THE PROPOSED FULLERTON STREETCAR – CONCERNS AND QUESTIONS

1. THE PROPOSED FULLERTON STREETCAR – CONCERNS AND QUESTIONS Presentation to the Fullerton City Council By Thomas A. Rubin, CPA, CMA, CMC, CIA CGMA, CFM October 21, 2014

2. PURPOSE OF PRESENTATION • A review of the DraftFullerton College Connector Study (DFCCS), 2/12/14, reveals a number of important errors and raises many questions not addressed in the report or other available sources • Peer comparisons with existing U.S. streetcar systems and other research make many of the points in the DFCCS questionable • Throughout DFCCS, almost every single error and questionable assumption or statement favors streetcar or makes alternatives look unfavorable – this would not be expected if errors were random

3. WHAT WE DON’T KNOW • After spending considerable time studying DFCCS, there is a lot of data and information that we would like to have that is just not included or otherwise available – which has led to our concerns and issues • It is certainly possible that there are good responses to many of our questions that may satisfy our concerns – but, until these are publicized, we will continue to express our concerns • We have not been able to discuss this with City staff • If you decide that you might want to go forward, we strongly suggest that these issues be studied – first

4. PEER COMPARISONS • One of the best ways to test the reliability of projections for a proposed transportation system is to compute significant metrics and compare • There are seven streetcar systems in the U.S. comparable to what is proposed for Fullerton with data available: Kenosha, Little Rock, Memphis, Portland, Seattle, Tacoma, and Tampa • We took actual data for from the Federal Transit Administration’s (FTA) National Transit Database (NTD) for these seven for 2012 and compared it to the computations we made from DFCCS for 2035

5. Kenosha, Little Rock, and Tampa are generally regarded as failed systems due to their low ridership

6. ANNUAL BOARDINGS/ROUTE MILE • So it is clear what is being evaluated, it is the 2035 ridership projections • This low level of projected ridership could be cause for considerable pause – is it really worth it to spend this much taxpayer money, and this is all we get? • If this is all the ridership that can be expected, there is no need to go the huge expense of Streetcar design and construction (although if higher ridership did exist, it very well could be handled excellently by modes other than Streetcar)

7. DFCCS costs appear very low compared to other agencies; we can’t reconcile stated methodology to data in report

8. COST/REVENUE VEHICLE HOUR • DCCFS, Table 5, page 45: “Streetcar cost per hour figure was extracted from the National Transit Database and represented an average for services provided in 2011 for Seattle and Portland Streetcars.” • Cost/Revenue Vehicle Hour per NTD 2011: • Portland: $218 • Seattle: $208 • Santa Ana/Garden Grove Streetcar: $187 • Anaheim Rapid Connection: $180 • Cost/Revenue Vehicle Hour for Fullerton Streetcar alternatives, per previous graph: $85-95 • We cannot explain why these differ so widely

9. CAPITAL COSTS • DCCFS, page 45: “Capital cost estimates were created based on experience with other modern streetcar systems and use of a “unit rate" approach, where the major components of each alternative are quantified and multiplied by average unit costs.” • “On a per-track mile basis, the three preferred alignment alternatives range from $25.47 million to $25.58 million.” • We were not able to reference the “Preferred Alternatives Cost Estimates” Technical Appendix

10. CAPITAL COSTS II • “Case studies” in DFCCS: • Tacoma Link (page 19): $81 million for 1.6 miles  $25.3 million/route mile (two-way) • Seattle (page 20): “$19.4 million per track mile” • Orange County streetcar projects (not in DFCCS): • Anaheim: $318.7 million for 6.4 miles  $49.8 million/route mile • Santa Ana/Garden Grove: $197.4-228.1 million for 8.22/8.45 miles  $24.0-27.0 million/route mile • Anaheim is deliberately done rather “fancy,” SA/GG saves cost by utilizing former Pacific Electric right-of-way for close to half of the total alignment

