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2. A-8 Tasking and BackgroundAlternate Futures and Methodology Operational AnalysisSummary of Underlying Technologies2008 Findings and Conclusions. Overview. A-8 Tasking and Background. 4. Background. Blue Horizons is an Outgrowth of AF 2025 StudyAir Force 2025 study conducted in 1995-96$1.5M
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2. 2 A-8 Tasking and Background
Alternate Futures and Methodology
Operational Analysis
Summary of Underlying Technologies
2008 Findings and Conclusions Overview This is the overview for today’s presentationThis is the overview for today’s presentation
3. A-8 Tasking and Background
4. 4 Background Blue Horizons is an Outgrowth of AF 2025 Study
Air Force 2025 study conducted in 1995-96
$1.5M Effort, 286 participants
Charter: Identify concepts, capabilities and technologies USAF requires to remain dominant
Intent: Repeat every five years (not accomplished)
Blue Horizons – AF/A8 long range planning effort
Results briefed to and approved by CSAF
Results to be meshed with QDR/POM cycles
The origins of Blue Horizons was the Air Force 2025 study of technology conducted in the mid-1990s at Air University and intended to repeat every five years (this was never accomplished). Blue Horizons began in 2007 and is slated to continue into the future.
Although smaller in scope, budget and size than the 2025 effort, Blue Horizons brings together a powerful combination of Air Force Majors, Lt Cols and Cols grounded in evolving current operations concepts, Air University faculty specialized in the fields of future technology and operations analysis, and outside experts from a variety of technology and political science disciplines.The origins of Blue Horizons was the Air Force 2025 study of technology conducted in the mid-1990s at Air University and intended to repeat every five years (this was never accomplished). Blue Horizons began in 2007 and is slated to continue into the future.
Although smaller in scope, budget and size than the 2025 effort, Blue Horizons brings together a powerful combination of Air Force Majors, Lt Cols and Cols grounded in evolving current operations concepts, Air University faculty specialized in the fields of future technology and operations analysis, and outside experts from a variety of technology and political science disciplines.
5. 5 A8 Tasking for Blue Horizons II (2008)
Specified Task
“…develop a prioritized list of concepts and their key enabling technologies that the U.S. Air Force will need to maintain the dominant air, space and cyber forces in the future”
For the 2008 Academic Year, which ran from July 2007 to May 2008, Air Force A8 asked CSAT to focus on developing a prioritized list of concepts and enabling technologies to keep the service dominant given the threats that could be encountered in the 2030 timeframe. Of particular interest was finding those technologies that, with a small shift of investment today, could produce disproportionately high returns in the future.For the 2008 Academic Year, which ran from July 2007 to May 2008, Air Force A8 asked CSAT to focus on developing a prioritized list of concepts and enabling technologies to keep the service dominant given the threats that could be encountered in the 2030 timeframe. Of particular interest was finding those technologies that, with a small shift of investment today, could produce disproportionately high returns in the future.
6. 6 The Researchers The students who participated in the study were principally Air Force operators, with a broad range of experience and grounded in doctrine, concepts, and combat operations. Those participating in the concept development had a wide variety of experience across the operations and scientific disciplines. Those entrusted with the development of the alternative futures and scoring of these concepts were disproportionately operators, as this study’s intent was to provide an operational view of which concepts had the greatest future utility. However, within this group, the study directors ensured that this group had expertise in the scientific, engineering, space, and acquisition disciplines to prevent study errors in these areas.The students who participated in the study were principally Air Force operators, with a broad range of experience and grounded in doctrine, concepts, and combat operations. Those participating in the concept development had a wide variety of experience across the operations and scientific disciplines. Those entrusted with the development of the alternative futures and scoring of these concepts were disproportionately operators, as this study’s intent was to provide an operational view of which concepts had the greatest future utility. However, within this group, the study directors ensured that this group had expertise in the scientific, engineering, space, and acquisition disciplines to prevent study errors in these areas.
7. 7 2030 Alternate Futures: Rooted in National and AF Guidance The group’s work began by examining a number of national security documents including the President’s National Security Strategy, the National Military Strategy, the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review and Air Force strategic guidance. Based on the research, the group selected futures involving a failed state, the insurgent overthrow of a friendly government, a peer China and a resurgent Russia. It then divided itself into four teams to explore these futures in-depth.
The research conducted by the study team was extensive, involving in-depth review of the literature, face-to-face meetings with experts, and travel within the United States and abroad. The capstone event was a wargame and a four-day operations analysis that produced the technology ratings we will present in a moment.
The group’s work began by examining a number of national security documents including the President’s National Security Strategy, the National Military Strategy, the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review and Air Force strategic guidance. Based on the research, the group selected futures involving a failed state, the insurgent overthrow of a friendly government, a peer China and a resurgent Russia. It then divided itself into four teams to explore these futures in-depth.
The research conducted by the study team was extensive, involving in-depth review of the literature, face-to-face meetings with experts, and travel within the United States and abroad. The capstone event was a wargame and a four-day operations analysis that produced the technology ratings we will present in a moment.
8. 8 Model equation:
Concepts scored across all four alternate futures using the following value model:
BH 2030 Research Methodology Quantitative Analysis This is the model equation and the model structure used to score the 58 concepts evaluated in this study.
The model takes the underlying capabilities scores (the weights) of each of the concepts, multiplies this by the value-score matrix created by the model structure above, which is then multiplied by the weighting matrix for the individual alternative futures. The result is a total score for each concept that enables determining which concept is most important in each of the four alternative futures, as well as which concepts are of the greatest value across the range of potential future scenarios.
This is the model equation and the model structure used to score the 58 concepts evaluated in this study.
The model takes the underlying capabilities scores (the weights) of each of the concepts, multiplies this by the value-score matrix created by the model structure above, which is then multiplied by the weighting matrix for the individual alternative futures. The result is a total score for each concept that enables determining which concept is most important in each of the four alternative futures, as well as which concepts are of the greatest value across the range of potential future scenarios.
9. 9 BH 2030 Research Methodology Quantitative Analysis
Capability curves were created for each of 47 significant AF military capabilities in each scenario.
Values curves do vary by scenario
Each of the 58 concepts were then scored using these capability functions. The capabilities scores were derived separately for each of the alternative futures scenarios. The study team examined each concept and developed a mathematical expression of how well, in each future, the concept would be able to fulfill its basic mission. These mathematical functions were, in some cases, step functions, and in other cases were developed as continuous mathematical equations. The capabilities scores were derived separately for each of the alternative futures scenarios. The study team examined each concept and developed a mathematical expression of how well, in each future, the concept would be able to fulfill its basic mission. These mathematical functions were, in some cases, step functions, and in other cases were developed as continuous mathematical equations.
10. 10 BH 2030 Research Methodology Quantitative Analysis
Capability Scores were then Multiplied by Value Scores
Value Scores were Determined by a Separate Set of Models – One for Each Future
Structure of the Model is the Same for Each Scenario, but the Weights are Different
Values at each level sum to 100 percent
Weights of model components vary by scenario
The mathematical computation is thus a multiplication of the capabilities scores generated by the mathematical functions that are scenario dependent, against the value model, which was also scenario dependent. Thus, while the overall model structure is identical across the four alternative futures, the value scores and capabilities assessments were derived independently for each future. Thus, each future has its own unique model with its own unique model weights. The mathematical computation is thus a multiplication of the capabilities scores generated by the mathematical functions that are scenario dependent, against the value model, which was also scenario dependent. Thus, while the overall model structure is identical across the four alternative futures, the value scores and capabilities assessments were derived independently for each future. Thus, each future has its own unique model with its own unique model weights.
11.
Technology Model
172 mutually exclusive but comprehensively exhaustive enabling technologies underpin the 58 concepts
Technologies scored points based on the value of the concept(s) they underpinned.
Model is a 172 x 58 x 4 three-dimensional matrix
Fundamental Model Equation is:
Output: A prioritized list of enabling technologies of greatest value to the AF
11 BH 2030 Research Methodology Quantitative Analysis Underlying the concept evaluation model was a technology model designed to score the value of the key enabling technologies that underpin each of the 58 concepts evaluated. To develop this model, a list of 172 mutually exclusive but comprehensively exhaustive key enabling technologies were mapped against each of the scored concepts. The model equation is the method by which the technologies were given credit for enabling key concepts. Technologies were scored by a combination of how important the concepts they enabled were, as well as how many concepts the technologies underpinned.Underlying the concept evaluation model was a technology model designed to score the value of the key enabling technologies that underpin each of the 58 concepts evaluated. To develop this model, a list of 172 mutually exclusive but comprehensively exhaustive key enabling technologies were mapped against each of the scored concepts. The model equation is the method by which the technologies were given credit for enabling key concepts. Technologies were scored by a combination of how important the concepts they enabled were, as well as how many concepts the technologies underpinned.
