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2001: THE END OF REACTIVE NETWORK SECURITY

THE CASE FOR PROACTIVE NETWORK SECURITY: WORMS, VIRUSES & BUSINESS CONTINUITY Presented to Dr. Yan Chen MITP 458- Information Security & Assurance Business Case Study Presentation 09 June 2007 by The Loop Group Farney, Heilprin, Leonard. 2001: THE END OF REACTIVE NETWORK SECURITY.

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2001: THE END OF REACTIVE NETWORK SECURITY

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  1. THE CASE FOR PROACTIVE NETWORK SECURITY:WORMS, VIRUSES & BUSINESS CONTINUITYPresented to Dr. Yan ChenMITP 458- Information Security & AssuranceBusiness Case Study Presentation09 June 2007by The Loop GroupFarney, Heilprin, Leonard

  2. 2001: THE END OF REACTIVE NETWORK SECURITY • The Year of the Worm; (3) major worms released July-September 2001 • Code Red • $2.6bn estimated damage • Simple buffer overflow infected 350,000+ hosts in single day • Code Red II • Same attack vector (.ida), but different signature • Nimda • Mass-mailing, multivariate attack • All based on previously released and patched vulnerabilities • MS01-033, MS00-052, MS00-078, MS01-020 • A/V software useless • Used firewall ports not needed (externally) in the first place • 135, 137, 138, 139, 445, 593, 1639, 2000-3000, 3127-3198 100% Preventability!

  3. “HEROIC IT” NOT ENOUGH, PEOPLE AND PROCESS REQUIRED • Speed of attack dispersion and increased geographic expansion make it impossible to react to today’s threats • Design and deploy network security operations infrastructure in which automatic patch management plays central role • Vulnerabilities addressed on release day (making test assumption) • Proactively tighten defenses • “deny all” vs. “allow all” on interior firewall interfaces • Perform network analysis to determine required business functions and corresponding ports, deny all else 2001 attacks responsible for major shift in corporate defenses • Heroic IT Management Is No Longer Enough, Diamond Cluster Viewpoint, 2004

  4. NEXT PARADIGM SHIFT: STRING SCANNING -> HEURISTICS • Zero Day attacks becoming more common • Virus definitions and patches not available • “Ex post mechanism is folly- by focusing on catching attack of the past, you miss the attack of the future”1 • A new proactivity required: behavior based security • Create behaviors for which to look for, not specific strings • Heuristics is the only way to protect against Zero Day attacks • Looks for anomalous activity like • Use off the shelf software, security services, or product like Internet Motion Sensor • Most A/V software today uses heuristics at some level • Most effective are agent-based products dedicated to this type of analysis • The Efficacy of Network-Level SPAM Mitigation , Sean Farney, MITP 458, 2007

  5. PERSONAL LESSONS LEARNED • Globally dispersed operations offers challenges • Follow-the-sun staffing great for finite day-to-day tasks, but can impede focus on large events • Lack of 24x7 line responsibility allows transition gaps and requires re-activation energy • Consider centralization and/or sourcing to true 24x7 model/provider for consistent and efficient handling of operations • Patching systems, either internally or externally, produce same effect • Remove human element from revision compliance • Commonplace now, but still new in 2001 • Fight battles before they start, be as proactive as possible • The Freedom1 of “Deny All” • See Nietzsche’s Twilight of the Idols

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