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Evaluating Potential Routing Diversity for Internet Failure Recovery. *Chengchen Hu, + Kai Chen , + Yan Chen, *Bin Liu *Tsinghua University, + Northwestern University. Internet Emergency. Emergencies or disasters can lead to substantial Internet disruption Earthquakes, Storms,
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Evaluating Potential Routing Diversity for Internet Failure Recovery *Chengchen Hu, +Kai Chen, +Yan Chen, *Bin Liu *Tsinghua University, +Northwestern University
Internet Emergency Emergencies or disasters can lead to substantial Internet disruption Earthquakes, Storms, Terrorist incident: 9.11 event
Example: Taiwan earthquake incident Large earthquakes hit Luzon Strait, south of Taiwan on 26 December 2006 Only two of nine cross-sea cables not affected All cables reported repaired as of February 14, 2007 Long-term network interruption from Asia to USA Page 3
How reliable the Internet is? • BGP resilience is limited [Wu, CoNEXT’07] • 32% ASes are vulnerable to a single critical customer-provider link cut • 93.7% Tier-1 ISP’s single-homed customers are lost due to Tier-1 depeering • Internet is not as reliable as people expected! • Our question: can we find more resources to increase the Internet reliability under Internet emergency?
Outline • Background and Motivation • Basic Idea • Simulation Study • Conclusion
Basic Idea • Internet eXchange Points (IXPs) • Co-location where multiple ASes exchange their traffic • Participant ASes in an IXP may not be connected via BGP • Internet valley-free routing policy • AS relationships: customer-provider, peering, sibling • Peering relationship won’t allow one peer to carry the traffic from the other peer to its provider • Mentioned in [Wu, CoNEXT’07], without evaluation • How much can we gain from these two potential resources, i.e., IXP and PR?
Dataset • Most complete AS topology • BGP data + P2P traceroute • 120K AS links with relationships • http://aqualab.cs.northwestern.edu/projects/SidewalkEnds.html [Chen et al, CoNEXT’09] • IXP data • PCH + Peeringdb + Euro-IX (~200 IXPs) • 3468 participant ASes
Failure Models • Tier-1 depeering • Cogent and Level3 depeering • Tier-1 provider-customer link teardown • Reported in NANOG • Mixed types of link breakdown • 9.11 event, Taiwan Earthquakes,
Evaluation Metrics • Recovery Ratio • # of recovered <src-dst> AS pairs versus total # of affected <src-dst> AS pairs • Path Diversity • # of increased link-disjoint AS paths between affected <src-dst> AS pairs • Shifted Path • # of link-disjoint AS paths shifted onto a normal link after we use IXP or PR resources
Results: Tier-1 Depeering • 36 experiments for 9 Tier-1 ASes • Recovery ratio
Results: Tier-1 Depeering • Path diversity
Results: Tier-1 Depeering • Shifted path • Different # of shifted AS paths for different links • In average, 3.75 ~ 17.2 for all experiments
Conclusion A first work to evaluate potential routing diversity with the most complete AS map 40%-80% of disconnected <Src, Dst>AS pairs can be recovered via IXP and PR Point out a new venue for Internet emergency recovery
Results: Tier-1 provider-customer links teardown • Recovery ratio • Path diversity • 4.64 for 10 Tier-1 provider-customer links teardown • 4.54 for 20 Tier-1 provider-customer links teardown
Results: Mixed types of links breakdown • Focus on Taiwan earthquake, 9 big victim ASes • Recovery ratio
Results: Mixed types of links breakdown • Path diversity