12. Blue Horizons Alternate Futures
13. 13 Peer China Why China?
In 2030, world’s largest country in terms of population and GDP
A regional military peer with a limited—but growing—global power projection capability
A nation whose future strategic direction is still uncertain, but one who also has many strategic options The last 100 years have been called the American Century. Today, the world is at the start of what may be the Asian Millennium. The ancient Middle Kingdom is again on the rise, and China’s destiny, like its past, seems to be one of preeminence. Every indication suggests that at some time in the next 30-50 years, China will be the world’s single strongest state, both economically and militarily. While some quibble about dates, few argue the outcome. Although seeking a “Harmonious Society” in a “Harmonious World”—words Chinese leaders use to describe their vision for domestic and foreign policy—China’s rising power will present its leaders with an array of strategic options both regionally and internationally.
The last 100 years have been called the American Century. Today, the world is at the start of what may be the Asian Millennium. The ancient Middle Kingdom is again on the rise, and China’s destiny, like its past, seems to be one of preeminence. Every indication suggests that at some time in the next 30-50 years, China will be the world’s single strongest state, both economically and militarily. While some quibble about dates, few argue the outcome. Although seeking a “Harmonious Society” in a “Harmonious World”—words Chinese leaders use to describe their vision for domestic and foreign policy—China’s rising power will present its leaders with an array of strategic options both regionally and internationally.
14. 14 Plausible History Economy passes US PPP in 2011, Approaches US GDP in 2022
Serious reforms of the Chinese economic began in 1978 following the death of Mao Zedong. While some westerners viewed these reforms as steps toward democratization, Chinese leaders described them as Marxism Under Chinese Conditions—a strategy that enabled a more open economic, while still maintaining firm control within the government as demonstrated by its response to the 1989 Tiananmen Square uprising. Since being admitted into the WTO in 2001, China has enjoyed annual growth rates as high as 13 percent annually. In 2008, the International Monetary Fund estimated China’s GDP, using Purchasing Power Parity as a measure, $12.988 trillion. Given its current rate of growth, China’s economy passes the US in PPP, although per capita income lags significantly.
18th Plenum for Chinese Leadership
Promotion results from the 17th CPC make it clear that President Hu’s influence and “Harmonious Society” or another parallel Confucian-Boxer-like derivative strategy will be China’s path for at least the next two decades. The fifth generation of leaders from Hu’s tuanpai students will be the leadership element in China for the foreseeable future. From the 17th CPC, the new selections to the Politburo Standing Committee include two potential successors to Hu in 2012. They are his protégés, Xi Jinping (Shanghai party chief) and Li Keqiang (Liaoning party chief). They meet a Hu criterion in selecting emerging leaders in that they are all in the late forties to early fifties—very young by Chinese standards. The turnover rate for the Politburo Standing Committee, Politburo, Central Committee, and the Central Military Commission will remain at 60 percent per congress and higher, now and for the foreseeable future.
China imports large quantities of foodstuffs
Although China’s land mass and latitude is comparable to the US, only 10 percent of its land is arable. Rising standards of living bring increased consumption of foodstuffs. China imported $500 billion per year of commodities from December 2001 through September 2005. China projects to exceed $1 trillion (US) by 2010. Similarly, China’s oil demand, already huge, will more than double by 2030.
Start date for China’s 1st CVBG, Reaches regional peer in 2030
China is managing international perceptions regarding its military growth, but Chinese intentions for this new power remain uncertain.. Through 2018, China will continue focusing development on anti-access capabilities, including “assassin’s mace” weapons, to slow deployment of adversary forces and compel cause these forces to operate from distances further than desired
In parallel with producing anti-access capabilities, China is also beginning to focus more resources on developing systems to project military power beyond the region. New Chinese conventional theater ballistic missiles are capable of projecting power beyond Taiwan. Also, the PLA is seeking to purchase or develop over-the-horizon sensors and space-based C4ISR assets to track distant naval targets. The PLAAF will soon field its first-ever aerial refueling capability with the Russian Il-78 Midas and indigenous B-6U, extending the range of strike and bomber aircraft beyond the Taiwan Strait. Finally, advanced destroyers and nuclear submarines, both Russian and Chinese-made, will considerably advance power projection abilities. In 2006, China stated it intends to build and deploy aircraft carriers. However, most analysts agree that Chinese efforts to deploy a carrier will likely not be successful before 2020.
By 2030, Much of China’s ground and air forces will be regionally limited to the Taiwan Strait and the Yellow, East China, and South China Seas. However, China will be capable of projecting some aspects of military power beyond the region via aircraft carriers, submarines, conventional ballistic missiles, cyberspace, and space platforms. China will likely not be an expeditionary force, but will selectively use these projection options to ensure access to natural resources and commerce.
35% of China’s population over 60
By 2030, the Chinese population will be aging rapidly. As a result, the younger generation at that time will likely become the most educated of any generation in Chinese history. With only 17 percent of the population in the 5-19 age group, the burden on the education system will have decreased which, in turn, will increase the opportunity and thus percentage of youth that complete primary and secondary education. By 2030, these figures will likely be at over 90 percent. However, a decreasing workforce providing for an increasingly elderly population pose serious economic questions. High health care costs and older retirement ages are in the offing, and a socialist retirement system enabling early retirement is not compatible with China’s demographic profileEconomy passes US PPP in 2011, Approaches US GDP in 2022
Serious reforms of the Chinese economic began in 1978 following the death of Mao Zedong. While some westerners viewed these reforms as steps toward democratization, Chinese leaders described them as Marxism Under Chinese Conditions—a strategy that enabled a more open economic, while still maintaining firm control within the government as demonstrated by its response to the 1989 Tiananmen Square uprising. Since being admitted into the WTO in 2001, China has enjoyed annual growth rates as high as 13 percent annually. In 2008, the International Monetary Fund estimated China’s GDP, using Purchasing Power Parity as a measure, $12.988 trillion. Given its current rate of growth, China’s economy passes the US in PPP, although per capita income lags significantly.
18th Plenum for Chinese Leadership
Promotion results from the 17th CPC make it clear that President Hu’s influence and “Harmonious Society” or another parallel Confucian-Boxer-like derivative strategy will be China’s path for at least the next two decades. The fifth generation of leaders from Hu’s tuanpai students will be the leadership element in China for the foreseeable future. From the 17th CPC, the new selections to the Politburo Standing Committee include two potential successors to Hu in 2012. They are his protégés, Xi Jinping (Shanghai party chief) and Li Keqiang (Liaoning party chief). They meet a Hu criterion in selecting emerging leaders in that they are all in the late forties to early fifties—very young by Chinese standards. The turnover rate for the Politburo Standing Committee, Politburo, Central Committee, and the Central Military Commission will remain at 60 percent per congress and higher, now and for the foreseeable future.
China imports large quantities of foodstuffs
Although China’s land mass and latitude is comparable to the US, only 10 percent of its land is arable. Rising standards of living bring increased consumption of foodstuffs. China imported $500 billion per year of commodities from December 2001 through September 2005. China projects to exceed $1 trillion (US) by 2010. Similarly, China’s oil demand, already huge, will more than double by 2030.
Start date for China’s 1st CVBG, Reaches regional peer in 2030
China is managing international perceptions regarding its military growth, but Chinese intentions for this new power remain uncertain.. Through 2018, China will continue focusing development on anti-access capabilities, including “assassin’s mace” weapons, to slow deployment of adversary forces and compel cause these forces to operate from distances further than desired
In parallel with producing anti-access capabilities, China is also beginning to focus more resources on developing systems to project military power beyond the region. New Chinese conventional theater ballistic missiles are capable of projecting power beyond Taiwan. Also, the PLA is seeking to purchase or develop over-the-horizon sensors and space-based C4ISR assets to track distant naval targets. The PLAAF will soon field its first-ever aerial refueling capability with the Russian Il-78 Midas and indigenous B-6U, extending the range of strike and bomber aircraft beyond the Taiwan Strait. Finally, advanced destroyers and nuclear submarines, both Russian and Chinese-made, will considerably advance power projection abilities. In 2006, China stated it intends to build and deploy aircraft carriers. However, most analysts agree that Chinese efforts to deploy a carrier will likely not be successful before 2020.
By 2030, Much of China’s ground and air forces will be regionally limited to the Taiwan Strait and the Yellow, East China, and South China Seas. However, China will be capable of projecting some aspects of military power beyond the region via aircraft carriers, submarines, conventional ballistic missiles, cyberspace, and space platforms. China will likely not be an expeditionary force, but will selectively use these projection options to ensure access to natural resources and commerce.
