450 likes | 956 Views
OPSEC and SAEDA. CPT Nicole Martinez 168 th BSB S2/BN Security Manager 20OCT07. This briefing is UNCLASSIFIED. DO NOT venture into classified information!! If in doubt, save your question for AFTER the brief. OPSEC. AR 530-1. OPERATIONAL SECURITY.
E N D
OPSECand SAEDA CPT Nicole Martinez 168th BSB S2/BN Security Manager 20OCT07
This briefing is UNCLASSIFIED DO NOT venture into classified information!! If in doubt, save your question for AFTER the brief.
OPSEC AR 530-1
OPERATIONAL SECURITY OPSEC is the process we use to identify, analyze, and protect information concerning plans, operations, programs, projects, or activities. 1. Identify critical information needed by adversaries. 2. Determine indicators from which hostile intelligence services might derive critical information. 3. Select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation.
OPSEC PREVENTSDISCLOSURE OF THE FOLLOWING: • COMMUNICATIONS • COMPUTERS • NEW EQUIPMENT FIELDING • UNIT MAINTENANCE STATUS • PERSONNEL STRENGTH • SOLDIERS MORALE • READINESS • LOGISTICS • SOLDIER’S MORALE • TRAINING • UNIT READINESS • ESPRIT DE CORPS • OPERATIONS • UNIT STRENGTHS & WEAKNESSES • INTELLIGENCE Capabilities • UNIT PERSONALITIES
OPSEC INDICATORS ADMINISTRATION TDY Orders Conferences Transportation Arrangements Billeting Arrangements Medical Care Schedules Reserve Mobilization Change of Mail Address
OPSEC INDICATORS Runs on Post Exchange Emergency recall of personnel on leave Emergency personnel/equipment requisitions
OPSEC INDICATORS OPERATIONS Movement of Forces Dispersions or Concentrations of Forces Rehearsals and Drills Fixed Schedules and Routes Standard Reactions and Drills Fixed Guard Change Times
OPSEC INDICATORS COMMUNICATIONS Phone Calls CMD Nets Change in MSG Volume Units Reporting to New CDRS Identification of Unit Tasks Increased Commo Checks Abnormal Reporting Procedures New Crypto Equipment
OPSEC INDICATORS Trash with Unit Data
THE THREAT HUMINT (Human Intelligence) OVERT-open sources, magazines internet, TV, radio, newspaper COVERT-breaking and entering CLANDESTINE-under cover as business, insurance agent scientist reporter etc
THE THREAT EXPLOITING HUMAN WEAKNESSES Greed Financial Gain Alcohol or Drug Abuse Sexual Perversion, Seduction Infidelity Indebtedness Blackmail
THE THREAT IMINT (Imagery Intelligence) Photo Reconnaissance Open Sky Observation Flights Satellite Imagery
THE THREAT SIGINT (Signal Intelligence) Intercepted electronic communications Phone Radio Internet E-mail Detection of Radar
THE THREAT MASINT (Measurement and Signature Intelligence) Infrared Seismic Radar Laser Nuclear Optical
THE THREAT TECHNOLOGY Scientists/researchers Equipment Papers Computers/Software Threat can be government or Commercial
Examples of techniques used to obtain information: 1. Several foreigners question one soldier 2. One foreigner questions several soldiers 3. Circumventing established disclosure procedures 4. Use of rank to intimidate or coerce soldiers 5. Threats of “international incident”
If at any time during your contact with a foreign national you are... ...asked for classified or sensitive unclassified info ...offered future employment by anyone in exchange for information ...questioned at length regarding your duties, organization, operations, deployments, contingency areas, or technologies ...aware of any compromises of classified or sensitive information ...questioned in a manner that made you feel ill at ease Report It Immediately!!
Things To Remember: WHO? Name, Rank, Country, Physical Description, Others Present/Knowledgeable WHAT? Questions, Comments or Requests WHEN? Date, Time & Duration. Re-contact? WHERE? Exact Location of Incident WHY? Circumstances. First Time?
