Government alternation and legislative agenda setting

1. Governmentalternationand legislative agendasetting A presentationby: Alica Jung, Marco Carotta, Juliette Dubois, Katharina Dahms

2. Main questions • WhatarethereasonsfortheevolutionoftheExecutive‘sagendasetting power? • Whichmethodscanbeused in ordertocontrol legislative agendas? • Whatarethedistinctivecharacteristicsofthedevelopment?

3. Explanation fortheincreaseoftheExecutive‘s power in lawmaking • What have been drivers for this evolution? • What are the characteristics of the increase of power?

4. Historical approach • Under which circumstances was the constitution composed? • End of World War II: Italy was deeply divided and ideologically polarized • proportional representation • congruent and symmetric bicameralism • Relatively weak Executive

5. Executive‘srole in lawmakingaccordingtotheItalianconstitution Ordinaryprocedure (art.72) • nospecialrole/ same positionasany MP accordingtobillproposal • disadvantage: • Every billneedstobeapprovedbycommitee, floorandotherchamber = longprocedure Other procedures • decentralized • decreelaw • delegatinglaw

6. Decentralizedprocedure (sedelegislativa) decentralizedprocedure(sedelegislativa) • whole legislative proceduretakespart in thecommitee • crucialplayers: membersofcommitee (1/5+1) , floor (1/10+1), responsibileministers • veto power • onlyundertheconditionof quasi unanimityofcommiteeandfloor • possibilitytoskipthefloor

7. Decrease of decentralized procedure

8. Decree law procedure • undertheconditionofnecessityandurgency (!) • Executive passes a billwithoutapprovementofparliament • 60 daysforconvertingthedecreelawinto a regularlaw • otherwisetheformerlawis valid again • disadvantage: any MP in thecommitteeandfloorcanproposechanges outcome not whatgovernmentintended • extensive useofreissuing non converteddecrees • Constitutional Court‘ssentence in 1996: reiussing not possibileanymore • StrenghteningtheExecutive‘s power

9. Development of Decree laws[converted/not converted (reiussed)]

10. Delegating law procedure • a lawwith a section (delega) thatdelegatestheresponsibiltytoproclaim a newlaw (legislative decree) • a generalframeworkand a deadlineisgivenbytheparliament • advantage: • last wordby Executive • in casetheframeworkofthelawistoofarfromtheExecutive‘sdesires: refusalpossible • thereforeExecutive‘sdesiresconsideredin advance • most powerful evidencefortheExecutive‘sincreaseof power

11. Delegatinglawsanddeleghe (1963-2007)

12. Modification of executive role: • italian executive was one of the weakest in the world • attempts of the legislative to fight filibustering, obstructionism and centralize the agenda formation • it failed, just strengthened internal bodies • Chamber of deputies did not give the executive a special role

13. 1971:new standing orders: no improvement • end of the 1971: party fragmentation started increasing • 1980’s: government still had not any decisive role in planning the business • 1988 in Senate, 1990 in chamber of deputies: for the first time executive’s indications were one of the source for planning parliament activity • end of the 1990’s: government won the right to present the conference of group chairpersons • but no special proposal or voting rights about planning parliamentary activity

14. problems: • the amendment is not necessarily the last one and come only from executive • in the senate: executive has as many privileges as the committee • in the chamber of deputies: (beginning 1980’s) abnormal submission of amendments

15. most important change about voting and amendments (1988): • the chamber of deputies standing orders require two distinct voting, the first one on the article and the final on the bill • the so-called maxi amendments

16. Maxi amendments • When was the issue raised ? • In 2004 the President of the Republic reminded us about a principle in the Italian procedure for the vote of law : the bills must be approved section by section. • In this particulare case he reproaches that the articles are two long. • This anomaly is an italian practice called « maxi amendments »

17. What are maxi amendments : • It's a way for the Government to pass laws easier : • at last minute, a single amendment replaces all of the sections of a bill. • To the amendment, a question of confidence is attached so that : • 1) the bill has the priority • II) It’s difficult for MPs to vote against

18. Consequences : • Then the processus goes really faster • The final content really looks like what the government wants, • The bargaining equilibrium shifts to the executive area : the executive leads the legislative process

19. Harmful consequences : • Less understandable, • More difficult to amend, • Lack of constitutionality ? (as the pdt said, sections must be. Show a lack of cohesion from the government, which needs a « trick » to pass his laws • Lack of cohesion from the government, which needs a « trick » to pass his laws in the Parliament

20. When did it appear ? • Already existed during the First Republic but is widely utilized during the 2nd Republic. • At first it concerned only decree laws, but then was extended to any bill. • Started to be used a lot under the 13th and 14th legislatures (2 maxi amendments during the 10th, and 24 during the 14th).

21. Budgetary process • A legislative sequence for the vote of budget was defined for the first time in 1978. • Why ? Because of the bad financial results, and the bad management of its provision

22. How does it work ? • They introduced a government financial bill and a financial parliamentary session • The Executive instruments that we've studied before are used aswell for the budget • The procedure was changed 3 times since 1978

23. The rationalization of the budgetary process increased the agenda-setting power of the Presidents of the Chambers and of the Budget Committees. • He can : • “declare inadmissible any amendments and additional sections dealing with subjects that are unrelated to the Finance and Budget bills”. • decide to set aside the measures unrelated to the subject according to the law. • ask to re-table amendments during the Floor aswell.

24. Impact of the introduction of a budgetary process • The importance of the Europeanization makes difficult to estimate the impact • But according to the text, the financial goals established by the money government bills seem to have been substantially respected up to 2001

25. A tentativeexplanation • Demand of strong executive’srolehasmet an increase of exceptionalinstruments • Delegatinglaws • Deleghe • Degreelaws • Big changes in italianpoliticalsystem • End of old parties • New electoralrules(bipolarism)

26. differencesbetween I and II republic • Italian first republic • Onlyone party can rule : Dc (with ally) • No governmentwill be possible just with Msi and Pci • Onlychangementduring a long periodis party fragmentation • Italiansecondrepublic • Twobroadcoalitions • Bothcoalition can rule

28. Growing of delegatinglaws and deleghe in the ‘90 • Financial crisis No integration in european union • No decreasing of deleghe and delegatinglaws, the alternationhadbecome a realpossibility • In ’96 the leftiestcoalition in italianhistoryat the government • 2001 a center-right coalitionrighterthan Dc

29. Italian policy space: I and II republic

30. Whatmeansalternation? • In new governmentcoalition status quo is far enough to overcome the existingtransactioncoststhatplague a stillfragmentedcoalitiongovernment, and allow the policy change by a change in the allocation of the agenda settingpower. • For some of the government parties could be more convenient a no policy change. A relativelybaddecision can be convenient for a party member of the governmentifit can prevent the alternation.

31. Whyuntilnowwehavenotchanged the formalrules? • Formalchangesreinforced the Executive: • Some of the new formalrulesneed to be passed by costitutionallaws • The twocoalitionfind a reformusefulwhenthey are member of the government and dangerouswhenthey are atopposition. • Pro-executive changes in the parliamentary standing order are easier to be done: • Theyneedonly the absolutemajority of MP’s(No popular referendum required) • Crucialrole of the presidents of the chambers

32. conclusion • Hypothesisisthat the istitutional or proceduralchangefollows the samelogic of the policy change. • The alternationhelps the delegation of the agenda settingpower • It changes the set of veto players increasing instability • It introduces a prospective change of veto players in the strategic calculationsmoving the reverse point farther than the present SQ • We should expect to find a strengthening of the government agenda setting where • The alternation is more frequent • Distance between alternative government is larger • Veto players pareto set is small