Valts Kalni ņš Researcher, PROVIDUS

1. Asset Declarations for Public Officials: A Tool to Prevent CorruptionProject by OECD Anti-Corruption Network for Eastern Europe and Central Asia (ACN) and OECD-EU SIGMA Programme ValtsKalniņš Researcher, PROVIDUS 9 December 2011

2. OECD (2011), Asset Declarations for Public Officials: A Tool to Prevent Corruption, OECD Publishing. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264095281-enДекларации активов для государственных служащих: инструментдля предупреждениякоррупции http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264118799-ru

3. 20 countries that filled questionnaires designed by the Secretariat of the Anti-Corruption Network for Eastern Europe and Central Asia together with SIGMA: Albania, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Slovenia, Spain (Catalonia), Tajikistan, and Ukraine. • Selected OECD states in W. Europe and N. America. • References to other countries, incl. the Russian Federation. • Case studies: Lithuania, Romania, Spain (Catalonia), Ukraine. • Covered Countries

5. To increase transparency and the trust of citizens in public administration, by disclosing information about assets of politicians and civil servants that shows they have nothing to hide; • To help heads of public institutions prevent conflicts of interest among their employees and to resolve such situations when they arise, in order to promote integrity within their institutions; • To monitor wealth variations of individual politicians and civil servants, in order to dissuade them from misconduct and protect them from false accusations, and to help clarify the full scope of illicit enrichment or other illegal activity by providing additional evidence. • Aims of declarations

7. Interests and assets ofelected officials, e.g. MPs, should be subject to separate asset declarations that are made available to the wider public. • Senior executive officials, including ministers and other political appointees – as well as the highest levels of the judiciary and prosecutors – may also need specialised regulations, also made available to the wider public. • Supervision of the rank-and-file employees is the responsibility of the managers,e.g. ministers and heads of agencies. Therefore each public institution can have its internal systems based on common principles, which may or may not include a requirement for middle- and low-level officials to declare assets. • Differentiation of Declarations

8. No particular solution a priori better than others. The institutional set-up can vary: • Parliamentary standing commissions to provide for the collective self-control of MPs; • Asset declarations of judges can be managed by a special body within the judiciary; • Implementation of the system by each public institution for its own public servants, reflecting the responsibility of the manager; • A specialised, sufficiently empowered autonomous body. • Institutions in charge should enjoy reasonable protection against undue political or other interference. • Responsible Institutions

9. Members of parliaments only/MPs and government members (Denmark, Germany, Norway, Sweden). • Senior/political officials (Armenia, Bulgaria, France, Kosovo, Portugal, Spain). • Most/all public officials (Belarus, Latvia, Poland). • Special categories, e.g. advisors and office holders in publicly-owned enterprises (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, UK). • Discretionary scope – ministers/ managers determine (Albania, Estonia, Ireland). • Others (officials of political parties, candidates). • Related persons (spouses/domestic partners, children, other relatives and household members). • Who Declares

10. While the obligations of MPs and senior officials should be relatively heavy, those of ordinary, and especially middle- and low-level officials, can be light. • Obligation does not have to be linked formally to the rank, but rather to the extent of decision-making authority and managerial powers of officials, and the related risks of conflict of interest and abuses of office. • It should be possible to monitor the wealth not only of a public official, but that of close relatives and household members. • The coverage of declarations systems should not result in a heavy burden on a vast number of persons who are not public officials. • Who Declares (Recommendations)

11. Income (source, amount); assets (ownership, beneficial ownership, use);gifts; expenses; pecuniary and non-pecuniary interests (external positions, memberships, debts, etc.). • The scope of information depends on the purpose of declarations: • Conflict of interest control requires information about interests rather than a necessarily all-encompassing picture of all income, assets, outside business and other activities; • Wealth monitoring requires information about all of the substantial income and assets, and fluctuations thereof. • What Shall be Declared

