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Cryptography and Network Security Chapter 11

Cryptography and Network Security Chapter 11. Fifth Edition by William Stallings Lecture slides by Lawrie Brown. Chapter 11 – Cryptographic Hash Functions.

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Cryptography and Network Security Chapter 11

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  1. Cryptography and Network SecurityChapter 11 Fifth Edition by William Stallings Lecture slides by Lawrie Brown

  2. Chapter 11 – Cryptographic Hash Functions Each of the messages, like each one he had ever read of Stern's commands, began with a number and ended with a number or row of numbers. No efforts on the part of Mungo or any of his experts had been able to break Stern's code, nor was there any clue as to what the preliminary number and those ultimate numbers signified. —Talking to Strange Men, Ruth Rendell

  3. Hash Functions • condenses arbitrary message to fixed size h = H(M) • usually assume hash function is public • hash used to detect changes to message • want a cryptographic hash function • computationally infeasible to find data mapping to specific hash (one-way property) • computationally infeasible to find two data to same hash (collision-free property)

  4. Cryptographic Hash Function Note that the length L is appended to the message to be hashed Why do this? What other ways are there to accomplish this objective?

  5. Hash Function Uses • Message Integrity Check (MIC) • send hash of message (digest) • MIC always encrypted, message optionally • Message Authentication Code (MAC) • send keyed hash of message • MAC, message optionally encrypted • Digital Signature (non-repudiation) • Encrypt hash with private (signing) key • Verify with public (verification) key

  6. Hash Functions & Message Authentication Symmetric Key Unkeyed Hash • Message encrypted b) Message unencrypted

  7. Hash Functions & Message Authentication Symmetric Key Keyed Hash • Message unencrypted d) Message encrypted

  8. Hash Functions & Digital Signatures - PKCS

  9. Other Hash Function Uses • pseudorandom function (PRF) • Generate session keys, nonces • Produce key from password • Derive keys from master key cooperatively • pseudorandom number generator (PRNG) • Vernam Cipher/OTP • S/Key, proof of “what you have” via messages

  10. More Hash Function Uses • to create a one-way password file • store hash of password not actual password • e.g., Unix, Windows NT, etc. • salt to deter precomputation attacks • Rainbow tables • for intrusion detection and virus detection • keep & check hash of files on system • e.g., Tripwire • for membership detection • Blum filter

  11. Lamport One-time Passwords • Password safety in distributed system • server compromise does not compromise P • interception of authentication exchange does not compromise password either • Alice picks Password PA • Hashes password N times, HN(PA) • Server stores (Alice, N, HN(PA)) • Attacker can’t get PA from HN(PA)

  12. Lamport One-time Passwords • Assumptions • Authentication protocol over insecure channel • Attacker can see all messages • Server memory may also be read • Goal: Attacker still can’t authenticate as Alice • Alice must be able to prove she knows something that Darth can't • Even after reading server files and observing earlier exchanges

  13. Lamport One-time Passwords • Initialization • Alice chooses password PA • Alice hashes PA M times • Server stores <Alice, M, HM(PA)> • Even if server compromised • Attacker can't get PA from H(PA)

  14. Lamport One-time Passwords • Protocol • Alice sends “I’m Alice” • Server sends it current count “N” • Alice sends “X” where X=HN-1(PA) • Server verifies H(X) = HN(PA) • Server updates to (Alice, N-1, X) • Attacker fails • can’t get HN-1(PA) from HN(PA) • can't authenticate as Alice via replay

  15. Homework • What can happen if Alice has to authenticate to multiple servers with single sign-on (same password)? • How can you modify the protocol so that it works with multiple servers, without requiring the servers to stay in synch?