11. CAPITAL COSTS III • Los Angeles – shown on page 79 as $152 million (for 3.8 miles  $40 million/track mile); most recent projection is $72-100 million/track mile) • Milwaukee, Wisconsin – $84.6 million for 3.8 miles  $22.3 million/track mile • Portland Case Study (page 22), shows: • “System-wide average of $11.5 million per track mile” • Good Samaritan to Portland State, $56.9 million for 2.4 mile double track, which is $11.9 million/track mile – but Portland Streetcar web site has $148.3 million for 3.35 miles double track  $22.1 million/track mile

12. CAPITAL COSTS IV • Tempe, Arizona – $129.34 million for 2.7 miles  $48 million/mile • Tucson, Arizona -- $196.53 million for 3.9 route miles  $50 million/mile CONCLUSION 1: “$25.47 million to $25.58 million” in DFCCS may be more properly considered to be the lower end of the reasonable range, with a high end of approximately $50 million – and it is certainly possible to exceed that figure CONCLUSION 2: Both capital and operating costs in DFCCS may be significantly understated

13. WATCH OUT FOR COST CHANGES • There is a very long history of cost changes in rail projects • These changes are almost all increases, many of them major • Cost reductions are generally only due to changes in scope: • Reduction in route length • Change from double-track to single-track • Eliminate/reduce bicycle/pedestrian track or other promised amenities

17. WITH ALL THIS, WHY STREETCAR? • DFCCS, page 12: “This study focused on topics that recent studies on circulator systems in operations have shown to be the best predictors for whether investment in new transit will enhance mobility and generate substantial new investment in the area (emphasis added).” • Page 12: “Also, (bus) shuttle systems have not been found to enhance economic development along the corridors they service.” • So, this is not really a transportation study, it is an economic development study

18. BUT – IS THERE REALLY ANYTHING THERE? • DFCCS, page 22, shows Portland “Streetcar Results:” “Over $3.5 billion in economic development” • This is nothing but a list of construction projects that has occurred within a few blocks of the streetcar line through downtown Portland – cause/effect not shown • Even if one believes that rail transit is a development generator, do you think that the light rail system, with 224 million passenger miles a year, should be given some of the credit, rather than all going to the streetcar system, with four million a year? • The taxpayer subsidies are over $1,000,000,000 – which the taxpayers will never fully recover, particularly since there have been so much tax abatements on that $3.5 billion of economic development

19. WHAT IS THE DEVELOPMENT VALUE OF A STREETCAR PASSENGER? • According to the literature, very high • Let’s use data from Streetcars’ Economic Impact in the United States, equilibrium capital, May 26, 2010 • Ridership: National Transit Database 2012

21. WHAT IS THE DEVELOPMENT VALUE OF A STREETCAR PASSENGER? • The only output of Streetcar is moving people – so, unless someone is prepared to claim that it is the construction of streetcar track et al that is the driver of development, not that the streetcar has a transportation purpose, then the only thing to compare is claimed development impact and riders • I submit that one streetcar passenger making a daily round trip is simply not worth anything remotely close – meaning orders of magnitude – to $2.4 million in development impact • By the way, a lot of the Streetcar passengers were making the same trip before the Streetcar existed

22. LOS ANGELES DASH • Since the 1980’s the City of Los Angeles now operates 32 DASH circulator bus systems all over the City, particularly in the major commercial/ business/government/retail/entertainment areas • If all that is required to show that a transit mode creates development that would not otherwise exist is to total construction costs within a few blocks of a route, DASH would be shown to be the most incredible development engine ever discovered!!!

24. SPEED OF TRAVEL • Note that the average operating speed for the six original alternatives is almost two-thirds higher than the average for the seven comparable streetcar systems that reported to NTD – and the slowest of the six alternatives is almost 20% faster than the fastest of the existing systems • Although there is not sufficient data in DFCCS to allow the calculation of the speeds of the three modified alternatives, they were shortened slightly, so the speeds are now lower – but, as near as we can tell, they are still shown as operating faster than all the existing streetcar lines

25. WHY IS OPERATING SPEED IMPORTANT? • Speed is very important to potential passengers – if the speed is slower than is modeled, passenger demand may be overestimated • Slower speeds could easily require the procurement – and operations and maintenance – of more vehicles to operate the assumed 15 min. headways • Slower operating speeds could require redesign of the alignment for additional passing tracks or double-tracking – but, most likely, there will not be much single-track in Fullerton, except at route terminals

26. BUS SHUTTLE SYSTEM • DFCCS, page 12: “This Connector Study did not analyze the creation of a bus shuttle system. While shuttle systems exist throughout the United States, providing point-to-point connections between transit stations, educational institutions, and major employers, and they can be implemented more quickly and at lower cost than a streetcar or fixed guideway system, shuttles cannot access the full range of funds available for public transportation systems, and therefore rely upon funding from local governments and/or private funders.”

