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Public Expenditure Review of National Agricultural Input Voucher Scheme (NAIVS) September 2013. Study conducted by: Department of Policy and Planning (MAFC) Policy Research for Development (REPOA) World Bank Purpose: Review gains achieved Evaluate gains relative to costs Summarize lessons.
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Public Expenditure Review of National Agricultural Input Voucher Scheme (NAIVS)September 2013
Study conducted by: • Department of Policy and Planning (MAFC) • Policy Research for Development (REPOA) • World Bank • Purpose: • Review gains achieved • Evaluate gains relative to costs • Summarize lessons
Objectives of NAIVS • Raise domestic grain production in order to: • reduce the probability of imports in the face of the 2008 global price increase, and • reduce the rate of food price inflation
Global (and regional) maize prices had sharply increased in 2008 Rising grain prices NAIVS initiated
Objectives of NAIVS • Increase adoption rates of improved seed and fertilizer • Introduce potential new adopters to improved seed and fertilizer • Share the risks of experimentation with these inputs • Encourage successful graduation to commercial purchases
Global fertilizer prices (e.g. urea) had increased even more Rising fertilizer prices
Households Targeted • Full time farmer • Household cultivates less than 1 ha maize & rice • Farmer willing to use inputs following recommended practices • Farmer willing and able to pay 50% of the input costs (top-up) • Priority given to female headed households, & farmers not using improved seed & fertilizer in previous 5 years ie. “middle class”, not the poorest
Regions Targeted From 2009, the program was being expanded into drier parts of the country, and more outlying areas
NAIVS Strategy • Farmer receives 3 vouchers (for 1 acre) • Maize or rice seed • Basal fertilizer (50 kg) • Top dress fertilizer (50 kg) • Bring 50% cash top-up to local agro-dealer and trade with voucher for inputs • Agro-dealer gets voucher countersigned by DALDO, and redeemed for remaining 50% of input costs at National Microfinance Bank • Farmer ‘graduates’ after 3 years of assistance
NAIVS Coverage and Costs • In addition, World Bank funding under the Accelerated Food Security Project • supported • strengthening of seed production systems; • training of agro-dealers; • iii) independent impact surveys.
Implementation Challenges • Delays in printing and distribution of vouchers (esp 2011/12 season) • Delays in delivery of inputs • Delays in payment of agro-dealers & seed & fertilizer suppliers • Misallocation/misuse of vouchers
Did the NAIVS improve national food security? • 2009/10 to 2012/13 (last 4 years) • Approximately 2.4 million t additional maize • Worth about Tsh 840 billion (farmgate = Tsh 350) • Worth about Tsh 1.34 trillion (import parity =Tsh 560) • Approximately 71,000 t additional paddy • Worth about Tsh 42 billion (farmgate = Tsh600)
Did the NAIVS improve maize and paddy yields (kg/ha)? • Average yield gain across all households • maize 420.3 kg/acre [ave vouchers redeemed 2.5] • rice 286.5 kg/acre [ave vouchers redeemed 2.2] • Because • vouchers were late (or not delivered) • Inputs were late • Vouchers were shared • Voucher were sold
But is the use of improved seed and fertilizer profitable?
NAIVS input package is unprofitable for “average farmer” at 2012 prices
Benefit cost ratio Maize • At commercial farmgate prices: -20% to +93% ie. No immediate investment return • At import parity prices: -12% to +501% Paddy At commercial farmgate prices: -29% to +50%
Maize Yield Frequency Distribution – 2010/11 Fertilizer is not profitable Fertilizer is profitable
Did farmers successfully graduate? • 60% of expected graduates (after 3 years) still received vouchers a fourth year • Another family member enrolled? • Graduates purchasing inputs without vouchers
Key Factors Influencing Return on Investment • Fertilizer Use Efficiency (kg grain per kg N) • Farmgate cost of inputs • High transport costs; High costs of Late Payment • Farmgate Price of grain product • Surplus vs deficit region • Time of sales after harvest
Conclusions • NAIVS offers a positive rate of return if this reduces purchases of expensive imported grain – esp maize • NAIVS offers little or no return based on domestic farmgate prices for grain surplus households ------ Use the subsidy to reduce dependence on imports, but not to expand exports
Conclusions • NAIVS offers a negative rate of return if the subsidy displaces commercial input purchases which would otherwise have taken place --- Once farmers understand the value of a new variety or fertilizer, and can use these inputs well, they should find then profitable, and pay for them on their own
Conclusions • NAIVS has contributed to improving adoption of improved seed and fertilizer – based on continuing purchases after graduation ----- Commercial seed and fertilizer companies are optimistic about further commercial market growth
Conclusions • Fertilizer is not financially profitable unless fertilizer use efficiency is high – e.g. for better farm managers • Need more extension support • Better targeting of nutrients ------ Investments in speeding the adoption of improved seed offer much higher rates of return than investments in speeding fertilizer adoption
Conclusions • Graduation can also be facilitated with improvements in marketing efficiency E.g. • bulk purchase of inputs to reduce cost; • sell inputs when crop sold; • strengthen credit supply; • improved product market efficiency leading to improved prices: warehousing, auctions, etc
Footnote: Returns to Seed • 290,000 households given 2.5 kg sorghum seed • Cost of delivery Tsh 402 million • Average yield gain 10% • Value of yield gain Tsh 870 million • Benefit cost ratio 216% in year one [but benefit cost ratio for same OPV variety in year two is negative] Returns to public investment in getting new varieties to farmers are very high