770 likes | 918 Views
From Monday:. Two Different Problems for Freedom: The Problem of Sourcehood (Sober: “ Distant Causation Argument” ) The Problem of the Ability To Do Otherwise (Sober: “ Could-Not-Have-Done-Otherwise Argument” ). Two different problems. The Programmers. The Program. Environment.
E N D
From Monday: Two Different Problems for Freedom: The Problem of Sourcehood (Sober: “Distant Causation Argument”) The Problem of theAbility To Do Otherwise (Sober: “Could-Not-Have-Done-Otherwise Argument”)
Two different problems The Programmers The Program Environment Beliefs + Desires Actions Genes
The Problem of Sourcehood The agent doesn’t control her own actions. The real causes of action are in the distant past, which puts them outside the agent’s control.
The Problem of the Ability to Do Otherwise • For a action to be free, it must at least be possible to do more than one thing. • If there’s only one thing you can possibly do, then you don’t have freedom to choose among options.
The difference between them: different reasons for incompatibilism
P1) Your beliefs and desires determine what your actions are. P2) If your beliefs and desires determine what your actions are, then you have no ability to do otherwise. P3) If you have no ability to do otherwise, then you don’t act freely. P1) Your genes and environment determine what your actions are. P2) Your genes and environment are causes outside your control. P3) If your actions are determined by causes outside your control, then you don’t act freely. You don’t act freely. You don’t act freely.
Hume’s Compatibilism: (Soft Determinism) Even if your beliefs and desires do determine your actions, you can still act freely.
Hume’s Compatibilism: Freedom = ability to do otherwise if you desire otherwise. Actions are determined by beliefs and desires, but they still count as free, because people are free todo whatever they want.
Hume’s Compatibilism: • Recall the problem of the Ability To Do Otherwise: • To have freedom, it must be possible to choose among options. If your beliefs and desires determine your actions, then you have no options.
Hume’s Compatibilism: • Recall the problem of the Ability To Do Otherwise: • To have freedom, it must be possible to choose among options. If your beliefs and desires determine your actions, then you have no options. • Hume rejects this. • It’s a misunderstanding of the concept of freedom to think a person’s ownbeliefs and desires can restrict her freedom. That’s all freedom is: being able to follow your desires.
The Problem of the Ability to Do Otherwise P1) Your beliefs and desires determine your actions. P2) If your beliefs and desires determine your actions, then you have no ability to do otherwise. P3) If you have no ability to do otherwise, then you don’t act freely. You don’t act freely.
The Problem of the Ability to Do Otherwise P1) Your beliefs and desires determine your actions. P2) If your beliefs and desires determine your actions, then you have no ability to do otherwise. P3) If you have no ability to do otherwise, then you don’t act freely. You don’t act freely. Hume’s rejects this.
Hume’s Compatibilism: Hume defines freedom in terms of sourcehood, denying that it requires the ability to do otherwise.
Hume’s Compatibilism: Hume defines freedom in terms of sourcehood, denying that it requires the ability to do otherwise. • It’s sufficient for freedom that you get to do what you want. You don’t need the ability to do other than what your beliefs and desires specify. • Your actions are controlled by your own beliefs and desires, so you are the source. That’s enough by itself to make you free.
Hume’s Compatibilism: So Hume relies on the concept of sourcehood in offering a solution to the problem of the ability to do otherwise. How, then, does he handle the problem of sourcehood?
Hume’s Compatibilism: So Hume relies on the concept of sourcehood in offering a solution to the problem of the ability to do otherwise. How, then, does he handle the problem of sourcehood? He doesn’t.
The Problem of Sourcehood: The real causes of action lie outside the agent. Environment Beliefs + Desires Actions The Agent Genes
Hume only focuses on this threat to freedom... Environment Beliefs + Desires Actions Genes
He doesn’t address these factors. Environment Beliefs + Desires Actions Genes
Even if you can do whatever you desire, if you don’t control your desires, you don’t control the actions they produce. Environment Beliefs + Desires Actions Genes
Even if you can do whatever you desire, if you don’t control your desires, you don’t control the actions they produce. • Objection from Compulsive Behavior: • Compulsions are desires the agent doesn’t control. • So even if actions are caused by the agent’s desires, she still isn’t the source of her actions.
