Just War Theory

1. Just War Theory

2. Origins of the Just War Theory • Western Origin • Developed over time • Romans affirmed right-authority and proportionality • Influenced by Christianity • Late middle ages before concept is completed and incorporated

3. Just War Theory • Best conceived as cultural consensus • Theory rests on Nine Propositions • Seven in the jus ad bellum category; Going to war • Two in the jus in bello category; Prosecuting war

4. Just War Criteria:Rightness or Justice in going to War • Just Cause • Competent Authority • Comparative Justice • Right Intention • Last Resort • Probability of Success • Proportionality of Ends

5. Just War Criteria:Rightness or Justice in Prosecuting War • Proportionately of means • Discrimination/non-combatant immunity

6. Just War According to Aquinas • Those who wage war justly aim at peace! • Three criteria need to be met: • Authority of the ruler • Just cause • Rightful intention

7. Shift Towards Legal Basis • Protestant Reformation • Expanding International Law • War becoming more Deadly • De-emphasis of Chivalry • General shift from jus ad bellum to jus in bello • Rise of National Sovereignty

8. Legal Basis in 20th Century • De-emphasis of Sovereignty; Thinking in terms beyond the nation state • Creation of League of Nations • Kellogg-Brian Pact of 1928 • Article 6 of the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal • United Nations • the legal basis for use of force is found in the UN charter

9. Article 2, Section 4 “All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations”

10. Article 51 “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of the individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security”

11. United Nations Charter • Essentially allows only one cause of war: The cause is self defense in response to aggression • Nations can defend themselves and other nations may come to the defense of nations which are the victims of aggression

12. Problems with Charter • Does not require armed intervention to halt human right abuses including genocide • Reluctance to act until the number of victims reaches staggering proportions • Sovereignty rights are more important than prevention of genocide • Stems from lack of sanctions in the international community

13. Legalist Paradigm • Concept of Michael Walzer in Just and Unjust Wars • Based on international laws, treaties, and provisions of UN • Only one reason for fighting; Defense of Rights • All others are ruled out

14. Key Provision of Paradigm • There exists an international society of independent states • This international society has a law that establishes the rights of its members- above all, the rights of territorial integrity • Any use of force or imminent threat of force by one state against the political sovereignty of territorial integrity or another constitutes aggression and is a criminal act • Aggression justifies two kinds of violent response: a war of self-defense by the victim and a war of law enforcement by the victim and any other member of international society • Nothing but aggression can justify war • Once the aggressors state has been repulsed, it can also be punished

15. Problems with Legalist Paradigm • Only self-defense or mutual defense in response to aggression can justify resort to force • Inability to deal with violence initiated by states against their own citizens • Primacy afforded to sovereignty rather than to human rights • Failure to differentiate between combatant and non-combatant

16. Weinberger Doctrine • Stemmed from: • Lessons learned in Vietnam War • Sense of paralysis the U.S. felt following the war • Inadequacy of the legalist paradigm • Emergence of the Reagan Doctrine

17. Criteria of the Weinberger Doctrine • Only commit troops if it is deemed vital to our national interests or that of our allies • If we do send troops, only do so wholeheartedly and with the clear intention of winning otherwise do no commit them at all • If we do commit troops then we must have clearly defined political and military objectives • Relationship between our objectives and the forces we have committed must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary • Must have reasonable assurance that the public will support the action • The commitment of U.S. Forces to combat should be the last resort

18. Doctrine to Intervention • Force used to deter terrorist acts in Libya • Fall of the Soviet Union • Successful intervention in Grenada

19. Appeal to National Interests Commit force wholeheartedly Stating Clear Objectives Relationship between Objectives and Forces Public Support Last Resort What are they and who decides them? Flawed Constitutionally Hard to define, articulate, and legitimize Not enough forces to deal with a range of potential interests Always precarious in democracy May be much easier and save lives if done earlier Problems with Weinberger

20. Meaning of the Doctrine • Application of the paradigm is not automatic, thus there is discrimination in its use • Forestall the use of Force • Intervention leads to a moral calculus • Governments that violate rights and self determination are at intervention risk • Legalist Paradigm creates problems; • Lacks response to violence by non-state entities, no distinction between combatants and non, and lack of sanction to prevent genocide

21. Weinberger and Panama • Does the Weinberger Doctrine adhere to the invasion of Panama?

22. Analysis of Panama • Was the invasion in the national interest of the United States? Four reasons why it was in the best interest: 1. Right to conduct rescue missions to protect U.S. military personnel, nationals and installations 2. Right of self-determination over Noriega’s government claims of sovereignty 3. Asserted legal right to protect its territorial integrity against the shipment of narcotics 4. Right to enforce provision of the Panama Canal Treaty

23. Was an adequate force used in the invasion and did we go about the operation wholeheartedly? • The operation involved 24,000 and the key military objectives were achieved in a matter of hours Where the goals clearly defined both politically and militarily? Prior to the invasion, the State Department issued a press guidance outlining the political goals of the operation. All goals were met and as previously stated the military goals were achieved in matter of hours.

24. Was the relationship between objectives and our forces continually reassessedand was there public support? • Both of these criteria were met due to the short duration of the invasion, neither became necessary. Was in fact the invasion a last resort? The invasion was not an early or precipitous one

25. Apply to Bosnia • National Interests • Wholeheartedly Involvement • Defined Goals and Objectives • Continually Reassessed • Public Support • Last Resort

26. Critical Thinking • Can Nuclear war ever be justified by any of the doctrines? • How about Biological and Chemical Warfare? • Terrorism? • War over Oil?

27. Classic Theory Just Cause Competent Authority Comparative Justice Right Intention Last Resort Probability of Success Proportionality of Ends Proportionately of means Discrimination/non-combatant immunity Weinberger Doctrine National Interests Wholeheartedly Involvement Defined Goals and Objectives Continually Reassessed Public Support Last Resort Apply • Legalist paradigm • Independent States • Territory integrity • Force by one state against another act of aggression and is criminal • Justifiable by war of self-defense or law enforcement • Nothing but aggression can justify war • Once the aggressor has been repulsed, it can also be punished

28. Conduct of War Ethics for the Military Leader, 2nd edition pages 411-472 Fundamentals of Naval Leadership pages 25-1 to 25-27, and 27-1 to 27-3 Ethics and Moral Reasoning for Military Leaders Lesson 21: pages 21-9 to 21-32 Case Study: pages 21 to 57