35% of China’s population over 60
By 2030, the Chinese population will be aging rapidly. As a result, the younger generation at that time will likely become the most educated of any generation in Chinese history. With only 17 percent of the population in the 5-19 age group, the burden on the education system will have decreased which, in turn, will increase the opportunity and thus percentage of youth that complete primary and secondary education. By 2030, these figures will likely be at over 90 percent. However, a decreasing workforce providing for an increasingly elderly population pose serious economic questions. High health care costs and older retirement ages are in the offing, and a socialist retirement system enabling early retirement is not compatible with China’s demographic profile
15. 15 This graphic comes from a study released in February 2008 by the National Science Foundation which was conducted by Georgia Tech. The X-axis reflects the current level of technological infrastructure and the productive capacity (some of which may be unused) of the nation in question across all the scientific disciplines examined (. This is a measure of where the state stands at the present time. The Y-axis shows the “technological standing” which reflects the countries recent success in exploring new technologies with success. Among the measures of technological standing are the number of new scientific breakthroughs published in peer reviewed journals. The X axis, therefore, shows the current scientific position of the state; the Y-axis shows where the new research is being published – which is historically where scientific standing is derived. Of concern as we look to the future with China is that as new research in the U.S. is declining, it is rising within China at a phenomenal pace, allowing technological innovation within China to move forward at a rate faster than that of any other nation on the planet. China is already assessed as having passed the U.S. in overall scientific innovation in the field of nano-technology. If the trends across the remaining scientific disciplines were to remain unchanged, China would pass the U.S. in innovation and scientific standing in many, if not most, scientific fields within this study’s timeframe. This graphic comes from a study released in February 2008 by the National Science Foundation which was conducted by Georgia Tech. The X-axis reflects the current level of technological infrastructure and the productive capacity (some of which may be unused) of the nation in question across all the scientific disciplines examined (. This is a measure of where the state stands at the present time. The Y-axis shows the “technological standing” which reflects the countries recent success in exploring new technologies with success. Among the measures of technological standing are the number of new scientific breakthroughs published in peer reviewed journals. The X axis, therefore, shows the current scientific position of the state; the Y-axis shows where the new research is being published – which is historically where scientific standing is derived. Of concern as we look to the future with China is that as new research in the U.S. is declining, it is rising within China at a phenomenal pace, allowing technological innovation within China to move forward at a rate faster than that of any other nation on the planet. China is already assessed as having passed the U.S. in overall scientific innovation in the field of nano-technology. If the trends across the remaining scientific disciplines were to remain unchanged, China would pass the U.S. in innovation and scientific standing in many, if not most, scientific fields within this study’s timeframe.
16. 16 China in 2030 Causality
Greater GDP than US
Regional power peer, but projection can be challenged beyond Indian & Pacific
Huge demand for imported energy and foodstuffs
Environmental decay
Taiwan issue
Seeks “Harmonious World”
Chinese leaders face several largely internal stressors that could threaten their “mandate from heaven” (a source of legitimacy in Chinese culture) and move it in a different direction from its stated goals of achieving a “harmonious society” in a “harmonious world”
If growth continues at an “overheating,” eleven percent annual rate, any sharp downturn could foment instability. The rural areas expect coming prosperity as envisioned in “Harmonious Society” and the developed urban areas expect even more wealth. Both groups have internalized government rhetoric about more democracy. An economic crash will create some level of disenfranchisement, in which an exact outcome can not be predicted.
Although China’s land mass and latitude is comparable to the US, only 10 percent of its land is arable. Rising standards of living bring increased consumption of foodstuffs. China will need import substantial quantities of food by 2014. Similarly, China’s oil demand, already huge, will more than double by 2030. Simultaneous shortages couple pose a political “double whammy” resulting in greater instability than either would generate alone.
The “one child” policy slowed population growth to one of the slowest in the developed world. By 2030, over 500 million Chinese will be over 50 category, 37 percent of the total population. This may place social strains on the system, force workers into longer careers, and result in enormous heath care challenges.
Natural disasters and pandemics are both factors that could also alter China’s political future in ways that might alter the ruling elite’s ability to stay the course. At a minimum, they could be a source of potential rebellion as the population concludes that the Mandate of Heaven may have been lost.
Given China’s reliance on coal and lax environmental regulatory environment, environmental concerns and worries over water scarcity have the potential to create widespread discontent across Chinese society. If these issues are not dealt with properly in the middle of the twenty-first century, a rising opposition, possibly under a democratic banner could challenge the CCP.
While Taiwan remains on the list of possible stressors, economic integration between China and Taiwan combined with globalization will reduce the probability of armed conflict. Absent a full declaration of independence by Taiwan, a Chinese-Taiwanese war will be increasingly unlikely in the future. In fact, should China continue to slowly open its markets and system, eventual mutual accommodation or even merger is possible.
Chinese leaders face several largely internal stressors that could threaten their “mandate from heaven” (a source of legitimacy in Chinese culture) and move it in a different direction from its stated goals of achieving a “harmonious society” in a “harmonious world”
If growth continues at an “overheating,” eleven percent annual rate, any sharp downturn could foment instability. The rural areas expect coming prosperity as envisioned in “Harmonious Society” and the developed urban areas expect even more wealth. Both groups have internalized government rhetoric about more democracy. An economic crash will create some level of disenfranchisement, in which an exact outcome can not be predicted.
Although China’s land mass and latitude is comparable to the US, only 10 percent of its land is arable. Rising standards of living bring increased consumption of foodstuffs. China will need import substantial quantities of food by 2014. Similarly, China’s oil demand, already huge, will more than double by 2030. Simultaneous shortages couple pose a political “double whammy” resulting in greater instability than either would generate alone.
The “one child” policy slowed population growth to one of the slowest in the developed world. By 2030, over 500 million Chinese will be over 50 category, 37 percent of the total population. This may place social strains on the system, force workers into longer careers, and result in enormous heath care challenges.
Natural disasters and pandemics are both factors that could also alter China’s political future in ways that might alter the ruling elite’s ability to stay the course. At a minimum, they could be a source of potential rebellion as the population concludes that the Mandate of Heaven may have been lost.
Given China’s reliance on coal and lax environmental regulatory environment, environmental concerns and worries over water scarcity have the potential to create widespread discontent across Chinese society. If these issues are not dealt with properly in the middle of the twenty-first century, a rising opposition, possibly under a democratic banner could challenge the CCP.
While Taiwan remains on the list of possible stressors, economic integration between China and Taiwan combined with globalization will reduce the probability of armed conflict. Absent a full declaration of independence by Taiwan, a Chinese-Taiwanese war will be increasingly unlikely in the future. In fact, should China continue to slowly open its markets and system, eventual mutual accommodation or even merger is possible.
17. 17 Required USAF Capabilities Counter interior line advantages at great distances against:
Sophisticated integrated defense systems on land/at sea/in air
Cruise and ballistic missiles
Directed energy and information weapons
Requires:
Long range systems—China could initially deny penetration inside second island chain (Guam to Northern Australia)
Protection and rapid reconstitution in cyberspace of both civilian and military infrastructure
Large, fast lift capability
May become a race to see who can close first
Survivable basing against hypersonic missiles
Dispersal, lily pad, and/or hardening
Protection and rapid reconstitution of critical space capabilities
Awareness, debris and radiation mitigation, rapid launch
China enjoys the advantages of interior lines within the region plus strategic depth within its own territory and from principal US bases. A peer China will likely be a formidable nation militarily, with a range of advanced weapons and the ability to initially deny US penetration inside the second island chain. These challenges will require several capabilities:
Survivable basing. China’s anti-access strategies will likely initially keep U.S. forces at arms length – possibly further than Guam and northern Australia. Dispersed bare bases and floating air base concepts or “lily pads” may prove essential.
Large, fast lift capacity. Given the distances, this type of conflict may well be a race to see which side can get the battle area in force first. This requires air transport capabilities in the millions of pounds (the fastest sea lift likely isn’t fast enough).
Base Defense
Directed energy and/or kinetic kill systems. China is likely to have missiles that will fly at either high supersonic or hypersonic speeds. Detection and engagement systems sufficient to kill these weapons before they strike our forces will be needed.
Perimeter defense. Large populations of ethnic Chinese in the region and US who are sympathetic to the homeland could threaten US bases in variety of ways. The ability to detect and neutralize these threats will be an essential element of base defense.
Space
Responsive space. Destruction of satellites in space can make launching new satellites into space problematic. Space debris may need to be mitigated before new satellites can safely be launched into orbit (either de-orbited or cleared).
Nuclear electromagnetic pulse event. Residual radiation in the Van Allen belts following a HEMP greatly shortens the life of satellites launched through it. Capabilities to reduce high altitude radiation are needed to counter a massive EMP attack in space.
