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The limits of e- banking ? (Are you afraid of ghosts ?). Presentation for OWASP BeNeLux Sébastien Bischof Jean-Marc Bost 02.12 .2011. Impossible to dissociate transaction data and signing OTP. ETH( ical ) Hacking on SF1. 4 5 6 7 8 9. GC EZ NN 7W.
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The limits of e-banking? (Are youafraid of ghosts?) Presentation for OWASP BeNeLux Sébastien BischofJean-Marc Bost 02.12.2011
Impossible to dissociate transaction data and signing OTP ETH(ical) Hacking on SF1 4 5 6 7 8 9 GC EZ NN 7W Application Security Forum - Western Switzerland - 2011
L’ETH(ical) MITC = Man Inside The Computer Application Security Forum - Western Switzerland - 2011
Alone, the victimcanconfirm the transaction Confirmation? Application Security Forum - Western Switzerland - 2011
Trojan infections are a reality Switzerlandexhibits the 2ndlowest infection rate… … but itisalmost30% Trojans are plebiscited by pirates. “42 new malware strains created every minute» According to Microsoft, 5% of Windows PCs are infected(source «Safety Scanner», May 2011) At least 25%, according to Pandalabs, with a majority of Trojans(source «ActiveScan», Q2 2011) Application Security Forum - Western Switzerland - 2011
First, There was the MITM (Man In The Middle)… 2006 • MITM • Middle site • DNS pollution • etc … 2007 Application Security Forum - Western Switzerland - 2011
… then the MITB (Malware In the Browser)… 2007 • MITB • Anserin • Mebroot • Silentbanker 2008 Application Security Forum - Western Switzerland - 2011
… andnow, the MI (Malware Inside) 2009 • MI • Zeus • Ares • SpyEye 2011 Application Security Forum - Western Switzerland - 2011
Zeus and Spyeyes efficiency in numbers • 2009: 1.5 Millions of Infectious Spam towards Facebook • June 2009: 74’000 FTP accounts stolen by par Zeus • 2010: At least 6 millions £ were stolen by a 19 persons gang in England • October 2010: 70 millions US $ by Zeus • 3.6 millions PCs were infected by Zeus in the USA. • 2011: 3,2 millions US $ stolen by a young Russian in 6 month using Zeus and SpyEye Application Security Forum - Western Switzerland - 2011
E-Bankingis not the onlytarget • Otherwebsitescanbevictim • of varioustheftssuch as: • passwords • emails • cookies • Creditcards • … • Withoutevenbeingtargeted! Application Security Forum - Western Switzerland - 2011
E-Bankingis not the onlytarget Facebook Online games Google mail Microsoft Hot mail Windows live McAfee Application Security Forum - Western Switzerland - 2011
E-Bankingis not the onlytarget • Screenshots and screen captions allow to: • Spyvirtual keyboards • Be kept up to date on modifications • Spy on privatematters • … • Stillwithouttargettingsomebody in particular! Application Security Forum - Western Switzerland - 2011
E-Bankingis not the onlytarget … and the ftp connections Application Security Forum - Western Switzerland - 2011
MI = Man (or Malware) Inside Application Security Forum - Western Switzerland - 2011
A transaction form Application Security Forum - Western Switzerland - 2011
What You Sign Is What You See Not-) 456 FRA 666 666 Thanks, just perfectfomy transaction! -) The transaction ishijackedby the MI ? Application Security Forum - Western Switzerland - 2011
Whatshouldbe… Memory GUI POST CPT0123456789 TCP9876543210 5000 Application Security Forum - Western Switzerland - 2011
Whatreallyhappens! Memory GUI POST CPT0123456789 456FRA666666 5000 Application Security Forum - Western Switzerland - 2011
Zeus controls the browser by injection The malware controls the PC DLL request response MI DLL Application Security Forum - Western Switzerland - 2011
… and not only the browser Firefox Firefox crash reporter Java update Application Security Forum - Western Switzerland - 2011
A «professional» architecture Injection • Je suis: • Multitask • Configurable • Evolutionary • Stealthy • Resilient Commander & Controller Collection Configuration SpyEye’s detection rate by antivirus is approximatively 25% [abuse.ch] Victime Maintenance Application Security Forum - Western Switzerland - 2011