27. BUS SHUTTLE SYSTEM II • This is madness • It totally fails to recognize that the capital cost of Streetcar would be far more twenty times that of shuttle bus – the City share of the capital cost of a Streetcar project would be far more than the total cost of a bus shuttle system • It is false as to funding availability – Shuttle Bus can actually access funds that Streetcar projects can’t: • Federal 49 USC 5309 “Bus” capital program • OCTA Measure M2 “Community Based Transit/ Circulators” (Project V)

28. BUS SHUTTLE SYSTEM III • DFCCS, page 12: “The analysis focused on the evaluation of a fixed guideway (emphasis added) transit service, using either rail or rubber tired vehicles.” • Fixed guideway bus requires dedicated or semi-dedicated (HOV/HOT) lanes – and is impossible here because dedicated bus lanes in the study area would do great disservice to the cars, trucks, buses, and bicycles using roadway general-purpose lanes • This makes no sense, other than as excuse for not studying Shuttle Bus – which beats the @#$%?! out of Streetcar in a head-to-head comparison

29. YOU HAVE NO ROOM FOR DEDICATED TRANSIT LANES, RAIL OR BUS • Fullerton streets simply do not have roadway width to spare for dedicated transit lanes, neither steel tracks nor exclusive bus lanes for Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) – everything you have now is being used • There is nothing to give and no feasible way to get more road width • To understand what would be required, let’s take a look at how this works in other cities – where the ridership and time savings justifies the space utilized.

30. Dedicated Lanes CLEVELAND HEATHLINE BRT Healthline is a “center” BRT system – bus lanes/stations in road center Note right-side loading bus operating in “wrong” direction Requires two dedicated lanes, plus space for center stations

31. CURITIBA, BRAZIL “SURFACE METRO” “Conventional” right-side boarding – with dedicated lanes 80-foot, double-articulated buses May be world’s best transit system – 70% transit modal split, all funding from fares, no taxpayer cost

32. FULLERTON BRT MADES NO SENSE • If, like Curitiba, you would be running 80-foot buses with 270 passengers every 45 seconds at peak, with average trip lengths of five miles, it is not only worthwhile to dedicate traffic lanes, you should dedicate entire streets • But, for one 25-foot bus every fifteen minutes, with fewer than ten passengers on average, taking average trips of a bit over one mile, dedicated BRT lanes are totally inappropriate • We cannot understand why this was considered for one second in DFCCS – not only shouldn’t be done, but can’t be done

33. THE “REAL” ALTERNATIVE TO STREETCAR IS SMALL BUSES On the left is a 25-foot, sixteen-seat, two-wheelchair bus operated by City of Lawrence Transit near the University of Kansas campus If you want to get fancier, you can go for a replica trolley, designed to look like an old-fashioned streetcar – this one is from San Antonio. New streetcars run about $2.5-4.0 million each – these buses are about 10% of that. Yes, the buses are smaller, and will generally last only about half as long, but the cost per unit of capacity per year for a bus, vs. a streetcar, is well under half – and, since it runs on the same roads that have been and will always be there, there is no cost for tracks, stations, propulsion power supply, etc.