OPSEC MEASURES Randomize- Don’t be Predictable Use Darkness for Movements Use Camouflage, Smoke, Weather Radio on Low Power Control Radar Emissions Noise Discipline Slow Speed Control Trash
How do I conduct OPSEC in 168th BSB? • Do not discuss mission, times, location, nature of job, convoy configuration, frequencies/call signs, Rhino/Duke, C-IED procedures, friendly TTPs, shift change times, etc. in DFAC, Tent City, MWR, basically anywhere outside of convoy brief or in TOC
How do I conduct OPSEC in 168th BSB? • Do not handle or reproduce classified material without consent of BN S2, CO, or without current and valid courier card, to include: mission statement, SP times, trip tickets, locations of FOBs, nature of job, convoy configuration, frequencies/call signs, Rhino/Duke, C-IED procedures, friendly TTPs, shift change times, strip maps, etc.
How do I safeguard classified material in 168th BSB? • If handling classified material, must have a valid and current SECRET clearance, courier card, and sign for material on DA 3964 • If handling classified material, it must be on person AT ALL TIMES or locked in an approved GSA safe – NEVER lose positive control • Sanitize work areas when LNs, TCNs, or non-clearance holders are present
SAEDA AR 381-12
Subversion and Espionage Directed Against the US Army • AR 381-12 • Title 18, US Code • Article 106a, UCMJ
Espionage • The act of obtaining, delivering, transmitting, communicating, or receiving information in respect to the national defense with an intent or reason to believe that the information may be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation. Sabotage • An act or acts with intent to injure, interfere with, or obstruct the national defense of a country by willfully injuring or destroying, or attempting to injure or destroy, any national defense or war material, premises or utilities, to include human and natural resources.
Subversion • Any active attempt to encourage U.S. Army personnel to violate laws, orders, or regulations. Terrorism • The use of violence or the threat of violence to attain goals, political, religious, or ideological in nature. This is done through intimidation, coercion, or instilling fear. Terrorism involves a criminal act that is often symbolic in nature and intended to influence an audience beyond the immediate victims.
Penalties • ESPIONAGE • Life in Prison • Capital Punishment • Failure to Report • UCMJ • Loss of life on the battlefield
Foreign Intelligence Services • FIS is an organization that is part of a foreign government and engages in intelligence activities.
Approaches • MONETARY GAIN • BLACKMAIL/ EXPLOIT WEAKNESS • Finances • Alcoholism • Moral behavior
Approaches • HOSTAGE SITUATION • EMOTIONAL INVOLVEMENT • FALSE FLAG
Former PFC Sombolay - 1994 • Volunteered to work for the Jordanians • Tried to work for the Iraqis • Sold unit information/ chemical defense SOP’s/manuals $1300.00 ALL WAS UNCLASSIFIED • Tried to sell more • Long Tour PCS = 34 years in Leavenworth
Clyde Lee Conrad - 1989Classified document custodian, 8th ID • Worked for the Hungarians • Passed everything he could find • Recruited junior enlisted soldiers • Arrested in 1993 at Ft Richardson, AK • Currently in prison
Aldrich Hazen Ames - 1994Career CIA employee • Earned 2+ million working for the Russians • U.S. intelligence provided may have cost ten lives • Sentenced to life no parole, wife currently free due to plea bargain
SAEDA Reportable • Attempts by unauthorized persons to obtain classified or unclassified information about U. S. Army installations, activities or personnel. • Known, suspected or contemplated acts of espionage by Army personnel • Contacts with members of FIS • Active attempts to encourage personnel to violate laws, orders, regulations (Subversion) • Known or suspected acts of treason
SAEDA reportable • Participation in activities advocating the overthrow of the US by force or violence • Contacts by DA personnel with officials or citizens that: • Exhibits undue interest in the DA member • Exhibits undue interest in U.S. technology, research, development, testing and evaluation efforts • Attempts to obtain classified or unclassified information • Attempts to place DA personnel under obligation
Deliberate Security Compromise • Any known, suspected or possible unauthorized disclosure of classified information • Known or suspected illegal diversion of attempted diversion of U.S. technology to a foreign country
Indicators of Espionage • Attempts to expand access to classified information • Unauthorized removal of classified • Extensive use of copy, facsimile or computer equipment to reproduce of transmit classified
Indicators • Abuse of access • Poor security practices • Financial indicators - large sums of money - buying big ticket items • Extensive travel to foreign countries at regular intervals