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Pablo Nemiña National University of San Martín

Conference on Reforming the Bretton Woods Institutions Danish Institute for International Studies Copenhagen, September 16-17, 2009. Accomplishments and limitations of the recent reforms in the IMF’s lending facilities and conditionality. Results of the empirical evidence. Pablo Nemiña

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Pablo Nemiña National University of San Martín

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  1. Conference on Reforming the Bretton Woods InstitutionsDanish Institute for International StudiesCopenhagen, September 16-17, 2009 Accomplishments and limitations of the recent reforms in the IMF’s lending facilities and conditionality. Results of the empirical evidence Pablo Nemiña National University of San Martín Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas National Scientific and Technical Research Council

  2. Objectives • IMF Reform (end-March 2009) • Lending Policy • Conditionality Policy • Accomplishments: • Augmentation of credits magnitude • Focusing conditionality in core areas • Limitations: • Increased emphasis on public expenditure adjustment • Continuity of the orthodox orientation

  3. Antecedents • Legitimation by G20 • Resources triplication up to USD 750B: • Industrialized countries direct contributions • Selling part of gold reserves • Issuance of Securities • Allocation of SDR 250B • Reform of Lending and Conditionality Policy

  4. IMF Reform • Lending Policy: • Flexible Credit Line (FCL) • Duplication of normal access limits in Stand-By (SBA) • Larger frontloading of access • Decrease of review frequency

  5. IMF Reform (cont.) • Conditionality Policy: • Less ex-post conditions and more pre-qualification criteria • Discontinuation of structural performance criteria • Focusing in central expertise areas: finance, monetary, fiscal and exchange rate variables

  6. Empirical evidence about financing policy

  7. Empirical evidence about financing policy

  8. Empirical evidence about financing policy

  9. Empirical evidence about financing policy

  10. Empirical evidence about conditionality policy • Methodology: • It were analyzed all the conditionalities included in the Staff Reports elaborated during that period. • A database was created containing 102 quantitative and 166 structural conditionalities, included in 16 Stand-By Agreements and its revisions.

  11. Empirical evidence about conditionality policy

  12. Empirical evidence about conditionality policy

  13. Empirical evidence about conditionality policy

  14. Empirical evidence about conditionality policy

  15. Concluding Remarks • IMF Post-Reform: an old version renewed. • Noveltys: • Larger lending. • High financing without ex post conditionalities (FCL). • Focusing of structural conditionalities in core areas. • Certain interest for protecting vulnerable sectors • Continuities: • Orthodox framework: adjustment with free capital mobility. • Public expenditure adjustments as preconditions.

  16. Thank You! Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas National Scientific and Technical Research Council

  17. Empirical evidence about financing policy

  18. Empirical evidence about conditionality policy

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