Rapid reconstitution. Satellites built using a common architecture may have great value, enabling rapid manufacture to quickly restore lost capabilities. Similarly, reusable two-stage or single stage to LEO concepts show promise to improve responsive launch.
Cyberspace
USAF brand as Cyber defender. Absent robust defenses against attacks for both private and governmental systems, USAF claims of defending in cyberspace means that, for better or worse, the blame will fall upon the Air Force if such an attack succeeds.
National cyber defense umbrella. If AF wishes to continue Cyber defender brand, defensive systems should extend to cover critical civilian architectures and infrastructures. Achieving this capability requires overcoming cultural and legal barriers.
AF Cyber force presentation. AF has centralized C4 to create fewer nodes that ease defense. By reducing nodes, however, one simplifies the adversary’s attack problem. To enable continued network functionality, dispersal should be a priority in future designs
Cyber deterrence. From an offensive standpoint, the AF must be able to visibly hold the infrastructure of its potential opponents at risk to enable a deterrent strategy.
Attack
Counter air. China’s fighters will be at least as capable as the F-22 and F-35, implying the need for counter stealth detection systems and missiles. Given development time, improving sensors and missiles may prove superior to purchasing new fighters beyond F-35.
Surface attack. Attack systems used in the first days of conflict need to be of markedly longer range than those of 2008, able withstand laser and microwave attacks and capable of surviving against the S-500. Employment of long-range hypersonic missiles and/or inserted special operations forces may be the best, most survivable methods of mitigating these systems.
SOF insertion. The insertion of special operations forces will require a survivable tactical lift capability that can reasonably evade or survive in this high-threat environment. Research is into low-signature, vertical-lift technologies is needed.
The range imperative. Once China’s defenses are reduced, less capable (and cheaper) systems can attack larger target sets. However, initial attack systems need greater range and survivability that those presently fielded, since China’s anti access capabilities will deny tanker support to short-range fighters. As with the air-to-air challenge, new weapons may be a more cost-competitive strategy than new platforms in this area.China enjoys the advantages of interior lines within the region plus strategic depth within its own territory and from principal US bases. A peer China will likely be a formidable nation militarily, with a range of advanced weapons and the ability to initially deny US penetration inside the second island chain. These challenges will require several capabilities:
Survivable basing. China’s anti-access strategies will likely initially keep U.S. forces at arms length – possibly further than Guam and northern Australia. Dispersed bare bases and floating air base concepts or “lily pads” may prove essential.
Large, fast lift capacity. Given the distances, this type of conflict may well be a race to see which side can get the battle area in force first. This requires air transport capabilities in the millions of pounds (the fastest sea lift likely isn’t fast enough).
Base Defense
Directed energy and/or kinetic kill systems. China is likely to have missiles that will fly at either high supersonic or hypersonic speeds. Detection and engagement systems sufficient to kill these weapons before they strike our forces will be needed.
Perimeter defense. Large populations of ethnic Chinese in the region and US who are sympathetic to the homeland could threaten US bases in variety of ways. The ability to detect and neutralize these threats will be an essential element of base defense.
Space
Responsive space. Destruction of satellites in space can make launching new satellites into space problematic. Space debris may need to be mitigated before new satellites can safely be launched into orbit (either de-orbited or cleared).
Nuclear electromagnetic pulse event. Residual radiation in the Van Allen belts following a HEMP greatly shortens the life of satellites launched through it. Capabilities to reduce high altitude radiation are needed to counter a massive EMP attack in space.
Rapid reconstitution. Satellites built using a common architecture may have great value, enabling rapid manufacture to quickly restore lost capabilities. Similarly, reusable two-stage or single stage to LEO concepts show promise to improve responsive launch.
Cyberspace
USAF brand as Cyber defender. Absent robust defenses against attacks for both private and governmental systems, USAF claims of defending in cyberspace means that, for better or worse, the blame will fall upon the Air Force if such an attack succeeds.
National cyber defense umbrella. If AF wishes to continue Cyber defender brand, defensive systems should extend to cover critical civilian architectures and infrastructures. Achieving this capability requires overcoming cultural and legal barriers.
AF Cyber force presentation. AF has centralized C4 to create fewer nodes that ease defense. By reducing nodes, however, one simplifies the adversary’s attack problem. To enable continued network functionality, dispersal should be a priority in future designs
Cyber deterrence. From an offensive standpoint, the AF must be able to visibly hold the infrastructure of its potential opponents at risk to enable a deterrent strategy.
Attack
Counter air. China’s fighters will be at least as capable as the F-22 and F-35, implying the need for counter stealth detection systems and missiles. Given development time, improving sensors and missiles may prove superior to purchasing new fighters beyond F-35.
Surface attack. Attack systems used in the first days of conflict need to be of markedly longer range than those of 2008, able withstand laser and microwave attacks and capable of surviving against the S-500. Employment of long-range hypersonic missiles and/or inserted special operations forces may be the best, most survivable methods of mitigating these systems.
SOF insertion. The insertion of special operations forces will require a survivable tactical lift capability that can reasonably evade or survive in this high-threat environment. Research is into low-signature, vertical-lift technologies is needed.
The range imperative. Once China’s defenses are reduced, less capable (and cheaper) systems can attack larger target sets. However, initial attack systems need greater range and survivability that those presently fielded, since China’s anti access capabilities will deny tanker support to short-range fighters. As with the air-to-air challenge, new weapons may be a more cost-competitive strategy than new platforms in this area.
18. 18 Failed State Case Study – Nigeria Why Nigeria?
Key US oil supplier; active insurgency (MEND) attacking oil infrastructure
Top 20 world economy
Disproportionate influence on regional stability – Nigeria’s failure can ignite wars between and within neighboring countries
Largest population in Africa
Growing Islamic population in the North follows Shari’a Law
Rampant institutional corruption; haven for transnational criminal enterprises Nigeria is a state that is culturally bifurcated, with a Muslim population in the north and the ruling majority Christian population in the south. The Muslim population is currently increasing at a rate faster than the Christian population, which portends a change in majority rule during the study’s timeframe.
Nigeria is a critical state to current national security interests. It supplies 27 percent of U.S. imported oil, is a top 20 economy within the world, and is the largest state in Africa in terms of population. Should government legitimacy problems ensue during the transition between a Christian majority toward a Muslim majority, the state could fail in a manner where the state would no longer be able to provide for its internal security or meet the basic needs of its people. Such a situation could result in ethnic or religious violence, a humanitarian crisis of near-Biblical proportions creating a cataclysmic crisis in an area of vital interest to the United States. Typically, ungoverned regions are also fertile grounds for the rapid spread of dangerous weapons and potentially terrorism. It is an area in which the U.S. would need to take actions to restore security. Specifically, the United States will need to take action to:
Prevent full civil war
Limit spread of conflict beyond Nigeria’s borders
Secure critical resource areas in order to limit damage to US and Global economy
Relieve human suffering
Create conditions for political solution between warring parties and national reconciliation
Transition from US-led Peace Enforcement to UN-led national recovery operations
Nigeria is a state that is culturally bifurcated, with a Muslim population in the north and the ruling majority Christian population in the south. The Muslim population is currently increasing at a rate faster than the Christian population, which portends a change in majority rule during the study’s timeframe.
Nigeria is a critical state to current national security interests. It supplies 27 percent of U.S. imported oil, is a top 20 economy within the world, and is the largest state in Africa in terms of population. Should government legitimacy problems ensue during the transition between a Christian majority toward a Muslim majority, the state could fail in a manner where the state would no longer be able to provide for its internal security or meet the basic needs of its people. Such a situation could result in ethnic or religious violence, a humanitarian crisis of near-Biblical proportions creating a cataclysmic crisis in an area of vital interest to the United States. Typically, ungoverned regions are also fertile grounds for the rapid spread of dangerous weapons and potentially terrorism. It is an area in which the U.S. would need to take actions to restore security. Specifically, the United States will need to take action to:
Prevent full civil war
Limit spread of conflict beyond Nigeria’s borders
Secure critical resource areas in order to limit damage to US and Global economy
Relieve human suffering
Create conditions for political solution between warring parties and national reconciliation
Transition from US-led Peace Enforcement to UN-led national recovery operations
19. 19 Jihadist Insurgency Case Study – Middle East Why the Middle East?
Disruption to vital oil resource
Wealth and military capability in hands of Jihadists ? disastrous
Muslim holy cities must not fall into hands of radical Muslims
Regional power balance - Sunni counterweight to Shiia Iraq and Iran
Substantial population growth with poor outlook in labor economics fostering discontent
Existing low level insurgency – strong potential for expanded religious, ethnic, and tribal conflict The Middle East presents an excellent setting for a future insurgency scenario. The United States will likely retain significant interest in the future of the region since it is the location of the two holy cities of Islam. If these cities were to fall into the hands of radical Islamists, it might serve as a basis for a radical leader to be a new Caliph who would unite radical Muslims throughout the world. With Iraq becoming a Shiia-dominated state, Saudi Arabia would should serve as an important Sunni counterweight to Shiia Iraq and Iran in maintaining a regional balance of power.