They are not easy to spot Rootkitproperties: • Stealth • Stability • Leave no traces • Persistence to survive reboots • Taking control of a computer • Can hide its communication channels Application Security Forum - Western Switzerland - 2011
Theymightappearanytime Diskview Global view Application Security Forum - Western Switzerland - 2011
Exemple: Bootkit Diskview Global view There existseveraltools to flash the BIOS from a running operational system Alteration Application Security Forum - Western Switzerland - 2011
Andanywhere! System vision Memory representation Process1 Process2 Process Physical reality • The system workswith a virtualrepresentation of the hardware itisrun on. • The programs run by the system rely on the information the system providesthem. • What if wechanged the system’s vision? Application Security Forum - Western Switzerland - 2011
Exemple: DKOM Process1 Process1 Process2 Process2 Process The processes are represented in memory by a structure (EPROCESS) DKOM can, for example, hide a process of thislist(and alsoother system resources) Application Security Forum - Western Switzerland - 2011
What if we combine such techniques? The malware isrunbefore the Operating System The system canbebootedwith the lowestsecuritylevel Malicious routines are executedbefore the system. The malware controls the vision of the system. It is hard to detect and to getrid of it. The system islitteralyhaunted! Application Security Forum - Western Switzerland - 2011
Demonstration Token USB : • Embedded smartcardreader • Mutualauthentication • Update system • … + Embedded safebrowser: • Avoids injections « à la Zeus » by providingitsownlibraries (DLLs) • Avoidsanother instance of firefox to beloadedbeforehand But… Application Security Forum - Western Switzerland - 2011
Tunnel between the 2 browsers MS API? Safe-Browser PC-Browser FORM CPT0123456789 456FRA666666 5000 Parsingoutput remoteThread Application Security Forum - Western Switzerland - 2011
Tunnel between the 2 browsers MS API? Safe-Browser PC-Browser POST CPT0123456789 456FRA666666 5000 Windows API remoteThread Application Security Forum - Western Switzerland - 2011
Add a bit of social engineering and… A ghostcan do anything if hecontrols the vision of the user Application Security Forum - Western Switzerland - 2011
ZITMO = Zeus + “Social Engineering”(SPITMO withSpyEye) 2008: OWASP recommends the SMS …the use of a second factor such as a mobile phone is an excellent low cost alternative … …is actually stronger than most two factor authentication fobs… …a single weakness in this model - mobile phone registration and updating 2010: Zeus attacks the SMS #2 Uncertain origin #3 Clear text #1 Public number Application Security Forum - Western Switzerland - 2011
Impossible to dissociate transaction data and the OTP! Let’sget back to ETH(ical)hacking conclusions 4 5 6 7 8 9 GC EZ NN 7W Application Security Forum - Western Switzerland - 2011
Is this case social-engineering proof ? !? 4 5 6 7 8 9 GC EZ NN 7W Application Security Forum - Western Switzerland - 2011
What You Sign Is What You See But… Seemsthatitis not the case… The destination accountisregisteredunder the international referencenumber 456 FRA 666 666 according to the new Swift international standard. For yoursecurity, wekindlyaskyou to enter the last 6 numbers of such a referencenumberinto yoursigningdevice and use the security code herebelow to confirm the transaction. Application Security Forum - Western Switzerland - 2011
WYSIWYS or not WYSIWYSThat is the Question Application Security Forum - Western Switzerland - 2011
… Questions? To contact us: Jean-Marc Bost Jean-marc.bost@elca.ch Sébastien Bischof sebastien.bischof@elca.ch Lausanne I Zürich I Bern I Genf I London I Paris I Ho Chi Minh City Lausanne I Zürich I Bern I Genf I London I Paris I Ho Chi Minh City