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Auctions

Auctions. Resource Bundling and Allocation Charles Snyder. Bundles. Programs use multiple resources Combine resources into one package CPU, Memory, Disk Space, Bandwidth EC2 Instances Users can buy to suit their needs. Why Auctions?. No need to determine price Let the market decide

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Auctions

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  1. Auctions Resource Bundling and Allocation Charles Snyder

  2. Bundles • Programs use multiple resources • Combine resources into one package • CPU, Memory, Disk Space, Bandwidth • EC2 Instances • Users can buy to suit their needs

  3. Why Auctions? • No need to determine price • Let the market decide • Bidders divide the pool of resources • Maximizes profit

  4. Walrasian Auctions • Bidders determine how much they’re willing to buy at each price • Auctioneer finds lowest price that sells everything • Match supply and demand • Fair distribution of limited resources • Maximize profit • Inconvenient for bidders, complex for auctioneer

  5. Simultaneous Clock Auction • Auctioneer sets a price • Bidders say how much they’ll buy at current price • If demand is higher than supply, raise the price • Clock-Proxy Auction • After clock auction, give a proxy the bid strategy • New round with only proxy bidders • Give some market information, but not all

  6. Difficulties • Large bidders can overshadow small bidders • Demand reduction • Influence price or other bidders • “Clinching” – sell undisputed bundles • Activity Rules • Can’t bid for more as price increases • Difficult for bundles • Limit Information

  7. Resources • L. Ausubel and P. Cramton. “Auctioning many divisible goods.” Journal European Economic Assoc., 2(2-3):480-493, 2004. • L. Ausubel, P. Cramton, and P. Milgrom. “The clock-proxy auction: a practical combinatorial auction design.” Chapter 5, in Combinatorial Auctions, P. Cramton, Y. Shoham, and R. Steinberg, Eds. MIT Press, 2006.

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