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Learning to Listen: legitimation in UK radwaste management policies. Frans Berkhout Institute for Environmental Studies (IVM) VU University Amsterdam. Sketch. Explanations for a recalcitrant policy problem Linked legitimation problems
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Learning to Listen:legitimation in UK radwaste management policies Frans Berkhout Institute for Environmental Studies (IVM) VU University Amsterdam
Sketch • Explanations for a recalcitrant policy problem • Linked legitimation problems • Institutional change as a response to legitimation problems • Three indicators of institutional change • Interpreting UK radioactive waste policy over 50 years
The question Why, after 50 years, does the management of radioactive wastes remain such a problem for policymakers? Is there learning?
Explanations of the problem • Uniqueness/newness: radiation • Hypotheticality: validation as hypothetical • Symbolism: associations with apocalypse • Justice: current and intergenerational • Environmental politics: contests between centres of political power • Legitimation/trust
Legitimation ‘…the prestige of being considered binding’ (Weber) Rational discourse as a basis for legitimacy: normative validity of values and factual validity are tested in a fair and transparent way (Habermas)
Nested problems of normative and factual validity • Legitimacy of radioactive waste generation • Legitimacy of storage vs. disposal • Legitimacy of standards of radiation protection • Legitimacy of safety claims
Legitimation and institutional change Hypothesis Institutional change is a response to a legitimation problem
Three indicators of institutional change a. segregation between operators and overseers b. the autonomy and power of overseers c. the diversity of oversight bodies
Five phases: phase 1 Separating oversight from production (1946-1976) 1946: UKAEA alone 1976: CEGB and BNFL (state-owned) segregated from NII and NRPB Flowers Report RWMAC created
Phase 2 Redefining the role of the state (1976-97) 1981: CEGB, BNFL and Nirex 1989-97: Privatisation of CEGB Nuclear policy divided between Environment and Industry ministries, oversight duties to Environment Agency Successive Nirex site-search processes (DADA)
Phase 3 Collapse of the old order (1997-2003) 1997: Final Nirex site search failure 1999 on: part-privatisation and re-nationalisation of nuclear reactors and reprocessing (NDA) New start on radioactive waste management
Phase 4 Reconstructing legitimacy through deliberative appraisal (2003-2008) 2003: CoRWM and exercise of ‘cooperative discourse’ (Renn, 2004) From 2005 new nuclear build debate – separating ‘legacy’ from ‘new’ wastes
Phase 5? Re-linking waste management and nuclear development (since 2008) 2005-2008: New nuclear build plans CoRWM Mark 2: conventional expert committee
Assessment: segregation • Dynamic institutional arrangements • Nuclear safety and radiological protection separated early • Ownership of industry has fluctuated between the state and private sector • No neat history towards greater segregation
Assessment: power of oversight • Stop-start progression from closed, expert committees to (semi) open and (semi) autonomous overseers with enforcement powers • ‘New public management’ as important causal factor
Assessment: diversity • Composition of advisory bodies and procedures did become more diverse in period 1976-2008 (now a reverse?)
Conclusions • Institutional form and dynamics is a reflection of underlying legitimation problems • There is a strong link between industrial and environmental legitimation problems in the nuclear field • Radioactive waste has seen much institutional innovation, but fluctuating legitimacy • ‘Givenness’ is hard to create, easy to destroy