • Concerns OK, focus since last 05 decades yielding no great results. CD deadlock since almost decade, do we continue? • Continue, & meanwhile: Focus also → On areas of reduced national allegiance. → Areas of common insecurity.

10. IN PRESENT ERA, INCREASED FOCUS ON THESE AREAS DOESN’T NECESSARILY IMPLY REDUCED FOCUS ON CONVENTIONAL ASPECTS B’COS MORE STAKEHOLDERS, MORE POSSIBILITY OF DSTBN OF LABOUR UNLIKE IN CW ERA. • Areas which include not only state but also non-state entities like commercial firms, industry, insurance coys, individuals etc. • Areas more amenable to equitable security by mutual agreement & negotiation. • Areas where insecurities need to be addressed emergently & have greater scope of redress. • Areas where demonstrated progress would trigger scope for opening deadlock in other areas. • Areas less visible and well known but with potent for equally disastrous consequences.

11. Areas • To begin with, in near term, focus also on workable near-term space security options for → Debris mitigation. → Equitable space resource allocation. → Traffic management. → Common security measures (share R&D, Technology) against natural threats like asteroids, solar activity etc. → Regulate non-state activities. → Reinforce (not review) the OST & other legislation for greater common security in space. • Some measures underway in some areas but grossly insufficient.

12. What’s in it for Asia? • The same as for all & much more. → Asian continent most disaster prone. → Great scope for human development; 60% of human popln,10/20 most populous countries, 02 world’s largest populaces. → Rising economies; lo cost ↔ hi commercial gain. energy dependent; He reserves of Moon. → Earth resource detection & distribution. • Imperative to explore solutions for “ Secure & sustainable use of space & measures possible for freedom from space based threats.”

13. “ In the end, the roots of man’s security does not lie in his weaponry. It lies in his mind”. Robert McNamara US Secy of Defence 1967.

14. Some examples of close encounters/collisions in orbit

15. May be associated with national security activity Orbital Debris Created by the Breakup of a 10-ton Satellite Debris Proportion Of Break-ups in Orbit