This scenario begins with the Middle East passing peak oil production in the 2005-2010 timeframe. Combined with a steadily increasing population, this portends a steadily decreasing per capita income, which history suggests tends to lead to unrest. In this alternative future, Islamist groups step in to bolster failing education systems and provide social services. In so doing, they spread Islamist ideals, resulting in a schism which develops across the region. This schism in the late 2020s manifests itself in an insurgency leading to a region which successfully becomes quasi-autonomous. We view the most likely region for this to occur as being near the border of Saudi Arabia and Iraq in areas currently heavily Wahhabi in religion. This leads to an Islamist regime with substantial resources with which to purchase modern armaments on international arms markets, right in the heart of the Middle East. U.S. interests in this region will remain significant due to the criticality of stability in the Middle East, and the fact that the region still be supplying much of the Western world with a large percentage of their imported oil. As such, this insurgency/civil war is not something the U.S. can ignore. Further, these Islamists, if allowed, may to export terror to nations and regions whose views are not in concert with their own.The Middle East presents an excellent setting for a future insurgency scenario. The United States will likely retain significant interest in the future of the region since it is the location of the two holy cities of Islam. If these cities were to fall into the hands of radical Islamists, it might serve as a basis for a radical leader to be a new Caliph who would unite radical Muslims throughout the world. With Iraq becoming a Shiia-dominated state, Saudi Arabia would should serve as an important Sunni counterweight to Shiia Iraq and Iran in maintaining a regional balance of power.
This scenario begins with the Middle East passing peak oil production in the 2005-2010 timeframe. Combined with a steadily increasing population, this portends a steadily decreasing per capita income, which history suggests tends to lead to unrest. In this alternative future, Islamist groups step in to bolster failing education systems and provide social services. In so doing, they spread Islamist ideals, resulting in a schism which develops across the region. This schism in the late 2020s manifests itself in an insurgency leading to a region which successfully becomes quasi-autonomous. We view the most likely region for this to occur as being near the border of Saudi Arabia and Iraq in areas currently heavily Wahhabi in religion. This leads to an Islamist regime with substantial resources with which to purchase modern armaments on international arms markets, right in the heart of the Middle East. U.S. interests in this region will remain significant due to the criticality of stability in the Middle East, and the fact that the region still be supplying much of the Western world with a large percentage of their imported oil. As such, this insurgency/civil war is not something the U.S. can ignore. Further, these Islamists, if allowed, may to export terror to nations and regions whose views are not in concert with their own.
20. 20 Why Russia?
Key supplier of world energy
Major world economy – high potential for rapid increase via wealth from hydrocarbon exports
Transitioning philosophy – Communism, ~ Democracy, to autocracy?
NATO expansion – regional tensions increasing
Rising nationalism and xenophobia
Large nuclear stockpile with modernizing conventional capabilities
Demands a role on the world stage Resurgent Russia Resurgent Russia is a forced scenario, but one based on solid trend data. As the world’s 2nd largest oil exporter (only behind Saudi Arabia), and with oil exceeding $140 per barrel, Russia is awash in new found petroleum wealth. As the current 11th largest GDP, increasing oil revenues will only further increase Russia’s position.
Since the fall of communism in 1991, Russia has been in constant governmental transition. Perestroika brought about “openness”, but the first foray into democracy was fraught with corruption and poor execution of national goals among many problems. Putin assumed power and began centralizing authority back in the Kremlin and Moscow. Coupled with new wealth and a Russian psyche for a strong, autocratic leader, Putin maintained tremendous public support even while reducing civil liberties. With the transition to President Medvedev while retaining Putin as Prime Minister means some change, all indications are for continuing consolidation of authority. The term often cited is Sovereign Democracy.
NATO continues to expand and continues to cause regional tensions. With Missile Defense in the backdrop, it is more of a question of what purpose does NATO serve now that the Soviet Union is no more. And, why does NATO need the Ukraine and Georgia in particular? Russia maintains a border security paranoia.
Russia fights terrorism on its own fronts particularly in Chechnya. As she battles separatist ideas, she is also plagued with regions of increased nationalistic tendencies and an ever growing Muslim population.
Lastly, Russia is still a big boy on the nuclear block. Even with START II and other nuclear reduction treaties, her nuclear arsenal is formidable. Yet, she retains a large, conventional force that is in dire need of modernizing. Flush with cash from oil sales, that conventional force coupled with asymmetric capabilities leads to a Resurgent Russia.Resurgent Russia is a forced scenario, but one based on solid trend data. As the world’s 2nd largest oil exporter (only behind Saudi Arabia), and with oil exceeding $140 per barrel, Russia is awash in new found petroleum wealth. As the current 11th largest GDP, increasing oil revenues will only further increase Russia’s position.
Since the fall of communism in 1991, Russia has been in constant governmental transition. Perestroika brought about “openness”, but the first foray into democracy was fraught with corruption and poor execution of national goals among many problems. Putin assumed power and began centralizing authority back in the Kremlin and Moscow. Coupled with new wealth and a Russian psyche for a strong, autocratic leader, Putin maintained tremendous public support even while reducing civil liberties. With the transition to President Medvedev while retaining Putin as Prime Minister means some change, all indications are for continuing consolidation of authority. The term often cited is Sovereign Democracy.
NATO continues to expand and continues to cause regional tensions. With Missile Defense in the backdrop, it is more of a question of what purpose does NATO serve now that the Soviet Union is no more. And, why does NATO need the Ukraine and Georgia in particular? Russia maintains a border security paranoia.
Russia fights terrorism on its own fronts particularly in Chechnya. As she battles separatist ideas, she is also plagued with regions of increased nationalistic tendencies and an ever growing Muslim population.
Lastly, Russia is still a big boy on the nuclear block. Even with START II and other nuclear reduction treaties, her nuclear arsenal is formidable. Yet, she retains a large, conventional force that is in dire need of modernizing. Flush with cash from oil sales, that conventional force coupled with asymmetric capabilities leads to a Resurgent Russia.
21. Blue Horizons 2008 Operational Analysis
22. 22 Summary of 58 Concepts Notional systems (in most cases) representing specific capabilities
Some top concepts are worth exploring for production
Concepts provide a vehicle for evaluating enabling technologies A total of 58 concepts were consolidated from several sources. Among these were the HQ USAF DCS Plans and Programs, and concept papers written over the past two years by students of the Air War College and Air Command and Staff College. Lastly, to fill a few gaps in various domains, a few technology concepts from the last major USAF futures study, Air Force 2025, were added to the mix.
A total of 58 concepts were consolidated from several sources. Among these were the HQ USAF DCS Plans and Programs, and concept papers written over the past two years by students of the Air War College and Air Command and Staff College. Lastly, to fill a few gaps in various domains, a few technology concepts from the last major USAF futures study, Air Force 2025, were added to the mix.
23. 23 Rank Order of Concepts Across All Alternate Futures This chart shows the ranking of scores of each of the concepts across each of the four alternative futures. The concepts are listed from left to right in order of their overall score. What is remarkable is that despite the fact that each alternative future had its own set of capabilities functions and values measures, the overall ranking of the concepts changes very little from one alternative future to another. This reflects the fact that while for ground forces, insurgent warfare may well differ greatly from major armored battles, in the mission sets of maintaining air superiority, conducting ISR, providing airlift, inserting forces, and enabling navigation and communication via our space assets, many AF mission sets remain remarkably constant across a variety of scenarios.
Indeed, the only areas where there is significant difference across the four scenarios is in the areas of space. This made intuitive sense to the study leadership, as it was not believed that in insurgent of failed state scenarios, that U.S. space assets would be threatened by insurgents or failed state adversaries. As a result, these systems score better in state-on-state warfare than in other scenarios.
Except for these space systems, the remaining systems score almost the same across the scenarios. This suggests that what is irregular about irregular warfare is not the capabilities required, but how these capabilities are employed. This chart shows the ranking of scores of each of the concepts across each of the four alternative futures. The concepts are listed from left to right in order of their overall score. What is remarkable is that despite the fact that each alternative future had its own set of capabilities functions and values measures, the overall ranking of the concepts changes very little from one alternative future to another. This reflects the fact that while for ground forces, insurgent warfare may well differ greatly from major armored battles, in the mission sets of maintaining air superiority, conducting ISR, providing airlift, inserting forces, and enabling navigation and communication via our space assets, many AF mission sets remain remarkably constant across a variety of scenarios.
