Abdelilah Essiari Gary Hoo Keith Jackson William Johnston Srilekha Mudumbai Mary Thompson

1. Akenti - Certificate-based Access Control for Widely Distributed Resources Abdelilah Essiari Gary Hoo Keith Jackson William Johnston Srilekha Mudumbai Mary Thompson

2. Motivation • Distributed computing environments, collaborative research environments • Resources, stakeholders and users are all distributed • Spanning organizational as well as geographical boundaries, e.g., DOE Collaboratories • Requires a flexible but secure way to identify users • Requires a flexible and secure way for stakeholders to remotely specify access control for their resources

3. Goals • Access based on policy statements made by stakeholders • Handle multiple independent stakeholders for a single resource • Use Public Key Infrastructure standards to identify users and create digitally signed certificates • Emphasize usability

4. Approach • Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) • Architecture • Usability features

5. Public Key Infrastructure • Provides a uniform way for organizations to identify people or other entities through X.509 identity certificates containing public keys. • These certificates and keys can be used though secured connections (SSL) and possession of a private key to establish the identity of the entities on the connection. • The keys can be used to provide digital signatures on documents. The authors and contents of signed documents can be verified at the time of use. • Public Key Infrastructure is beginning to be widely deployed in terms of organizations running Certificate Authorities.

6. Akenti Access Control • Minimal local Policy Files (authorization files). Who to trust, where to look for certificates. • Based on the following digitally signed certificates: • X.509 certificates for user authentication • UseCondition certificates containing stakeholder policy • Attribute certificates in which a trusted party attests that a user possesses some attribute, e.g. training, group membership • Can be called from any application that has an authenticated user’s identity certificate and a unique resource name, to return that users privileges with respect to the resource.

7. Required Infrastructure • Certificate Authority to issue identity certificates (required) • SSLeay provides simple CA for testing • Netscape CA - moderate cost and effort • Enterprise solutions - Entrust, Verisign, … • Method to check for revocation of identity certificates (required) • LDAP server - free from Univ. of Mich.. Or comes with Netscape CA • Certificate Revocation lists - supported by most CA’s • Network accessible ways for stakeholders to store their certificates (optional) • Web servers • MSQL web accessible data bases

8. AKENTI ARCHITECTURE Cache Manager Fetch Certificate DN Resource Server Client Akenti DN DN Identity (X509) certificate on behalf of the user. Log Server Internet Use condition or attribute certificates LDAP File Servers Database Server Web Server DN Identity certificates Certificate Servers

9. AKENTI CERTIFICATE MANAGMENT Stakeholders S3 S4 S1 S2 Certificate Generator C4(S4) C1(S1) C2(S2) C3(S3) Certificate Servers Akenti Hash Generator Search based on resource name, user DN, and attribute

10. Emphasis on usability • Akenti certificate generators provide a user friendly interface for stakeholders to specify the use constraints for their resources. • User or stakeholder can see a static view of the policy that controls the use of a resource. • Akenti Monitor applet provides a Web interface for a user to check his access to a resource to see why it succeeded or failed.

11. Vulnerabilities • Distributed certificates might not be available when needed. • Independent stakeholders may create a policy that is inconsistent with what they intend. Easy to deny all access.

12. Related Work • Ellison, et.al. SPKI - authorization certificates • Nekander & Partanen (HUT) SPKI style certificates for access permissions on Java code. To replace per/machine Java policy files. • Blaze,Feigenbaum Policy Maker and KeyNote based on authorization certificates written in a specified executable language. • Foster, Kesselman Globus Use of X.509 identity certificates to authenticate users. • Ryutov, Neuman Generic Authorization and Access-control API - and IETF draft standard t define an interface for authorization.

13. Status • Akenti enabled Apache Web servers deployed at LBNL and Sandia. • Controlling Akenti code distribution, secure data/image repository, ORNL electronic notebooks • We have given code to CONDOR, Univ. of Wisc., WebFlow at Syracuse Univ., NIST, and ISI/USC • Servers run on Solaris, but client code runs on Linux as well • Java interface to Akenti policy engine exists and is used by the Anchor agent code.

14. Future Directions • Implement Akenti as a standalone server • Expand Use Conditions to include dynamic variables such as time-of-day, originating IP address, state variables. • Change syntax of certificates, probably to XML. We already have a Matchmaker want-ad style in addition to our original key-word/value syntax. • Add delegation - probably in the form of authorization certificates • Integrate with additional applications • Network bandwidth Quality of service, • Secure Mobile agents, • Group key agreement protocol.

15. Conclusions • As enterprises deploy PKI, identifying users by their identity certificates will become natural and transparent. • Currently there are several competing standards • browsers, Netscape and Explorer • Entrust - own client interface • Akenti/SSL overhead acceptable for medium grained access checking. E.g , starting an operation, making a authenticated connection. • Ease of use for stakeholders must be emphasized.