210 likes | 457 Views
Participatory Budget Expenditure Tracking (PBET). The Uganda Experience. Participatory Public Expenditure Management Cycle. Budget Formulation. Performance Monitoring. Budget Review & Analysis. Civic Engagement. Expenditure Tracking. PUBLIC EXPENDITURE TRACKING. What? Why? How?.
E N D
Participatory Budget Expenditure Tracking (PBET) The Uganda Experience
Participatory Public Expenditure Management Cycle Budget Formulation Performance Monitoring Budget Review & Analysis Civic Engagement Expenditure Tracking
PUBLIC EXPENDITURE TRACKING What? Why? How?
WHAT? “Of every rupee spent on the poor, only 15 paise actually reaches them” Rajiv Gandhi Participatory Budget Expenditure Tracking (PBET) involves the use of civil society to track how the public sector spends the money that was allocated to it.
HOW? PET: Some Tools • Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys (PETS): Uganda, Zambia, • Participatory Social Audits (Jan Sunvai): Rajasthan, Delhi, Uttar Pradesh • Right To Information Movements: Rajasthan, Goa, Delhi Public Budget Hearings • Citizen Juries • Civil Society Monitoring of performance of public agencies • Investigative Journalism
WHY? 85 Paise Method 1 Method 2 (Using PBET) 100 Paise 15 Paise 557 Paise 667 Paise 100 Paise 100 Paise 100 Paise
Uganda: The Situation Many improvements since early 1990s • Macroeconomic stability • Stable growth (>7%) • Resource shift from defense to social sectors (education 3X) But No observed increase in pupil enrollment Why? “Allocations don’t reach the destination” (Corruption & Mismanagement)
“Prototype” PETS – Uganda 96 MISSION HOW MUCH MONEY THAT LEFT THE EXCHEQUER REACHED SCHOOLS IN 1991-95? • 250 primary schools in 19 districts selected • Focus on capitation grants • Data on income, expenditure, enrollment collected by former teachers • Standardized forms were used
PETS: KEY STAGES • Identify scope, actors and purpose • Design of questionnaires • Sampling • Execution of survey • Data analysis • Dissemination • Institutionalization
PETS Uganda: The Findings • Only 13% of allocations actually reached schools in 1991-95 • Poor schools received nothing!!! Median = 0% • 73% schools – more than 95% leakage; • 10% schools – less than 50% • Enrollment rates increased by 60% but had not been reported due to systemic disincentives • Salaries went up by 200% while expenses on instructional materials went up by 20% • Local governments were retaining grants
Advocating and negotiating change Rallying support and building coalitions Going public Building an information/ evidence base Mobilizing around entry point PETS UGANDA: The Process
Government Action Improve information flow + Make transfers transparent Findings were disseminated through a mass information campaign (signal to local governments)
MORE REFORMS • Publish and broadcast transferred amounts • Mandate schools to post amounts on notice boards monthly • Accountability and information dissemination provisions in Local Governance Act, 1997 • Require districts to deposit grants to schools in their accounts • Delegate procurement from center to schools
The Final Impact Source: Reinikka and Svensson (2001), Reinikka and Svensson (2003a)
Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys (PETS) Strengths: • Provide concrete evidence of mismanagement or leakage of funds by local governments • Process empowers poor giving them confidence and self-respect • Significantly lowers corruption and leakages Limitations: • No legal guarantee/binding for punishing guilty • No safeguards for whistleblowers • Government backlash/resistance
PETS In Other Countries • Tanzania (1999 and 2001) • Tracking of pro-poor expenditures in priority sectors at all levels • Ghana (2000) • Expenditure tracking based on data collected at facility, district, and central level • Honduras (2000) • Survey looking at ghost workers, absenteeism, and “job-migration” • Georgia, Peru, Bolivia, Laos, Zambia, Chad, Mozambique, Rwanda, Madagascar, Nigeria.
Uganda: Lessons Learnt • Access to information reduces local capture • Inexpensive policy actions + mass media campaign = Improved targeting of programs • Poor are least likely to claim their entitlements from district officials so benefit most from such exercises