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Smart cards a fascinating and fruitful adventure. Gemalto Technology & Innovation. Nguyen Quang Huy. Secure transaction (banking, pay-TV). Smart Cards in the our life. Telecom (SIM/USIM/RUIM, M2M, convergence, M-TV, M-banking, M-ticket). Control Access (physical and logical resource).
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Smart cardsa fascinating and fruitful adventure Gemalto Technology & Innovation Nguyen Quang Huy
Secure transaction (banking, pay-TV) Smart Cards in the our life • Telecom (SIM/USIM/RUIM, M2M, convergence, M-TV, M-banking, M-ticket) • Control Access (physical and logical resource) • E-citizen (e-passport, e-ID, e-Heath, e-driving license, ..)
25 mm2 Smart Card HW • No internal timer, battery • No keyboard, display, network interface • Current generation • µ-processor: 16-bits, <=10MHz • RAM: 4K • ROM: 100K for code storage • E2PROM (105 updates ): 64K for data storage • I/O: serial (9600 bps), • Contactless protocols: MiFare, FeliCa, Calypso • Next generation • µ-processor: 32-bits, up to 100MHz • Flash memory: more durable and more rapid • I/O: USB (12 Mbps) • Contactless open protocols: NFC, ZigBee
Proprietary architecture Undisclosed specification Tedious application development Closed configuration: no application can be added after issuance Open architecture Open specification High-level programming languages Post-issuance applications are available Some open architectures Java Card MULTOS .NET Card Basic Card Smart Card SW
JC Firewall Applet 1 Applet 2 Card Manager API in Java Native API Java Card Virtual Machine Operating System Integrated Circuit Example: Java Card • Introduced by Schlumberger in 1996 • Leading open multi-applicative architecture • >5 billions Java-embedded cards issued • Applications (applets) developed in Java I/O command
Security threats • No battery • Card tearing (or power failure ) may cause inconsistency data • No internal timer • Logging for post-mortem analysis is not possible • No keyboard, display, network device secure usage environment • Payment terminals (POS and ATM): security certification • Security of PC and handset: keyboard logger, false display (phishing), etc • Contactless interface • Cardholder is not aware of malicious actions • Physically owned by attackers • Vulnerable to both logical and physical attacks
Attacks Logical attacks: use I/O commands to exploit SW vulnerabilities buffer overflow, type confusion, covert channels, protocol attacks, etc Physical attacks: use physical phenomenon to exploit SW/HW vulnerabilities • Invasive attacks: destructive and require specific logistics HW reverse-engineering; disabling HW security features, etc • Non invasive attacks: affordable logistics • Side-channel: use the emitted signals (power consumption, execution time) to guess the secret (keys, PIN) Execution signature (E2PROM update, DES rounds, etc) may leak secret • Fault-injection attacks: use physical means (infrared heat, laser, X-ray) to flip some bits in the memory Modify code and runtime control flow, data: the consequence is hardly predictable Combined attacks
Counter-measures and beyond • Detection • HW: (shield-removal, temperature, frequency, laser, light) sensors • SW: checksum, fault-trap • Protection • HW: memory/bus encryption, redundancy, error-correcting code • SW: transaction mechanism (anti-tearing), random noise, protection of control flow • Auditing • HW: security registers • SW: fault-counters, security exception • Reaction • Muting (infinite loop) and clearing RAM No counter-measure is perfect Trade-off between security and performance (tender eligibility criterion) Use of mathematical techniques: formal methods
Vietnam: smart card deployment • Mobile telecom • Low-end cards: <=64K EEPROM • Banking • Small-scale migrations to EMV standard: VP Bank, VCB, etc • Online banking (secure reader/authentication server): VCB • Why the banks are not keen on using smart cards ? • Cards mainly used for ATM withdrawal: rare (offline) POS payment fraud is limited • Card holders are usually paying for the fraud ! • Insfratructure cost for a migration (ATM, POS, servers, etc) • E-government • e-passport project (since 2006)
Dosmetic industry • Small market implies small players • Few smart cards manufacturers • MK Technology JSC: 20 milions smart cards delivered in 2008 • Main products: SIM, USIM, RUIM • Sale representative of foreign products • Dosmetic share in final products • Card personalization for final clients • A first Vietnamese smart card OS ? MKCos (Sao Khue 2008) • Even fewer application developers • Vietnamizing imported applications
Joining the adventure • Expanding dosmetic market by SIM-based attractive applications e.g., • M-payment, online payment • Value-added applications on mobile network • M-ticket for public transport • Making E-Government come true • Healthcare card, ID-card, etc • Education/Training • More training courses for • embeded programming: lucrative outsourcing market • security engineering: go beyond anti-virus • Support of overseas experts • Enterprising • Win-win JV with foreign partners to learn technology