WTO Doha Round: Japan’s Position

1. CPL2 561 781 North America and Global Economy WTO Doha Round: Japan’s Position Presented by: Kyoo Son260099687 Minh Ho260204029

2. Table of Content • Agriculture • Services • Market Access for Non-Agricultural Products • TRIPS • Singaporean Issues • Fisheries • Dispute Settlement • Anti-dumping

3. Agriculture: Position • Doha's Official Ministerial Declaration • Japan's unyielding position • Prime importance of multi-benefits of agriculture for the country

4. Agriculture: Analysis • The world's biggest net importer Figure 2.017,18

5. Agriculture: Analysis • Concentration of food production Figure 2.119

6. Agriculture: Analysis • Central Union of Agricultural Cooperatives' lobby

7. Services: Maximizing trade liberalization Figure 2.216

8. Services: Maritime Transport Figure 2.320,21,22,23

9. Services: Energy Figure 2.424p1

10. Services: Misc. • Education • MFN Exemptions

11. Market Access for Non Agricultural Products • Tariff peaks and tariff escalations • The United States have generally low tariffs but apply tariff peaks on sensitive sectors such as textile, footwear, leather goods and jewelry • Japan asked for elimination of tariff peaks and stated that they should be rectified efficiently. • Position supported by countries like South Korea and Norway • Norway stated that the current unbalance tariffs make it difficult for developing countries to receive value for their raw materials

12. Market Access for Non Agricultural Products • Tariff reduction formulas Three possible types of formulas Formula approach • Tariff reductions are applied to all non agricultural products • More pressure and reductions on sensitive sectors, US against this approach • Support from EC, Korea, Canada and Japan Request-offer-approach • Bilateral agreements with offer lists on tariff reductions; US for this approach Zero-for-zero approach • Extensively used in Uruguay Round; Tariff reductions on a product for entire Market

13. Japanese Position on Tariff reduction formulas • It suggested that is was open to both the formula approach as well as the “zero-for-zero” and “harmonization” (formula) approach, assuming there is meaningful participation by as many Members as possible • Japan has the lowest tariff on manufacturing goods • After Uruguay Round, Japan significantly reduced tariffs on textiles. • 70% of textile products are imports • Most of imports come from China

14. Table 1

15. TRIPS (Trade related Aspects to Intellectual Property Rights) • Compulsory Licensing African countries wanted the simplification in notifications to import generic drugs Japanese position is that the notification obligations such as specifying in advance the name and the exact quantity is necessary to ensure drugs are not re-exported. The position is shared by developed countries like EU, Switzerland and US who are major patented medicines producers.

16. TRIPS Discussions on these issues have largely focused on whether the TRIPS Agreement should be made to require applicants to disclose the country of origin and source of any genetic material/TK used either in the research and development process and/or directly in the invention they seek to patent. This could include providing evidence of prior informed consent of the country/community of origin, and how they intend to share the benefits arising from the commercialization of the invention with the country/ community of origin. Japan and US are firmly opposed. They believe it will be a burden to patent system US and Japan hold respectively 40% and 14% of biotechnological patents. They are the largest patent holders (OECD 2002 report).

17. Singapore Issues Singapore issues included discussions in areas such as government procurement, investment, competition and trade facilitation. Only trade facilitation remained on the negotiation table in this Round. Japan pushed for multilateral rules regarding the investment that could replace existing bilateral investment rules It issued reports that lack of transparency, regulations, laws and lack of information were major obstacles for Japanese firms investing in foreign countries In trade facilitation issue, Japan, the EC, Canada and the United States had submitted proposals that would require clarification of customs procedures, including fees, penalties, appeal of decisions, and introduction of an advance ruling system Developing countries are against on these issues because of lack of resources in implementing those rules and the sovereignty issues

18. Fisheries Subsidies Friends of Fish countries asked for elimination of fisheries subsidies to promote environment and trade. They stated that subsidies were responsible for depletion of fishing stocks. Japan stated subsidies themselves are not causing illegal fishing or depletion of reserves. The fish stock depletion was caused by inadequate management. But, in 2004 report, it stated there should be some disciplines regarding subsidies. Friends of Fish favor for bottom-up-approach that prohibits for general elimination of subsidies with some exemptions Japan favors for top-down approach. Position shared by Taiwan and Korea

19. Fisheries Subsidies cont’d • Japan is already highly dependent on fish imports. The subsidies in fisheries are needed to support revenues for remaining independent fishers . The population living on fisheries is growing old and diminishing. Fishing is small scale and rather rudimentary in Japan.