Indeed, the only areas where there is significant difference across the four scenarios is in the areas of space. This made intuitive sense to the study leadership, as it was not believed that in insurgent of failed state scenarios, that U.S. space assets would be threatened by insurgents or failed state adversaries. As a result, these systems score better in state-on-state warfare than in other scenarios.
Except for these space systems, the remaining systems score almost the same across the scenarios. This suggests that what is irregular about irregular warfare is not the capabilities required, but how these capabilities are employed.
24. 24 Rank Order of Concepts China/Russia vs Insurgency/Failed State Comparing how systems scored in the state versus non-state futures, again a strikingly similar pattern emerges. The principal differences (discernable by the locations of the sharp opposing spikes), again lie in the domain of space. In general, space based capabilities scored very well in the Russian scenario – a scenario where space-based conflict is seen by the study team as most likely. However, in insurgent warfare, the need to protect space assets from a space-based attack, and the need to attack in space, is not viewed as likely even in the year 2030. While Al Qeada-like organizations may utilize space for communication and navigation, we do not see them as being able to launch their own satellites or used space-based attack methods. The other principal differences between the two types of conflict is in the area of airlift. Failed state and insurgent warfare was seen by the team as likely needing less airborne strategic lift than the more conventional conflicts.Comparing how systems scored in the state versus non-state futures, again a strikingly similar pattern emerges. The principal differences (discernable by the locations of the sharp opposing spikes), again lie in the domain of space. In general, space based capabilities scored very well in the Russian scenario – a scenario where space-based conflict is seen by the study team as most likely. However, in insurgent warfare, the need to protect space assets from a space-based attack, and the need to attack in space, is not viewed as likely even in the year 2030. While Al Qeada-like organizations may utilize space for communication and navigation, we do not see them as being able to launch their own satellites or used space-based attack methods. The other principal differences between the two types of conflict is in the area of airlift. Failed state and insurgent warfare was seen by the team as likely needing less airborne strategic lift than the more conventional conflicts.
25. 25 Top 10 Concepts Across All Futures Pathfinder is an unmanned vehicle that accompanies a manned vehicle into combat territory. This system is able to conduct ISR; conduct attacks of adversary integrated defense systems; conduct command and control of micro-UAVs, and essentially act as a “wingman” for a manned platform. This system is capable of self-defense, and is thus, a survivable platform even in medium to high threat environments. Pathfinder is an unmanned vehicle that accompanies a manned vehicle into combat territory. This system is able to conduct ISR; conduct attacks of adversary integrated defense systems; conduct command and control of micro-UAVs, and essentially act as a “wingman” for a manned platform. This system is capable of self-defense, and is thus, a survivable platform even in medium to high threat environments.
26. 26 Top 10 Concepts Across All Alternate Futures The Cyberspace UAV is a virtual vehicle in virtual space. Essentially it is a package of programming that can navigate through the realm of cyberspace. This package can conduct ISR, provides a dynamic view of cyberspace, and can conduct repairs of friendly nodes that have come under attack. It is able to ensure that trusted networks remain secure, and ensures survivability in a high-threat environment.The Cyberspace UAV is a virtual vehicle in virtual space. Essentially it is a package of programming that can navigate through the realm of cyberspace. This package can conduct ISR, provides a dynamic view of cyberspace, and can conduct repairs of friendly nodes that have come under attack. It is able to ensure that trusted networks remain secure, and ensures survivability in a high-threat environment.
27. 27 Top 10 Concepts Across All Alternate Futures This system is a ground-based high-energy laser system that shoots upwards toward a series of relay mirrors. This minimizes atmospheric attenuation of the laser beam, as it needs to pass only through a few kilometers of the atmosphere as it shoots upward. The laser beam is captured and then refocused and relayed by a series of space-based satellites to a point above the intended target, where it is re-directed toward the air or ground target. Given that this laser must pass only through a few tens of kilometers of atmosphere (going both up and down), the majority of the initial laser power can strike the target. Given that laser power will be limited only by a combination of laser technology and the ground-based power source co-located with the laser, this system is envisioned to be able to deposit substantial fluence on targets of choice, enabling striking of both soft and medium-hard targets. Hard targets may be degraded, if soft spots exist.
This system is a ground-based high-energy laser system that shoots upwards toward a series of relay mirrors. This minimizes atmospheric attenuation of the laser beam, as it needs to pass only through a few kilometers of the atmosphere as it shoots upward. The laser beam is captured and then refocused and relayed by a series of space-based satellites to a point above the intended target, where it is re-directed toward the air or ground target. Given that this laser must pass only through a few tens of kilometers of atmosphere (going both up and down), the majority of the initial laser power can strike the target. Given that laser power will be limited only by a combination of laser technology and the ground-based power source co-located with the laser, this system is envisioned to be able to deposit substantial fluence on targets of choice, enabling striking of both soft and medium-hard targets. Hard targets may be degraded, if soft spots exist.
28. 28 Top 10 Concepts Across All Alternate Futures This system is a space-based laser that operates based on solar-power. As a result of the smaller powerplant, this system is envisioned to have much less power than its ground-based counterpart. As such, this system is envisioned to be useful as a missile defense and/or satellite defense or attack system. The laser embedded is envisioned to be solid state. This system is a space-based laser that operates based on solar-power. As a result of the smaller powerplant, this system is envisioned to have much less power than its ground-based counterpart. As such, this system is envisioned to be useful as a missile defense and/or satellite defense or attack system. The laser embedded is envisioned to be solid state.
29. 29 Top 10 Concepts Across All Alternate Futures This is a potential future concept beyond the original ABL. Operating on a nuclear engine, this aircraft would have exceptionally long endurance, limited only to engine oil change cycles or aircrew endurance. Notionally, this system would have multiple turreted laser system each of megawatt class, and each powered by the on-board electrical systems. This is a potential future concept beyond the original ABL. Operating on a nuclear engine, this aircraft would have exceptionally long endurance, limited only to engine oil change cycles or aircrew endurance. Notionally, this system would have multiple turreted laser system each of megawatt class, and each powered by the on-board electrical systems.
30. 30 Top 10 Concepts Across All Alternate Futures Vulture is a long-rang combat UAV. It is capable of fast flight (supercruise) enabling it to reach target environments in a relatively short time. It may carry ISR or combat payloads, but does require a full airbase for take-offs and landings.Vulture is a long-rang combat UAV. It is capable of fast flight (supercruise) enabling it to reach target environments in a relatively short time. It may carry ISR or combat payloads, but does require a full airbase for take-offs and landings.
31. 31 Top 10 Concepts Across All Alternate Futures This concept was included as, at study time, it had not been fielded yet. The thinly veiled title is a descriptor of what is now known as the F-35 or Joint Strike Fighter. This concept was included as, at study time, it had not been fielded yet. The thinly veiled title is a descriptor of what is now known as the F-35 or Joint Strike Fighter.
32. Top 10 Concepts Across All Alternate Futures This is not necessarily the next generation bomber. Notionally named by the study team, this is a long-range supersonic bomber capable of carrying medium payloads. The bomber is envisioned to be able to release its bombs at speed, which would give the platform some stand-off weapons capability. The system would have embedded data fusion enabling it to act as a command and control platform where needed, and respond immediately to re-tasking and command and control inputs from other command centers or aircraft.This is not necessarily the next generation bomber. Notionally named by the study team, this is a long-range supersonic bomber capable of carrying medium payloads. The bomber is envisioned to be able to release its bombs at speed, which would give the platform some stand-off weapons capability. The system would have embedded data fusion enabling it to act as a command and control platform where needed, and respond immediately to re-tasking and command and control inputs from other command centers or aircraft.
33. 33 Top 10 Concepts Across All Alternate Futures This is a tactical aircraft. As a result of its smaller size, the lasers envisioned for this platform, even by 2030, are likely to be much smaller than the other systems in the top 10 list. Notionally, the study team assessed it to be likely such weapons would be in the 300KW class. This would enable this system to remain armed as long as it had fuel on board. Medium energy lasers are capable of attacking soft targets at range, and medium targets if closer. This is a tactical aircraft. As a result of its smaller size, the lasers envisioned for this platform, even by 2030, are likely to be much smaller than the other systems in the top 10 list. Notionally, the study team assessed it to be likely such weapons would be in the 300KW class. This would enable this system to remain armed as long as it had fuel on board. Medium energy lasers are capable of attacking soft targets at range, and medium targets if closer.