Kleptomania: Environment Steal, Steal, Steal!!! Theft The Agent Genes
Since the kleptomaniac doesn’t control what her desires are, she doesn’t control the actions caused by those desires. Environment Steal, Steal, Steal!!! Theft The Agent Genes
Here’s where Mill comes in... “...human actions...are never (except in some cases of mania) ruled by any one motive with such absolute sway that there is no room for the influence of any other.” Even in kleptomania there is “room for the influence” of the desire not to steal...
If a kleptomaniac has a desire to stop stealing, then she has two different desires, leading to different actions. Steal, Steal, Steal!!! Steal Stop Stealing Don’t Steal
If these desires occur at the same time, leading to competing actions, then the compulsive desire wins the competition (by definition). Steal, Steal, Steal!!! Steal Stop Stealing Don’t Steal
But if the desires don’t lead to competing actions, then both can be pursued. Steal, Steal, Steal!!! Steal Stop Stealing Enter Therapy
Mill’s suggestion for the kleptomaniac: Environment Desire: Stop Stealing Action: Enter Therapy Genes
You can at least “influence” your desires, even if you don’t have complete control over them. Environment Desire: Stop Stealing Action: Enter Therapy Genes
You can at least “influence” your desires, even if you don’t have complete control over them. Recall from Monday the notion of contributing factors...
(FROM MONDAY) Determinism makes a possibility claim. Given past events and the laws of nature, everything that does happen must happen. No alternative futures are possible.
(FROM MONDAY) Determinism makes a possibility claim. This makes it something more than just a causal claim. • Compare: • A caused B • A caused B, and made B necessary. Given past events and the laws of nature, everything that does happen must happen. No alternative futures are possible.
(FROM MONDAY) Determinism makes a possibility claim. This makes it something more than just a causal claim. • Compare: • A caused B • A caused B, and made B necessary. Sometimes causes are just contributing factors—they don’t make their results necessary.
(FROM MONDAY) In a book I’m reading, an important character drowns. Two factors contribute to the drowning: A submarine torpedoes the boat A storm prevents the rescue operation
(FROM MONDAY) In a book I’m reading, an important character drowns. Two factors contribute to the drowning: A submarine torpedoes the boat A storm prevents the rescue operation The torpedoes cause the drowning, but they don’t make it necessary. Without the storm, rescue was still possible.
Mill: “There are physical sequences which we call necessary, as death for want of food or air; there are others which, though as much cases of causation as the former, are not said to be necessary, as death from poison, which an antidote, or the use of the stomach-pump, will sometimes avert.” The poison in Mill’s example is equivalent to the torpedoes in my example. The antidote or stomach pump is equivalent to the rescue operation.
Mill’s point is that human desires are always contributing factors—”influences.” They cause actions without making them necessary. Thus, no particular desire determines what it causes.
Mill’s point is that human desires are always contributing factors—”influences.” They cause actions without making them necessary. Thus, no desire determines what it causes. • For a kleptomaniac, the desire to steal is a strong contributing factor—strong enough to overpower competing desires.
Even strong, compulsive desires are still just contributing factors.
Even strong, compulsive desires are still just contributing factors. It’s at least possiblefor a kleptomaniac to interfere with the desire to steal (e.g., through therapy).
Even strong, compulsive desires are still just contributing factors. • It’s at least possiblefor a kleptomaniac to interfere with the desire to steal (e.g., through therapy). • The desire to steal causes stealing without necessitating it (just as the torpedoes cause the drowning without necessitating it).
Where are we? Hume responds to the Ability To Do Otherwise problem, only to fall victim to the problem of Sourcehood instead. The problem for Hume is that being able to do whatever you want isn’t enough by itself to make you the source of your actions.
Where are we? • Mill adopts Hume’s definition of freedom, rejecting the requirement of an ability to do otherwise. • He then adds to Hume’s view a way of showing how people can still be the sources of their actions: • People can control their actions by taking control of their desires.
What do you think? • First, should we follow Hume and Mill in denying that freedom requires an ability to do otherwise? • Recall Locke’s locked room.
What do you think? Next, should we accept Mill’s claim about how we become the sources of our actions? Consult the model...
Does this make you the source of your actions? Environment Beliefs And Desires Actions Genes
In groups: • What kinds of action could one be the source of? • List some examples of desires you would and would not have control over. Environment Beliefs And Desires Actions Genes
In groups: Does Mill’s view give us enough freedom? • Would a libertarian be satisfied? • For any particular action, to what extent is it • really free? • Does this give us freedom for the right kinds of • action (freedom where it counts)?