  16. Two Simple Insecure Hash Functions • consider two simple insecure hash functions • bit-by-bit exclusive-OR (XOR) of every block • Ci = bi1 xor bi2 xor . . . xor bim • a longitudinal redundancy check • reasonably effective as data integrity check • one-bit circular shift on hash value • for each successive n-bit block • rotate current hash value to left by1bit and XOR block • good for data integrity but useless for security

  17. Hash Function Requirements

  18. Attacks on Hash Functions • have brute-force attacks and cryptanalysis • a preimage or second preimage attack • find ys.t. H(y) equals a given hash value • collision resistance • find two messages x & ywith same hash so H(x) = H(y) • hence value 2m/2 determines strength of hash code against brute-force attacks • 128-bits inadequate, 160-bits suspect

  19. Birthday Attacks • might think a 64-bit hash is secure • but by Birthday Paradox is not • birthday attack works thus: • given user prepared to sign a valid message x • opponent generates 2m/2variations x’ of x, all with essentially the same meaning, and saves them • opponent generates 2m/2variations y’ of a desired fraudulent message y • two sets of messages are compared to find pair with same hash (probability > 0.5 by birthday paradox) • have user sign the valid message, then substitute the forgery which will have a valid signature • conclusion is that need to use larger MAC/hash

  20. Birthday Attacks Find i and j such that H(y’j)=H(x’i) Table takes O(N2) time Faster … Sorted lists take O(NlogN) time

  21. Birthday Attacks • What are chances we get a match? • N distinct values, k randomly chosen ones • P(N,i) = prob(i randomly selected values from 1..N have at least one match) • P(N,2) = 1/N • P(N,i+1) = P(N,i)+(1-P(N,i))(i/N) • For P(N,k)>0.5, need k ≈ N1/2 • Need double # bits in hash value [Second matches first] [At least one match in first i] [Last matches one of i distinct]

  22. Hash Function Cryptanalysis • cryptanalytic attacks exploit some property of algo so faster than exhaustive search • hash functions use iterative structure • process message in blocks (incl length) • attacks focus on collisions in function f

  23. Block Ciphers as Hash Functions • can use block ciphers as hash functions • using H0=0 and zero-pad of final block • compute: Hi = EMi [Hi-1] • and use final block as the hash value • similar to CBC but without a key • resulting hash is too small (64-bit) • both due to direct birthday attack • and to “meet-in-the-middle” attack • other variants also susceptible to attack

  24. Block Ciphers as Hash Functions Block cipher key length B Pad Message M to multiple of B Break padded M into L blocks L = |M|/B M = M1 M2 … ML Use blocks of M as keys in block cipher, iteratively encrypt state value starting with constant H0 resulting in hash value H = HL = E(ML,….E(M2,E(M1,H0))…)

  25. Secure Hash Algorithm • SHA originally designed by NIST & NSA in 1993 • was revised in 1995 as SHA-1 • US standard for use with DSA signature scheme • standard is FIPS 180-1 1995, also Internet RFC3174 • nb. the algorithm is SHA, the standard is SHS • based on design of MD4 with key differences • produces 160-bit hash values • 2005 results on security of SHA-1 raised concerns on its use in future applications

  26. Revised Secure Hash Standard • NIST issued revision FIPS 180-2 in 2002 • adds 3 additional versions of SHA • SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 • designed for compatibility with increased security provided by the AES cipher • structure & detail is similar to SHA-1 • hence analysis should be similar • but security levels are rather higher

  27. SHA Versions

  28. SHA-512 Overview

  29. SHA-512 Compression Function • heart of the algorithm • processing message in 1024-bit blocks • consists of 80 rounds • updating a 512-bit buffer • using a 64-bit value Wt derived from the current message block • and a round constant based on cube root of first 80 prime numbers

  30. SHA-512 Round Function

  31. SHA-512 Round Function

  32. SHA-3 • SHA-1 not yet "broken” • but similar to broken MD5 & SHA-0 • so considered insecure • SHA-2 (esp. SHA-512) seems secure • shares same structure and mathematical operations as predecessors so have concern • NIST announced in 2007 a competition for the SHA-3 next gen NIST hash function • Draft standard based on Keccak in 2014

  33. SHA-3 Requirements • replace SHA-2 with SHA-3 in any use • so use same hash sizes • preserve the online nature of SHA-2 • so must process small blocks (512 / 1024 bits) • evaluation criteria • security close to theoretical max for hash sizes • cost in time & memory • characteristics: such as flexibility & simplicity

  34. Summary • have considered: • hash functions • uses, requirements, security • hash functions based on block ciphers • SHA-1, SHA-2, SHA-3

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