20. Fisheries Subsidies cont’d

21. Dispute Settlement Understanding • Japan and EU jointly made submission about the procedure to be followed when a Member under trade sanction notifies the WTO that it has brought the condemned measures into compliance with the dispute settlement ruling. They suggested that if that the Member applying the sanctions does not request a compliance panel within 60 days of notification, the DSB shall, upon request, withdraw the authorization to retaliate. • Japan and EU want the parties applying the sanctions bear the burden to prove its case. A country applying the sanctions for retaliation has interests to not lift them even after another country under sanctions have made measures of compliances and reported to WTO.

22. Anti-dumping: Position • A tool of choice of protectionists • Making unsubstantiated investigation requests more difficult • Clarifying the meaning of "dumped imports“ • Increasing the current de-minimis dumping margin

23. Anti-dumping: Analysis • A target of anti-dumping investigations Figure 2.525,26

24. Anti-dumping: Analysis • Antidumping investigation results Figure 2.625,27

25. Conclusion

26. References • 1: Http://Www.Sidley.Com/Db30/Cgi-Bin/Pubs/Dohaupdate.Pdf • 2: WTO document G/Ag/Ng/W/91: Negotiating Proposal By Japan On Wto Agricultural Negotiations • 3: Http://Www.Mofa.Go.Jp/Policy/Economy/Wto/Min99/Agri.Html • 4:Http://Www.Cedla.Uva.Nl/Pdf/Agriculture's%20Multifunctionality%20and%20the%20WTO,%20Kym%20Anderson.Pdf • 5: Http://Www.Mofa.Go.Jp/Policy/Economy/Wto/Min99/Service.Html • 6: WTO document S/CSS/W/137: Negotiating Proposal On Education Services • 7: WTO document S/CSS/W/42/Suppl.3: Negotiation Proposal On Energy Services • 8: WTO document S/CSS/W/42: The Negotiations On Trade In Services • 9: WTO document Tn/Rl/Gen/124: Proposal On Procedure Of Providing Non-Confidential Application • 10: WTO document Tn/Rl/Gen/65/Rev.1: Proposal On Dumped Imports • 11: “Whither The Wto?” Http://Www.Freetrade.Org/Pubs/Pas/Tpa-023.Pdf • 12: Http://Www.Mofa.Go.Jp/Policy/Economy/Wto/Min99/Anti-Dump.Html • 13: WTO document Tn/Rl/Gen/30/Rev.1: Proposal On De Minimis Margins Of Dumping • 14: http://www.cfr.org/publication/8058/on_japan.html • 15: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Union_of_Agricultural_Cooperatives • 16: http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2005_e/its05_byregion_e.pdf • 17: http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2004_e/section4_e/iv08.xls • 18: http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2004_e/section4_e/iv09.xls • 19: http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2004_e/section4_e/iv07b.xls • 20: http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2000/section3/iii78.xls • 21: http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2002_e/section3_e/iii80.xls • 22: http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2004_e/section3_e/iii79.xls

27. References, cont’d • 23: http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2006_e/section3_e/iii76.xls • 24: http://www.fpcj.jp/e/mres/publication/ff/pdf/12_energy.pdf • 25: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_stattab1_e.xls • 26: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_stattab2_e.xls • 27: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_stattab6_e.xls • 28: http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2005_e/section1_e/i07.xls • 29: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2007/february/tradoc_133290.pdf • 30: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/51/59/36760212.pdf • 31: http://www.stat.go.jp/English/data/handbook/c05cont.htm • 32: http://www.ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/06Sep/RL33634.pdf • 33: http://www.iie.com • 34: http://www.ictsd.org/pubs/dohabriefings/Doha_Hong_Kong_Update.pdf • 35: http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/negotiations/wto_bulletin/2007/wto_bulletin_070201.html • 36: http://www.ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/06Oct/RL33144.pdf • 37: http://www.meti.go.jp/english/information/data/cWTOnonag_a1e.html • 38: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/51/59/36760212.pdf