12. Typical schedule (example of the US): • First declaration within 30 days of assuming the position or within 5 days of the transmittal by the President to the Senate of the nomination of an individual; • Annual filing on or before 15 May of the year following; • On or before the thirtieth day after the termination of employment. • In some countries also – some time after termination of office and when assets change significantly. • Declared information should be updated as often as reasonably needed to keep data relevant for the fulfilment of the stated purpose of declaration system. • Frequency

13. Ex officio verification. • Verification upon random selection. • Verification based on risks identified in the disclosed information, e.g. major increases in wealth. • Verifications based on indications about suspected violations. • Verification upon receipt of a complaint by citizens. • Verification

14. At least some verification beneficial, particularly if the number of officials covered and the level of perceived corruption are high while trust is low. • Verification to maintain the integrity of information in the system. • Balance between systematic verification according to rigid criteria and an ad hoc approach acting on particular warning notifications or other signals. • Some countries may choose not to run any verification of declarations for valid reasons, e.g. public disclosure per se is considered sufficient, civil society is strong, media is independent and elections are fair and free. • Verification (Recommendations)

15. Defined violations (failure to submit or late submission, incomplete statement, inadvertently or intentionally false statement). • Character of sanctions: • Criminal (The US: fine and/or imprisonment for a person who knowingly and willfully falsifies any information that that person is required to report); • Administrative (widely common); • Disciplinary (common for civil servants); • Civil sanctions, dismissal/suspension, wage reduction, other/soft measures less common (in Sweden it is announced at the plenary meeting if a member of parliament has failed to submit information to the register). • Sanctions

17. Where public disclosure is ensured, active media and civil society and their reactions can be sufficiently disciplining factors. • Sanctions – a tool to promote disciplined compliance. • Where legal sanctions used, the publicity of the sanction can itself be a dissuasive measure. • Sanctions for provision of false information require a reliable verification mechanism. • Sanctions for elected officials are a sensitive issue because disciplinary and (often) other sanctions cannot be used due to constitutional principles and the special status of such officials. However, some effective sanctions needed; otherwise they will be perceived to be above the reach of the law. • Sanctions (Recommendations)

18. Full public disclosure (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Denmark, Montenegro, Romania, the UK parliament). • Limited disclosure (exempt kinds of information or officials) (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Germany, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania and Macedonia, US). • Access to verification results? • Restricted data (Belarus, France, Kazakhstan and Kosovo). • Protection of information on public officials: • The consent of the public official in question (Estonia); • Requirement to identify the requester (US). • Ad hoc assessment (US – for declarations by judges). • Public Disclosure

19. The right balance between public disclosure and protection of privacy remains subject to debate. • Political officials – strong reasons for disclosure. Politicians shouldbe prepared to provide explanations publicly. • Lower-level officials – the right degree of public disclosure should be determined by weighing of considerations such as traditions, perceptions of corruption in a given country, safety concerns, etc. • Declared data should be available to investigators for detecting possible criminal offences. • Countries should enhance the use of declarations to monitor conflicts of interest and hence allow superiors access to the data. • Public Disclosure (Rec-dations)

20. Flaws in the legal framework: • Required data inadequate to the purpose; too many officials covered; inadequate sanctions. • Flaws of implementing bodies: • Inadequate powers/ resources; lacking autonomy. • Flawed verification: • Lengthy learning-by-doing process; extreme cases – no one does anything with the declarations. • Underdeveloped institutional context: • Anti-corruption agencies as lone fighters; limited access to various public databases; ineffective taxation system -> poor wealth monitoring. • Lack of support and/or awareness among officials. • Lack of interest and/or support by the broader public. • Obstacles for Implementation

21. Questions as to what extent public officials’ declarations actually contribute to lower levels of corruption or higher levels of public trust will not be answered decisively in the near future. • Countries should develop and employ adequate indicators to assess the effectiveness of asset declarations systems. • Countries should consider continuous tracking of resources (financial, human) spent on operating the system to make sure they are commensurate with gains. • Concluding Considerations

22. Спасибозавнимание!