34. Top 10 Concepts Across All Alternate Futures The hypersonic attack aircraft is a very long range transatmospheric vehicle capable of medium payloads at speeds well above Mach 6. At the desired hypersonic speeds, it will be possible to launch small satellites on rockets from this aircraft that would then use the rocket stage to reach orbital velocity sufficient for low earth orbit. This system enables rapid global strike as well as rapid space reconstitution.The hypersonic attack aircraft is a very long range transatmospheric vehicle capable of medium payloads at speeds well above Mach 6. At the desired hypersonic speeds, it will be possible to launch small satellites on rockets from this aircraft that would then use the rocket stage to reach orbital velocity sufficient for low earth orbit. This system enables rapid global strike as well as rapid space reconstitution.
35. Blue Horizons Summary of Underlying Technologies
36. 36 Evaluating Technology Scores 172 Technologies Across All Futures Yet, when we examined the initial output from the technology model, two things were very striking. First, the congruence across scenarios as to which technologies were the most important was nearly total. Even more so than with the concepts, the underlying technologies that were important in state-on-state conflict were the same as those in failed state and insurgent warfare. The curve also seemed to have a “knee” or point at which the importance of the enabling technologies quickly leveled off at seemingly unimportant levels. As a research team, we initially had hopes that we would be able to recommend a relatively small set of technologies in which to invest. As we explored this curve in greater detail, however, we discovered that these hopes were premature.Yet, when we examined the initial output from the technology model, two things were very striking. First, the congruence across scenarios as to which technologies were the most important was nearly total. Even more so than with the concepts, the underlying technologies that were important in state-on-state conflict were the same as those in failed state and insurgent warfare. The curve also seemed to have a “knee” or point at which the importance of the enabling technologies quickly leveled off at seemingly unimportant levels. As a research team, we initially had hopes that we would be able to recommend a relatively small set of technologies in which to invest. As we explored this curve in greater detail, however, we discovered that these hopes were premature.
37. Evaluating Technology Scores Pathfinder’s 41 Enabling Technologies As mentioned in our preview of the top concepts, Pathfinder had 41 enabling technologies. We plotted these technologies on the curve, and found that Pathfinder can only be brought to fruition by investment in six technologies that are well out in the tail of the curve. Unfortunately, with the exception of the Near-term, Short Range Attack Fighter, all the concepts have at least one, and most have several, technologies in the tail of the curve. In fact, because pathfinder is the number 1 concept, it gave more points to its enabling technologies than did the other concepts. This graph is as good as it gets. Other key concepts enabling technologies that rank order even lower.
As mentioned in our preview of the top concepts, Pathfinder had 41 enabling technologies. We plotted these technologies on the curve, and found that Pathfinder can only be brought to fruition by investment in six technologies that are well out in the tail of the curve. Unfortunately, with the exception of the Near-term, Short Range Attack Fighter, all the concepts have at least one, and most have several, technologies in the tail of the curve. In fact, because pathfinder is the number 1 concept, it gave more points to its enabling technologies than did the other concepts. This graph is as good as it gets. Other key concepts enabling technologies that rank order even lower.
38. Number of Technologies and Concepts Enabled By Rank Order This chart puts into perspective how serious a problem this really is. Our hope was for a curve similar to the black line, where one could enable most of the concepts by investing in a limited number of technologies. If this were the case, the chart would show an exponential growth toward the end of the graph. What we found was a curve of exactly the opposite shape. If one disinvests in only 10 percent of the technologies, one eliminates nearly 50 percent of the concepts. Disinvestment in approximately 20 percent of the technologies (meaning investment in approximately 130 of them) results in roughly 80 percent of the concepts being rendered impossible to build. This graph depicts one of the fundamental conclusions of the quantitative analysis in this study: Anything other than investment in all of the enabling technologies is a high-risk strategy.
This chart puts into perspective how serious a problem this really is. Our hope was for a curve similar to the black line, where one could enable most of the concepts by investing in a limited number of technologies. If this were the case, the chart would show an exponential growth toward the end of the graph. What we found was a curve of exactly the opposite shape. If one disinvests in only 10 percent of the technologies, one eliminates nearly 50 percent of the concepts. Disinvestment in approximately 20 percent of the technologies (meaning investment in approximately 130 of them) results in roughly 80 percent of the concepts being rendered impossible to build. This graph depicts one of the fundamental conclusions of the quantitative analysis in this study: Anything other than investment in all of the enabling technologies is a high-risk strategy.
39. Top Technologies Prioritized Technology Categories To see if there were some areas where the U.S. Air Force might find investment efficiencies, we took the top enabling technologies and categorized them. We then rank-ordered these categories based on the average score of the technologies within the category.
To see if there were some areas where the U.S. Air Force might find investment efficiencies, we took the top enabling technologies and categorized them. We then rank-ordered these categories based on the average score of the technologies within the category.
40. Additional 2008 Findings and Conclusions
41. 41 The Study Reveals This slide is the theoretical underpinning for the rest of the brief and the description of the S & T landscape in which we are operating. For a variety of reasons listed above, we are in a period of unprecedented technological change. The rate of change and the symbiotic impact technologies will have on each other are non-linear. The rate of change is far more rapid, cumulative and significant. Many from different walks of life (Kurzweil, Garreau, Gingrich) see the amount of change in the next 25 years equal to or greater than the amount of change in the previous century. But the way in which it builds may mean that 90% of the change will occur in the last 2.5 years of the next 25. That makes preparing for the next 25 years extremely difficult.
But as the technology is changing, so too are the economic, political, social and informational landscape. As the cost of data and the distribution of knowledge go down, the availability and access to it increase dramatically. An individual with a lap top and a credit card can access huge amounts of data, buy sophisticated sensors and weapons, learn how to use them effectively, and even train with them virtually all on the Internet. Neither states, no militaries control the R & D, the products developed or the uses to which they may be put. Increasingly technology is civilian designed, commercially available and globally distributed. Increasingly, states and militaries are the consumers, not the producers of the fruits of scientific inquiry and technological advances. A hypothetical adversary, but a real possibility, is “Bubba Einstein,” a disaffected, tech savvy, ideologically dedicated individual who decides to make a statement by using WMD against a state and its people whom he despises.
The spectrum of conflict has shifted from the Cold War concern with deterring a single state opponent and its proxies from the great danger but lower probability of nuclear war to a circumstance where what used to be a nuisance of terrorist acts which were probable but not very serious now take on the possibility of having a relatively small non-state actor use a variety of WMD capabilities to threaten or attack states.This slide is the theoretical underpinning for the rest of the brief and the description of the S & T landscape in which we are operating. For a variety of reasons listed above, we are in a period of unprecedented technological change. The rate of change and the symbiotic impact technologies will have on each other are non-linear. The rate of change is far more rapid, cumulative and significant. Many from different walks of life (Kurzweil, Garreau, Gingrich) see the amount of change in the next 25 years equal to or greater than the amount of change in the previous century. But the way in which it builds may mean that 90% of the change will occur in the last 2.5 years of the next 25. That makes preparing for the next 25 years extremely difficult.
But as the technology is changing, so too are the economic, political, social and informational landscape. As the cost of data and the distribution of knowledge go down, the availability and access to it increase dramatically. An individual with a lap top and a credit card can access huge amounts of data, buy sophisticated sensors and weapons, learn how to use them effectively, and even train with them virtually all on the Internet. Neither states, no militaries control the R & D, the products developed or the uses to which they may be put. Increasingly technology is civilian designed, commercially available and globally distributed. Increasingly, states and militaries are the consumers, not the producers of the fruits of scientific inquiry and technological advances. A hypothetical adversary, but a real possibility, is “Bubba Einstein,” a disaffected, tech savvy, ideologically dedicated individual who decides to make a statement by using WMD against a state and its people whom he despises.
The spectrum of conflict has shifted from the Cold War concern with deterring a single state opponent and its proxies from the great danger but lower probability of nuclear war to a circumstance where what used to be a nuisance of terrorist acts which were probable but not very serious now take on the possibility of having a relatively small non-state actor use a variety of WMD capabilities to threaten or attack states.
42. “OODA-loop” shrinks toward an “OODA-point”
2008 – Human commands throughout
2030 – Machines will execute human intent at machine speeds.
Human remains in the loop, but in new role
Will reigns supreme
Programs, builds, integrates, repairs, and analyzes
Time between observation and action in tactical engagements will be measured in fractions of seconds
Decisions, based on human intent, will be made by machines at machine speeds
Among the key insights as we look toward the future is that the Observe-Orient-Decide-Act cycle is shrinking. By 2030 it will have shrunk to a cycle measured in micro or nano-seconds, especially where it comes to efforts in the cyber realm. Humans cannot react at these speeds. This means that increasingly, humans will no longer be in the loop – but rather will find themselves on the loop – monitoring the loop’s execution, often at machine speeds. The humans will be able to stop the loop, but in the large, warfighting decisions will increasingly be made by machines, programmed based on human intent, with humans monitoring the execution of these operations.Among the key insights as we look toward the future is that the Observe-Orient-Decide-Act cycle is shrinking. By 2030 it will have shrunk to a cycle measured in micro or nano-seconds, especially where it comes to efforts in the cyber realm. Humans cannot react at these speeds. This means that increasingly, humans will no longer be in the loop – but rather will find themselves on the loop – monitoring the loop’s execution, often at machine speeds. The humans will be able to stop the loop, but in the large, warfighting decisions will increasingly be made by machines, programmed based on human intent, with humans monitoring the execution of these operations.