34. STREETCAR vs. SHUTTLE BUS • An important question to ask is, what does it cost to provide a trip on the Streetcar vs. the obvious transit alternative, a “Shuttle Bus?” • We used Alternative 4 for comparison (not much difference between alternatives for this purpose) • DFCCS did not have full data for Bus alternatives, so we made reasonable assumptions • Annualized capital costs are computed using the Federal Transit Administration’s “New Starts” methodology – allocates capital costs over the useful lives of the assets procured for the project

35. STREETCAR vs. SHUTTLE BUS II • Shuttle Bus assumptions: • Ridership: Two-thirds of Streetcar’s (16 boardings/hour; OCTA bus average for 2012 was 34) • Capital costs: Five buses @ $350,000 each, plus 25% more for all else  $2,187,500 total • Shuttle Bus would likely cost less and carry more • Useful lives (from FTA): • Streetcar: 25 years • Shuttle bus: 12 years • All other data from DFCCS (even though we find much of it questionable)

37. OPERATING RESULTS • Streetcar ridership is 50% higher • Streetcar operating cost is 27% higher • Streetcar operating cost per rider is 16% lower Advantage, Streetcar

39. CAPITAL AND OVERALL RESULTS • Streetcar capital costs over 80 times that of Shuttle Bus • Streetcar annualized capital costs are over 37 times that of Shuttle Bus • Streetcar total annualized costs are over six-and-one-half times that of Shuttle Bus • Streetcar annualized costs per rider are over four-and-one-third times that of Shuttle Bus Advantage, Shuttle Bus

41. IF THE OBJECTIVE IS RIDERSHIP, … • Even using streetcar capital and operating cost data that may be significantly understated, the cost of carrying passengers on Streetcar is far, far higher than carrying passengers on Shuttle Bus • If what the City is after is to add mobility options, and doing so in a cost-effective manner, then Shuttle Bus is far superior to Streetcar for the taxpayers • Even using assumptions unfavorable to Shuttle Bus, ridership could be increased substantially by adding more bus service at a fraction of Streetcar’s cost – and done much faster, with far lower risks

42. HOW TO FIT IN THE TRACKS? • Since streetcar – by definition – runs on general purpose lanes on streets with rubber-tire vehicles, there are always major issues with placing Streetcar tracks, particularly on existing streets • Streetcars operate at lower speeds than most other motorized vehicles, and make frequent start/stops • Given the low carrying capacity of Streetcars, it is common for total road capacity to decline when they are implemented, which may result in traffic transferred to other roadways

43. HOW TO FIT IN THE TRACKS? II • Turns are a particular problem • For this reason, the preferred practice is to eliminate, or at least minimize, the number of turns • Of course, it is rarely possible to completely eliminate all turns, so the emphasis becomes one of avoiding left turns if at all possible • Left turning Streetcars have to start in, or get to, the middle of the (two-way) street, then cross against on-coming traffic • Left turns for Streetcars are also difficult to coordinate with left turning cars/trucks

44. HOW TO FIT IN THE TRACKS? III • We were surprised to find that, in all three Preferred Alternatives, there were almost as many left turns as right • Streetcar operations can also conflict with: • Street parking • Entrances to parking lots and garages • Bike paths and cyclists • Buses • Rubber-tire vehicles making right turns

45. STATE COLLEGE AT CHAPMANLOOKING NORTH

46. STATE COLLEGE AT CHAPMANLOOKING NORTH • You are using the entire street – two thru traffic lanes in each direction plus dual left turn lanes • There is nothing to take for any other use – you need all that there is there and there are no options for adding anything new, such as curb parking – or a dedicated Bus Rapid Transit Lane • Even providing three-foot clearance for cyclists under new statute is marginal • Putting Streetcar tracks in center of road will be very difficult – and stations close to impossible

47. CHAPMAN AVENUELooking West Towards State College

48. CHAPMAN AVENUELooking West Towards State College • In this area, City has good sidewalk system with appropriate width for pedestrian load • With some possible exceptions, sidewalks should be adequate for “curb lane” Streetcar stops for expected passenger loads • Note minimal setback of buildings, common to most of proposed streets along alignment – there is just not anything that can be done to add to street or sidewalk width, so you must work with what you have – and minimize disruptions to current users

49. FULLERTON TRANSPORTATION CENTERLooking North up Pomona Avenue

50. FULLERTON TRANSPORTATION CENTER • DFCCS has line terminating on the far side of Commonwealth, where Streetcars would remain for several minutes while awaiting return trip • This would block access in and out of parking on both sides • Probably better to extend line to approximately where the photograph was taken, where layover will not be a problem, probably on East (right) side of the access • Will require some redesign of parking lot access and loss of some parking slots – but is doable