43. 43 The Study Reveals Increased role for unmanned systems
Five of top 10 systems are unmanned or CONUS-based
Increased importance of the cyberspace domain
Need to be able to navigate, explore, defend, and attribute attack in this domain (e.g., Cyberspace UAV)
Increased need for rapid attack capability
Only one of top 10 systems attacks at speeds below Mach 1
Increased need for survivability – threats proliferate
Many of top-ranked technologies are related to defense against directed energy (lasers and HPM) or cyberspace attacks
Defensive systems are critical to maintain freedom of action
Must be able to defend, reconstitute AND operate while degraded This slide shows some of the commonalities among those concepts that scored well. It is interesting that half the concepts are unmanned; only one operates below Mach 1; and half of the concepts operate literally at warp speed.
The increased need for survivability is striking. Despite this study using the same methodology as the AF 2025 study of 1996, survivability scored nearly at the top technologies required. Only 12 years ago, survivability ranked nearly last. This quantum jump, in studies of nearly identical methodology is a strong indicator that a fundamental change is underway in the requirements for future airpower. Future systems will need to incorporate defensive systems, and these systems will need to enable operations in high-threat environments, as high-tech anti-air weaponry will likely be available from world arms merchants, and will be available to almost anyone. This slide shows some of the commonalities among those concepts that scored well. It is interesting that half the concepts are unmanned; only one operates below Mach 1; and half of the concepts operate literally at warp speed.
44. The Study Reveals
Rank ordering of concepts and technologies does NOT vary significantly between state-on-state and irregular warfare
Offensive and defensive space systems and technologies are more crucial in state-on-state warfare than in other types of conflict
The fact that the rank ordering of concepts and technologies is essentially impervious to the type of scenario came as a bit of a surprise. After further analysis, we discovered that, for the AF, the types of missions we conduct does not vary across warfare types, but how we perform these missions does. The result is that the key concepts and technologies are nearly constant (except for space systems), though how we will apply these technologies may vary.The fact that the rank ordering of concepts and technologies is essentially impervious to the type of scenario came as a bit of a surprise. After further analysis, we discovered that, for the AF, the types of missions we conduct does not vary across warfare types, but how we perform these missions does. The result is that the key concepts and technologies are nearly constant (except for space systems), though how we will apply these technologies may vary.
46. Study Recommendations Pursue concepts with increased range and persistence
Increase UAV investments – 5 of top 10 concepts are UAVs
Develop counters to directed energy – DE threatens all
Increase emphasis on defensive capabilities because:
Technological proliferation is closing the capability gap between the US and its adversaries – individuals and states
Adversary systems threaten USAF freedom of action -- greatest impact is in cyber and space
Improve speed and effectiveness of acquisition process
Old issue…but speed of technological development is accelerating
Near-action essential to keep pace with adversaries
Treat cyberspace as a geographic territory in which wars will be fought As we looked across the better scoring concepts there were some commonalities that were nearly universally true.
Regardless of what type of conflict one is in, the ability to have persistence, and by extension, longer mission range, was a constant. Short-range aircraft have little utility in the world of 2030. Increased need for range and persistence is a constant, and future procurement needs to be done with this in mind. Unmanned systems are likely to be more important in the future. While pilots comprised the majority of our scoring team, UAVs still comprise half of our top ten concept list. Defensive capabilities will need to increase for future systems, as without them, these future systems will not survive. The developmental cycle for surface-to-air defenses is very much tighter than that for aircraft systems. This needs to be a factor in procurement decisions, or our aircraft will not be relevant to some of the battlefields of the future.
Lastly, cyberspace needs to be treated like a geographic territory. It is a place in which we must operate. There is strong research evidence to suggest that our current predicament in Afghanistan is a manifestation of Al Qaeda being able to wage an uncontested campaign on the internet which has been wildly successful in converting minds, recruiting new personnel, and even conducting training. Separating the USAF from the Internet is akin to unilateral disarmament in this domain – and no one has ever won a war by unilateral disarmament. As we looked across the better scoring concepts there were some commonalities that were nearly universally true.
Regardless of what type of conflict one is in, the ability to have persistence, and by extension, longer mission range, was a constant. Short-range aircraft have little utility in the world of 2030. Increased need for range and persistence is a constant, and future procurement needs to be done with this in mind. Unmanned systems are likely to be more important in the future. While pilots comprised the majority of our scoring team, UAVs still comprise half of our top ten concept list. Defensive capabilities will need to increase for future systems, as without them, these future systems will not survive. The developmental cycle for surface-to-air defenses is very much tighter than that for aircraft systems. This needs to be a factor in procurement decisions, or our aircraft will not be relevant to some of the battlefields of the future.
Lastly, cyberspace needs to be treated like a geographic territory. It is a place in which we must operate. There is strong research evidence to suggest that our current predicament in Afghanistan is a manifestation of Al Qaeda being able to wage an uncontested campaign on the internet which has been wildly successful in converting minds, recruiting new personnel, and even conducting training. Separating the USAF from the Internet is akin to unilateral disarmament in this domain – and no one has ever won a war by unilateral disarmament.
47. Implications for Asia Taiwan an issue only…
If China destabilizes from within
If Terror Spreads
Observation is key
Piracy (Straits of Malacca) May become Linchpin in Local War on Terror
Possible Source of Terrorist Revenue
Science and Technology Underpin Everything
Source of Asian Tiger Economic Growth
Disinvestment in S&T Results in Foreclosure of Future Options The study team believes that China will not likely launch an assault against Taiwan unless Taiwan acts recklessly or unless China requires an outside adversary to unite the populace.
Terrorism could spread to the Asian mainland – already present in Philippines and Indonesia. Potential source of terrorist group revenue would be piracy through Straits of Malacca, which is already a problem.
Science and technology has been behind the rise of Asian economies. Its importance will not likely diminish over time. S&T will remain vital to economic growth, and also military power. Disinvestment in S&T for Asia, just as for the U.S., will foreclose future economic and military options.The study team believes that China will not likely launch an assault against Taiwan unless Taiwan acts recklessly or unless China requires an outside adversary to unite the populace.
Terrorism could spread to the Asian mainland – already present in Philippines and Indonesia. Potential source of terrorist group revenue would be piracy through Straits of Malacca, which is already a problem.
Science and technology has been behind the rise of Asian economies. Its importance will not likely diminish over time. S&T will remain vital to economic growth, and also military power. Disinvestment in S&T for Asia, just as for the U.S., will foreclose future economic and military options.
48. Implications for Asia China will Rise to Superpower Status in early 2030s
India will likely Supplant China as Asia’s Greatest Power in 2050-2070 Timeframe
Greater Population
Democratic Governance will likely Result in Eventual Higher per capita GDP
Pakistani-Indian Relations are a Potential Wildcard
Two Great-Power Transitions in next 50 Years
Hegemonic Transition Theory Suggests a Risk of Instability Long term projections suggest a high likelihood that China will become the world’s preeminent power in the 2030s. While this is not certain, it appears likely.
India is likely to pass China about 20 years later, as the open democratic nature of governance in India will likely attract more foreign direct investment, and India will eventually bet the larger of the two markets with a population 15-20 percent larger than China’s – topping out at 1.6 billion (or so).
- Hegemonic transition theory suggests that periods of transition between major powers can be unstable. Some do not believe human history records any instances of peaceful transition between the outgoing and upcoming power (these people believe World War II was characterized by two transitions – both violent – Britain to Germany in 1939-40 and Germany to the U.S. in 1944-45). If the human species is incapable of peaceful transitions, than the 21st Century for Asia may be an unstable one.Long term projections suggest a high likelihood that China will become the world’s preeminent power in the 2030s. While this is not certain, it appears likely.
India is likely to pass China about 20 years later, as the open democratic nature of governance in India will likely attract more foreign direct investment, and India will eventually bet the larger of the two markets with a population 15-20 percent larger than China’s – topping out at 1.6 billion (or so).
- Hegemonic transition theory suggests that periods of transition between major powers can be unstable. Some do not believe human history records any instances of peaceful transition between the outgoing and upcoming power (these people believe World War II was characterized by two transitions – both violent – Britain to Germany in 1939-40 and Germany to the U.S. in 1944-45). If the human species is incapable of peaceful transitions, than the 21st Century for Asia may be an unstable one.
49. Questions?
